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This dissertation examines the development of electoral politics in Great Britain 
between 1868 and 1880. It focuses on the general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 
together with the intervening by-elections and explores the impact on popular politics 
of changes in the size and composition of the electorate as well as alterations to the 
electoral system arising from the 1867 Reform Act and the Ballot Act of 1872. It 
further argues that electoral statistics are important and useful but many historians 
have chosen not to use them in relation to this period because of the inherent 
difficulties in their measurement when there was a preponderance of multi-member 
seats. This is corrected by the use of an improved technique - a stratified voter 
methodology - to calculate these statistics more accurately and provide a more 
meaningful basis for analysing voter turnout, swing and related trends. 
Core themes are the nationalisation of popular politics and the development of mass 
support for the Conservative party. These are considered through an exploration of the 
interaction of ideology, language and electoral politics and the ways parties sought to 
build their allegiances and support through ideas, language and organisation. The 
impact of the Ballot Act on corruption, undue influence and party organisation is 
investigated together with the importance of by-elections to the electoral process, 
emphasising their importance in the development and nationalisation of popular 
politics. Finally, a new survey of approximately 900 candidates’ addresses is used to 
show the development of ideology and language, together with the construction of 
national party messages. 
These investigations show the rapid decline of the importance of localised ‘politics of 
place’ in elections in this period but also that local organisation was important to the 
development of national ideology and was more extensive in 1868 than previously 
thought. Overall, the parties, especially the Conservatives in developing their support 
amongst the new electorate, are shown to have had a more adaptable and positive 
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North/South South = south of a Severn-Wash line; north = north of it, not 
including Wales and Scotland. 
Home Counties The counties nearest to London comprising: Surrey, Kent, 
Essex, Middlesex, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire and 
Berkshire. 
The electoral statistics used in this thesis have been prepared using a stratified voter 
methodology. The method of calculating votes in multi-member seats is described in 
Appendix I. The stratification of constituencies has been made according to their 
geographical location in the north or south as defined above. The stratification of 
English boroughs by size is set out below: 
English Boroughs have been classified in size according to their electorates in 1874 so 
that: 
Small = electorates of no more than 1,500 
Medium = electorates of between 1,500 and 7,501  
Large = electorates in excess of 7,500. 
1874 has been used as a reasonable mid-point for the period. The same categorisation 
has been used for the 1868 and 1880 general elections so that the same constituencies 
remain in each category for all three elections in order to maintain consistency. Thus, 
certain constituencies may be slightly smaller than their categorisation at the 1868 
general election, and slightly larger at the 1880 election. As the vast majority of 
constituencies grew at roughly similar rates this is not thought to produce any 





Analysis of the total electorate in English county and borough categories 
 North South 




Counties 35 362,330 47 395,350 
Boroughs <1,501 13 13,725 44 44,767 
Between 1,501 and 
7,500 
33 132,481 46 161,284 
Greater than 7,500 32 630,030 15 357,261 
A listing of the constituencies in each category is given in Appendix IV. 
Since there were far fewer constituencies in Wales and Scotland they have only been 
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A General Election is a transcendent act in the conduct of our national government. The 
satirist has some reason for describing a General Election in the United Kingdom as a 
periodical outbreak, where, with hideous noises and uncouth shows, a turbulent mob 
assembles to demonstrate how small is the faculty they possess for political discrimination. 
We believe this does great injustice to what actually occurs. Beneath the tumult which 
strikes the satirist’s attention there is to be found a solid core of substantial judgements on 





This dissertation is concerned with why people voted the way they did in the three 
general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 and examines the development and 
restructuring of electoral politics in Britain between the Second and Third Reform 
Acts. This introduction seeks to signpost and elaborates the main arguments of the 
dissertation by providing a brief summary of its key themes together with an overview 
of the relevant literature and certain methodological points concerning sources of 
evidence and data. The main findings of the dissertation suggest that a significant 
feature of the changes in electoral politics in this period was the growing 
nationalisation of the issues, language and organisation of popular politics. This is 
shown in subsequent chapters by an examination of candidates’ election addresses 
published at each of the three general elections. These addresses demonstrate a 
remarkable consistency in the issues dealt with and the language used by candidates. 
They are also marked by the notable lack of local issues mentioned. These findings are 
also supported by a review of candidates’ speeches and are further reinforced by an 
investigation of by-elections during the period. By-elections are shown to have 
provided the opportunity for the public debate of almost wholly national issues. 
The dissertation further seeks to show that the increasingly national nature of electoral 
politics in this period was supported and encouraged by a number of changes in the 
environment in which electoral politics was conducted. These included significant 
developments in the changes to the legislative environment through the Reform Act 
and the Ballot Act (which brought concomitant changes in party organisation) and in 
the growth and influence of print media,. The following paragraphs expand on these 
influences and their impact on the conduct of electoral politics. 
                                                 
1
 The Times, 13 November 1869.  
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 The first set of changes which influenced the nationalisation of electoral 
politics in this period arose from the impact of legislative changes on the electoral 
environment. The Second Reform Act of 1867 was arguably the most important 
electoral development of the nineteenth century, for, whilst the Great Reform Act of 
1832 was intended by its creators as a final step, after 1867 there were few who 
doubted that the remaining steps to full adult male enfranchisement would follow.
2
 As 
a result, the extension of the county franchise by the Third Reform Act in 1884/85 
became simply an extension of those developments that had already been under way 
for 18 years. The majority of electors who went to the hustings in 1868 had never 
voted before. The Act had nearly doubled the electorate and had enfranchised more 
than one million, mainly working- class, electors whose political allegiances were 
largely untested. Despite Conservative attempts to ameliorate the potential impact of 
this increase through the management of the distribution of parliamentary seats, the 
size and nature of this change became a formative influence on the development of a 
party orientated national electoral politics. 
Further profound changes in the conduct of electoral politics came from the 
1872 Ballot Act which not only brought secret voting for the first time to British 
parliamentary elections but also changed the procedure for the nomination of 
candidates, abolishing the ancient requirement that prospective candidates mount the 
hustings and face the public during their selection process.
3
 Other changes also came 
through the widening of the interpretation of the 1867 franchise provisions through 
judicial interpretation and legislation leading to further increases in the numbers 
eligible to vote. 
The expansion of the electorate and the Ballot Act’s changes to the electoral 
framework had profound effects on the organisation of political parties. An electorate 
which had nearly doubled in size also needed organising – at any rate that was the 
strong opinion of contemporaries. In an article for the Fortnightly Review written just 
after the passage of the 1867 Act, Frederic Harrison underlined the importance of 
organisation when he wrote: 
                                                 
2
 Gertrude Himmelfarb, 'The Politics of Democracy: The English Reform Act of 1867',  Journal of 
British Studies, 6 (1966), 97-138. See also J. P. Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in 
Victorian Britain, (London, 1993), p. 280 where he says the 1867 Act ‘created illogical arrangements 
which had no claim to ‘finality’ and which made further change irresistible’. 
3
 Jon Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair, (Oxford, 
2009), p. 45. 
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There can be no doubt that that working men are not likely to arrive instantaneously at 
the mysteries of the sixty-one clauses and seven schedules of the Act which the House 
of Commons found it so hard to follow, and crowds of potential electors will not come 
into the register at all. This, however, is a question of time and party organisation 
alone. As soon as the working of the Act is properly understood, and when any 
adequate object is open as the prize of electioneering energy, the new engine will be 




Developments in party organisation also contributed to the nationalisation of 
electoral politics in this period. The massive increase in the electorate, the abolition of 
the hustings and the introduction of the secret ballot also drove significant changes in 
party organisation. This loss of the hustings meant electors no longer declared their 
vote in public and the canvass and its organisation took on increased importance as the 
sole means of identifying a party’s supporters. The ballot increased the number of 
polling stations which had to be monitored. There was no longer a clear-cut means of 
determining the progress of the vote and whether a party’s known supporters had been 
brought to the polls. Greatly extended local organisation and techniques were needed 
to remedy these problems. The development of national party organisations in this 
period was a contributing factor to the nationalisation of politics and the growth of 
organisation at a national level has generally been well researched by historians. It is 
an important argument of this dissertation that there were also significant 
developments in the growth of grass-roots organisations, particularly Conservative 
associations seeking to anticipate and respond to the expansion of the electorate.  
This growth in local organisations together with the expansion of print media is 
shown to have further emphasised the importance of language and rhetoric used in 
political communications. As a result, the period showed significant developments in 
the language, as well as the symbols and imagery, of the messages of the political 
parties.
5
 The nationalisation of political discourse and the growing influence of central 
party organisation also meant that a consistency developed in the language and 
presentation of these messages. 
The changing dynamics of political communication in this period and the 
Conservatives’ suspicion of the new electorate gave them some cause for anxiety about 
the party political consequences of the Reform Act. Their fears seemed to be 
confirmed by the resounding Liberal victory in 1868. However, in 1874 better 
                                                 
4
 Frederic Harrison, 'The Transit of Power',  Fortnightly Review, 3 (1868), 374-396, pp. 375-376. 
5
 See H. C. G. Matthew, 'Rhetoric and Politics in Great Britain, 1860 – 1950', in P. J. Waller (eds), 
Politics and Social Change in Modern Britain: Essays Presented to A. F. Thompson, (Brighton, 1987), . 
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organisation, dissatisfaction with a hyper-active Liberal government and the 
development of a distinctly Conservative patriotic appeal to the newly enfranchised 
delivered Disraeli a victory of a magnitude even he had not anticipated. It was the first 
Conservative victory at a general election since Peel’s triumph in 1841 and although 
the Liberals were returned in 1880, the breakthrough in 1874 can be seen as the 
precursor of late-Victorian and Edwardian Conservative hegemony when that party 
was to rule for 17 of the 20 years after 1886. The 1880 general election saw the 
Liberals returned to power so that all three general elections of the period had resulted 
in a change in government. The Liberals, as well as the Conservatives, had now learnt 
some of the lessons of a period in which the party caucus developed and the 
implications of democracy became clear.
6
 Thus, the period between the Second and 
Third Reform Acts arguably saw the greatest electoral changes of the nineteenth 
century and is profoundly important to the development of electoral politics in the later 
nineteenth century and beyond. 
The second major influence on the development of national politics was the 
growth of the newspaper industry for which the 1870s proved to be a golden age. 
Driven by increases in literacy, developments in production technology and the spread 
of the electric telegraph, the newspaper industry grew at a staggering rate in the period. 
Between 1847 and 1877 the number of provincial newspaper titles in England 
increased from 230 to 938
7
 and individual cities experienced similar growth – in 
Manchester alone the 6 titles published in 1847 had grown to 23 in 1877.
8
 The growth 
in titles was accompanied by the fastest increase in newspaper circulation of any 
period in British history. This was graphically illustrated by the expansion of the 
Standard’s circulation from 30,000 in 1860 to 170,000 in 1874.9 Frequency of 
publication and the number of pages also increased and the period saw the introduction 
of mass-circulation Sunday newspapers, as well as evening papers and second daily 
editions of existing titles.
 10
 
                                                 
6
 See John Davis and Duncan Tanner, 'The Borough Franchise after 1867',  Historical Research, 69 
(1996), 306-327. 
7
 Andrew Walker, 'The Development of the Provincial Press in England c. 1780-1914',  Journalism 
Studies, 7 (2006), 373-386, p. 382. These figures are in turn based upon Mitchell’s Newspaper Press 
Directory (Newspaper Press Directory (London: Charles Mitchell and Co.; 1847 and 1877)). 
8
 Walker, ‘Development of the Provincial Press’, p. 383. 
9
 Lucy Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 31-2. 
10
 Kevin Williams, Read all about it! : a history of the British newspaper, (Abingdon, 2010), p. 99; Lucy 
Brown, 'The Treatment of the News in Mid-Victorian Newspapers',  Transactions of the Royal 
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Technological changes, cheaper newsprint and developing sources of income 
fuelled this growth.
11
 Improving profitability gave newspapers greater freedom from 
financing by politicians, although this did not necessarily make them less partisan.
12
 
The development with arguably the most significant impact, however, for electoral 
politics was the spread of the electric telegraph. By 1868 it allowed instantaneous 
communication between most major towns and cities in Great Britain. The foundation 
of the Press Association and the nationalisation of the telegraph companies gave 
regional newspapers an instant source of daily political news from London and other 
parts of the country.
 13
  Pitman shorthand dramatically improved the accuracy of 
reporting and facilitated extensive coverage of parliamentary debates, political 
speeches and election campaigns.
14
 An almost perfect conjunction of events allowed 
dramatic improvements in communications, provided the content to fill the papers, 
allowed cheaper pricing whilst increasing literacy provided an eager audience. The 
extent and immediacy of this communications revolution meant that national issues 
began to dominate debates as politicians came to realise their words would be 
communicated to the whole country. A political speech made on a Thursday in 
Manchester would be breakfast reading in Cornwall on Friday. This had dramatic 
consequences for electoral politics and enabled the nationalisation of politics and the 
rapid decline of the importance of the politics of place. 
The next important element of this dissertation is the argument that by-
elections are important to the understanding and examination of electoral politics and 
that their analysis also provides further evidence in favour of the nationalisation of 
electoral politics. By-elections were of central importance to electoral politics between 
the Second and Third Reform Acts but have often been ignored by historians of 
electoral politics and the analyses in the dissertation also to seek to partially remedy 
this lack of attention..
15
 By-elections, it will be shown, provide important insights into 
the development of electoral politics in a period in which the public political sphere 
                                                                                                                                             
Historical Society, Fifth Series (1977), 23-39, p. 26; Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political 
Press in Britain: The Nineteenth Century, (Chapel Hill, 1981). 
11
 Williams, Read all about it!, p. 112. 
12
 Ibid, p. 99. See also comments below on the use of print media. 
13
 Brown, 'The Treatment of the News', p. 27. 
14
 Williams, Read all about it!, p. 104. 
15
 A substantial contribution to remedying this deficiency has been made by the recent publication of 
Thomas Otte and Paul Readman  By-elections in British Politics, 1832-1914, (Woodbridge, 2013). 
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become much more ‘pluralistic, representative and responsive’.16 They were regarded 
by contemporaries, including politicians, commentators and the public, as important 
indicators of public opinion and as good predictors of the likely outcome of general 
elections. In the latter assumption they were generally justified. Sometimes individual 
by-election results needed careful interpretation because of the impact of important 
political issues of the day or because of the influence of particular local factors, but on 
the whole the results of by-elections immediately preceding general elections tended to 
be good predictors of the overall result of the general elections. This was particularly 
true of the period before the general election of 1874. The contests immediately before 
the 1880 general election, however, need care in their interpretation. Politicians used 
their results to make decisions – certainly they were considered by both Gladstone and 
Disraeli when making decisions on the timing of a dissolution of parliament. However, 
whilst there is no doubt both Prime Ministers used by-election results, ultimately 
Gladstone ignored their indications, called a general election and lost whilst 
Beaconsfield tried to interpret them, called a general election and also lost. They were 
also used to score political points and to mount attacks on the policies of opponents – 
by-elections were used this way in the run-up to the 1874 general election and during 
the heat of the debates over the Eastern Question. 
By-elections also functioned as laboratories for the development of new 
techniques of party organisation and political mobilisation such as those that were felt 
to be needed after the Ballot Act. Most importantly they played an important role in 
politics generally as forums of debate on pressing issues of the day. They tended to 
focus on the key issues of politics which were currently being debated and provided an 
important forum to do so when Parliament was not in session. Changes in modes of 
communications in this period both enabled and courage this role. Firstly, the 
communications revolution of the period ensured that news and debate from a single 
by-election was spread immediately across the country. Secondly, a single by-election 
with no other competing electoral news could achieve a degree of publicity which was 
simply not possible at a general election when the sheer volume of results swamped 
the reporting of individual debates. This meant by-elections were both an agent of as 
well as a beneficiary of the nationalisation of politics in this period. 
                                                 
16
 James Vernon, Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, c.1815-1867, 
(Cambridge, 1993), p. 146; although this phrase is taken from Vernon’s work, his own point is to 
contend that such a development was an illusion.  
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The final key arguments of the dissertation relate to the importance and 
calculation of electoral statistics and analyses. Two key issues are addressed and 
suggest importantly different approaches to those currently extant in the literature. 
Chapter I shows that electoral statistics such as turnout and electoral swing measured 
for each of the three general elections show exceptional consistency across Great 
Britain; broadly speaking, nationwide trends tended to be followed in the vast majority 
of constituencies. This is a finding suggestive of the considerable analytical power of 
these statistics since it is difficult to conceive of this aggregate picture arising from the 
total effect of a large number of random factors at play in individual constituencies and 
are, accordingly, highly suggestive of the growing influence of national factors in 
electoral politics. This thesis also takes the view that electoral statistics, used in an 
appropriate manner with relevant caveats, can also provide illuminating insights into 
the development and understanding of electoral politics. The results of elections are 
facts which historians ignore at their peril. There is certainly no evidence that 
contemporaries thought this. Salisbury wrote in1884 in his article on the redistribution 
of seats that ‘the obtrusion of statistics upon the readers of the National Review 




The dissertation describes and uses a new, innovative and more complete 
methodology for the computation of such statistics from the election results of these 
constituencies. This issue is discussed further below in Section IV of this Introduction 
and Appendix I which describes the approach adopted which allows a more accurate 
calculation of these statistics as well as providing further insights into party strategies 
in multi-member constituencies. Previous methods of calculating electoral statistics for 
this period have suffered from the difficulties inherent in calculating such statistics 
when there is prevalence of multi-member constituencies and the failure of the parties 
to always contest the maximum number of seats in a constituency. These methods have 
                                                 
17
 Lord Salisbury, 'The Value of Redistribution: A Note on Electoral Statistics',  National Review, 4 
(1884), 145-162, p. 1. This matter is further dealt with Section III of this Introduction and Appendix I 
which show that two particular approaches deployed to undermine the use of electoral statistics, 
particularly for this period, are not necessarily valid. The first argument is usually based on the supposed 
invalidity of using of election results together with other information in order to draw certain 
sociological conclusions. This argument is usually found in discussions of electoral sociology and the 
example given of such improper use of statistics is almost always the work of Kenneth Wald. This thesis 
has not disputed this particular critique but simply observes that any refutation of such sociological 




led to erroneous and misleading results which have frequently found their way into the 
existing literature. By way of example, it is suggested in Hanham that turnout at the 
1874 general election was 79%, an increase of 3% over 1868, whereas turnout in fact 
fell to 72%.
18
 In Rallings and Thrasher’s work on British Electoral Facts turnout in 




As should be apparent from the foregoing, a key theme of this dissertation is that 
British electoral politics exhibited a far greater degree of nationalisation in the 1870s 
than had previously been thought.
20
 H. J. Hanham took the view that general elections 
in this period ‘were not general’.21 He went on to say: 
Only about half the seats were contested by both parties, and even when both parties were in 
the field with the same number of candidates, local or regional or national issues tended to be 
as important as those which agitated the whole of the three kingdoms’.22 
 
This dissertation shows that the fact that only half the seats were contested was not 
indicative of any lack of generality of contest and was a legitimate and successful 
electoral strategy. It also shows that local and regional issues were of little importance 
in general elections in Great Britain.   
This view that electoral politics had become far more nationalised during the period 
gains some support from the work of a number of historians who have suggested that 
the development of national politics was well under way in the period after the 1832 
Reform Act.
23
 These suggestions have been generally based on the voting patterns of 
                                                 
18
 H. J. Hanham, Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone, 
(London, 1959), p. 193. 
19
 Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher  British Electoral Facts 1832-1999, (Aldershot, 2000), p. 99. 
20
 As discussed elsewhere in this dissertation this is a view particularly espoused by H. J. Hanham (see 
especially Hanham, Elections, p. 191.). 
21
 Ibid, p. 191. 
22
 Ibid, p. 191. 
23
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37;Philip Salmon, Electoral Reform at Work: Local and National Parties, 1832-1841, (Woodbridge, 
2002); Philip Salmon, '"Plumping Contests": The Impact of By-elections on English Voting Behaviour, 
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 and the examination of party organisation.
25
 Gary Cox undertook a 
study of voting patterns in the nineteenth century particularly of split-voting patterns in 
multi-member constituencies but generally concluded that the greater move to party 
orientated politics occurred in 1868 when there was a significant drop in the tendency 
of voters to split their votes between two parties.
26
 A different view of split-voting was 
taken by Charles Wetherell and John Phillips who sought to show that the fall in split-
voting in the majority of constituencies occurred after the Great Reform Act of 1832. 
They also undertook a number longitudinal studies of voter behaviour which suported 
this change. 
Coohill has argued that, particularly through the study of parliamentary guides, that the 
‘much-discussed Victorian two party system made up of ‘Liberal’ and ‘Conservative’ 
identities certainly had its origins in the reform period, and not in the later 1850s’.27 At 
another level of party organisation Philip Salmon has shown how the Great Reform 
Act was a catalyst for the formation of local registration societies.
28
 As Salmon has 
remarked, however, what lies ‘behind this rise in voter partisanship after 1832…has 
been thinner on the ground. Salmon’s own suggestions in clude organisation and the 
the influence of by-elections which required voters to make single choices of candidate 
causing the split-voting rate to decline at subsequent general elections. Weatherall and 
Phillips are less clear but do note that the new electoral behaviour was grounded in 
local issues as well as national ones whereas this dissertation suggests that election 
issues were almost wholly national after 1868.
29
 Notably, Norman Gash has argued 
that the: 
‘weakness (by modern standards) of party influence did not, however, result in a large 
floating vote. Too many other forms of control existed for the electorate to swing 
freely from one side to the other’.30  
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It may well be, therefore, that the nationalisation of electoral politics in the 1870s was 
in motion after the 1832 Great Reform Act. However, as Weatherall and Phillips 
acknowledge, historians need to discover ‘the relationship between stated principles, 
voter responses, and actual policy’ and there needs to be more systematic general 
surveys of the period after the Great Reform Act concerning the the importance of 
political ideology, its language and its electoral impact to take forward the precise 




II Historiography   
 
The contemporary and historical analysis of the development of electoral politics in 
this period has been rich and diverse. Contemporary views were often expressed 
through the pages of the ever burgeoning range of political journals by a wide range of 
writers which included political journalists, commentators, MPs and former and future 
Prime Ministers.
32
 Contemporary analysis also saw the beginnings of psephological 
investigations. John Biddulph Martin and Alfred Frisby both published statistical work 
on the three general elections which, although not often cited, have remained 
influential.
33
 By 1902 Moisei Ostrogorski’s Democracy and the Organization of 
Political Parties emphasised the importance of party organisation and proposed that 
mass politics and the caucus were damaging to democracy. This work was to remain 
sufficiently influential for its 1992 edition to contain an introduction by Seymour 
Lipsett, a leading political sociologist whose work in the 1950s and 1960s became 
closely associated with a sociological approach to electoral politics.
34
 Charles 
Seymour, writing in 1915, framed his view in the teleological Whig tradition of history 
when he wrote, ‘a constant advance towards democracy in elections’ together with ‘the 
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continual transfer, bit by bit, of electoral power from the land-owning classes and the 
commercial plutocracy to the masses’ which was ‘the thread which runs through the 
various phases of electoral development’.35  
Developments after the First World War saw the continued importance of high 
political writing and generally the continuance of this conventional Whig interpretation 
but there were also significant developments in social and labour history. Jon 
Lawrence has characterised these as giving rise to a three phase model of nineteenth-
century popular politics. The first phase was seen as beginning with early radical 
challenges which culminated in the Chartist movement in the 1840s. This was 
followed by a mid-Victorian period of peace and quiescence and, finally, there was a 
return to radical conflict after 1880.
36
 This model and its explanations, he argues, 
carried through into the work of Marxist historians in the 1960s, particularly E. P. 
Thompson and Eric Hobsbawn.
37
 As Neville Kirk has pointed out this model of 
discontinuity did not go unchallenged at the time and formed part of the Marxist/anti-
Marxist debate of that period. It was also, as described below, to receive further 




The 1950s and 1960s also saw developments in the field of political science 
influence other approaches concerned with the impact of social class on voting 
behaviour. This led to the development of electoral sociology, which Lawrence and 
Miles Taylor characterised, in the historical context, as the interpretation of ‘voting 
patterns since 1832 as the expression of underlying social forces’. Electoral sociology, 
they said, meant that people’s electoral choices were ‘not based on rational assessment, 
but on unseen social forces, tradition and habit’. 39 As a result the ideological role of 
political parties was of little relevance and their principal purposes were in the 
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organisation of already committed supporters and in the provision of ‘group solidarity’ 
for their supporters.
40
 They suggested this approach was promoted by a number of 
historians including H. J. Hanham, D. C. Moore, John Vincent, T. J. Nossiter, James 
Cornford and P. F. Clarke.
41
 Thus, following this interpretation, they suggested 
Hanham was principally concerned with the effect of the 1867 Reform Act on party 
organisation in the 1870s and Vincent saw the formation of the Liberal party as the 
binding together of elements of different social classes but in an electoral structure 
which was essentially pre-industrial.
 42
  Cornford and Nossiter both made use of 
electoral statistics in the consideration of the impact of social class. Most of these 
writers used some non-Marxist concept of class as part of their explanations - Clarke, 
for example, saw the later nineteenth century as the transition from ‘status politics 
based on shared values and identities (of which religion was a prime example) to class 
politics based on material interests’.43 
The advent of post-structuralist and post-modernist thinking in the 1980s and 
1990s,   together with its associated ‘linguistic turn’ produced a series of works which 
focussed on the language, ideas and discourses of politics. Some of the first of these 
studies came from Stedman Jones in his research on the language of Chartism wherein 
he explored the contention that the ‘growth and decline of Chartism was a function of 
its capacity to persuade its constituency to interpret their distress or discontent within 
the terms of its political language’.44 He was clear that these and other studies had a 
larger purpose in becoming ‘increasingly critical of the prevalent treatment of the 
‘social’ as something outside of, and logically – and often, though not necessarily, 
chronologically – prior to its articulation through language’.45 Lawrence has rightly 
questioned his ‘narrow definition of political discourse’ which tends to be limited to 
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the ‘formal public discourses of political organisations’, together with the degree of 
commitment which Stedman Jones exhibits for the linguistic turn.
46
 
One of the most enthusiastic advocates of the linguistic turn was Joyce who 
focussed on the various discursive practices central to working class life and through 
which workers made sense of themselves and the world around them.
47
 The core of his 
research was class and he argued that there were ‘social identities and shared visions of 
the social order that did not emerge from, nor derive their legitimacy from, the 
language of class’.48 It is also relevant to observe that Joyce took a fairly extreme line 
in the adoption of postmodernist epistemology, for in his view ‘Language does not 
correspond to a social referent outside it’ and ‘it is … very difficult to conceive of a 
structure of class relationships, or a structure of any set of ‘social’ variables 
(occupation, income, etc.), as lying objectively outside the observer’.49   
The other prime exponent of the post-modernist view emphasising the 
importance of the linguistic turn has been James Vernon.
50
 His intention was to offer a 
new ‘cultural history of the meanings of politics – a history of its subjectivities and 
identities, the ways in which politics defined and imagined people – which in turn 
provides, at least in my reading, a new narrative of nineteenth century English political 
history’.51 Vernon’s central argument was ‘the idea of English political culture as an 
arena of struggle in which competing groups contested each other’s definitions of the 
public political sphere according to their interpretation of the constitution’.52 Thus, the 
measured introduction of parliamentary reforms, far from being a steady progression 
towards democracy, was, instead, designed to restrict and control public participation 
in politics. Taken together with the development of the ‘print media’ at the expense of 
oral traditions and the growth of mass party organisation, this contributed to the 
closure of the public political sphere. Examples of this process were the 1832 Reform 
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Act which reduced public participation in politics to the extent that it brought greater 
order to the hustings and the 1872 Ballot Act which had an even greater impact by 
abolishing the hustings altogether. The problems with this argument have generally 
centred on the lack of evidence both of intentionality on the part of legislators and hard 
evidence that the public political space was in fact substantially reduced by these 
factors.
53
 It is also revealing that one of the leading supporters of a post-structuralist 
view should consider that the structure of the electoral system should have such an 
important influence on the nature and development of popular electoral politics.
 
 
More difficult to place in the development of the historiography is the work of 
Biagini. His principal work, Liberty, retrenchment and reform: popular liberalism in 
the age of Gladstone, 1860-1880, was published after much of Stedman Jones’s work 
and just after Joyce’s Visions of the People. Its arguments include a detailed 
commentary on the language of popular Liberalism seeking to show the connections 
between its language, rhetoric and ideas with the language and ideas of the popular 
radical tradition, Cromwell and a strong puritanical practice tinged with a Calvinist 
sense of predestination. Despite this he makes no attempt to locate his approach in a 
post-modernist framework, addressing instead the issue of why the working-classes 
should have lent such significant support to a party which was still led by a highly 
refined aristocratic elite. Biagini rejects class, in its Marxist sense, as an explanation 
and instead suggests that Liberalism provided for its working-class supporters ‘a more 
satisfactory collective consciousness than did class identity’.54 
Finally, the early 1990s saw the start of a new approach to the study of mid- to 
late-Victorian electoral politics which has grown from the work of Lawrence and 
Taylor, the former in particular.
55
 This approach was founded on their critique of 
electoral sociology which they charged with being empirically wrong, deterministic 
and reductionist. Instead, a new approach was proposed which held that, to the extent 
there is any relation between social reality and the nature of popular politics, it is 
highly contingent and political parties are to be regarded as active agents in the 
formation and development of politics. The corollaries of this view have been that 
locality is afforded precedence over ‘national’ analysis and greater importance has 
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been given to the significance of ideas and language. This revisionist critique has 
become a new orthodoxy which has produced significant benefits in adding to the 
richness of historical understanding particularly with regard to the importance of 
language, ideology and locality. 
An important corollary of these developments has been the exploration of the 
impact of gender in electoral politics. Jon Lawrence’s seminal article Class and 
Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism has been followed by a number of important 
works.
56
 These have led to a more nuanced and diverse understanding of the role of 
women in electoral politics and the ‘extent of women’s political agency within 
cultural, societal and economic constraints’.57 The examination of women’s political 
role has involved work on the conception of ‘family as a site for public debate rather 
than as a private, de-politicised state’.58 More directly, in electoral politics there has 
been more research on and much greater recognition of the use of feminine imagery, 
the direct involvement of women in election campaigning including canvassing and 
through the exercise of patronage.
59
 This focus on the part played by women in 
electoral politics has, in addition, also stimulated new research and insights into 




Lawrence and Taylor’s landmark essay, ‘Electoral sociology and the 
historians’, was first published in 1997.61 Since then there has been flourishing 
development of studies expanding some of the themes developed by the critique of 
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electoral sociology. More work has appeared focussing on the richness and detail of 
the electoral politics of particular localities.
62
 More individual general elections have 
also received specific attention and there has been more emphasis on previously less 
explored areas of electoral politics (by-elections’ for example).63 As part of the 
recognition of the instrumentality of electoral politics and the continuing influence of 
the linguistic turn there has been more stress on the importance of issues in 
determining voter choices and in the language and imagery used in the communication 
of those issues.
64
 These approaches have developed their own questions and there has 
been an increasing focus on the development of working–class Conservative support 
during the second half of the nineteenth century.
65
 
Following from these developments two of the major themes of this thesis are 
party organisation and the issues and ideas of political discourse during the elections. 
These two themes are related. Post-electoral sociology approaches have emphasised 
that political parties are not the passive beneficiaries of social change and to be 
successful needed to embrace the contingent nature of their appeal. This means that 
political parties needed to construct their allegiances and support and did this through 
the use of language and ideas. These languages and the vocabulary and imagery which 
they employed needed to be communicated to the electorate and this had to be 
achieved through party organisation. In this conception party organisation is not just, 
or even, about the centralisation of party control or the administrative aspects of 
arranging canvassers or ensuring known supporters got to the polls. It is much more 
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about the on-going grass roots party organisation which was responsible for the 
communication of party ideas and values. As a result, there is a focus on organisation 
at a grass roots level. 
Of course, once it is accepted that ideas were important factors influencing 
electoral behaviour in the period, then the language in which those messages were 
expressed and the way this language was used in the mediation of political constructs 
and conceptions by political parties become equally important. Accordingly, in 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation, dealing with electoral issues, there has been an emphasis 
on determining some forms of commonality in expression in order to identify with 
greater accuracy the precise words being used. However, the reception and 
understanding of political messages is highly complex and, even at this point, it must 
be recognised there are difficulties in understanding and assessing how a particular 
issue, expressed in a particular way, impacted on voter behaviour and how it interacted 
with other issues. 
III The use of electoral statistics 
 
We have seen how criticisms of electoral sociology have emphasised the importance of 
locality. This has led to the questioning of the utility, and even the validity, of using 
electoral statistics as important historical evidence. In particular, Lawrence has 
criticised the so-called ‘Nuffield-style’ and ‘ecological’ studies of individual election 
campaigns in three main ways.
66
 Firstly, he believes that the aggregation of election 
data across constituency boundaries’ is invalid. In his view most historians have 
‘insisted that, since Westminster politics were determined by constituencies of unequal 
size, votes should not therefore be aggregated across constituency boundaries’ and 
they have suggested that ‘it is very difficult to incorporate local election data into 
broad aggregate surveys’.67  
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Secondly, he has claimed that the use of statistics with other data of a 
sociological nature cannot yield meaningful or valid historical results. This claim is 
illustrated by reference to the work of Kenneth Wald, which attempts to correlate 
voting patterns with social and economic data. Lawrence correctly points out that one 
of the problems of this form of analysis is that electoral districts are not congruent with 
the districts used to collect social and economic data, such as that collected from 
censuses. Wald attempted to overcome this by using larger aggregated surrogate units 
in order to provide congruity for the two sets of data but Lawrence thought this 
approach lost the ‘peculiarities of place’ and these units could ‘in no sense have been 
identical’.68 (More recently Alex Windscheffel has noted that the use and interpretive 
analysis of electoral data has been driven by the dominance of the electoral 
sociological model and that we need to ‘be sceptical of the epistemological utility of 
such approaches’.69) The main example of this criticism is also a repudiation of Wald’s 
work for similar reasons to those put forward by Lawrence.
70
 Lawrence’s third and 
final criticism is that Hanham, together with T. J. Nossiter, apparently considered that 
the ‘viability of psephological techniques stemmed from the fact that there appeared to 
be substantial continuities between voting behaviour in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries’.71 The precise nature of this criticism is not completely clear, but it is 
probable that he and Taylor thought it was an approach which suggested the same 
sociological explanations of voting behaviour derived from the 1950s and 1960s could 
be applied to the nineteenth century and was based on the belief that voters and parties 
behaved in both periods in fundamentally the same manner.
72
 
Taking each of these criticisms in turn, the evidence underpinning the first 
point regarding aggregation over constituency boundaries is less than solid. In making 
his claim, Lawrence cites as supporting evidence Dunbabin’s analysis of regional 
trends in his article ‘British Elections in the 19th and 20th Centuries’. In this article 
Dunbabin says he aggregates seats rather than votes because it is a method that ‘can be 
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applied with greater certainty to the confused politics of the 1920s when many seats 
often lacked either a Liberal or else a Labour candidate’.73 In fact, Dunbabin makes no 
mention of constituencies of unequal size. It is also difficult to see how Dunbabin can 
regard the general aggregation of data as a problem since his work is based on the 
aggregation of seats won, which is susceptible to the same arguments as the 
aggregation of any other data from different constituencies. The other piece of 
evidence cited by Lawrence in support of this view is the way in which aggregate 
election data is used in Cornford’s article ‘The Adoption of Mass Organisation by the 
British Conservative Party’.74 In this case the evidence is also unclear. The reference is 
to Cornford’s discussion of the computation of the Conservative share of the vote in 
elections from 1885 to 1910 where he makes the simple point that because the number 
and location of uncontested seats varied from election to election, it is necessary to 
compute the change in each party’s share of the vote from election to election by using 
‘seats contested at both pairs of elections’.75 This appears to be an entirely justifiable 
approach and follows the general methodology for allowing for uncontested seats 
followed by Biddulph Martin, Frisby, Dunbabin and Parry.
76
 It is also the method used 
in this thesis as described more fully in Appendix I. 
In the case of Wald’s work the difficulties concerning the analyses of the social 
composition of parliamentary constituencies can be readily conceded, and his work 
should certainly be treated with great caution. However, these difficulties simply 
cannot be a relevant argument for the suppression of the use of other electoral statistics 
for other uses in different contexts.
77
 Finally, the suggestion that the valid use of 
statistical techniques, solely with reference to nineteenth-century elections with no 
underlying assumptions about the nature of electoral motivation, in some way depends 
on there being substantial continuities between voting behaviour in two centuries is, at 
best, bizarre.  It is difficult to see how the usefulness of such statistics as turnout or a 
party’s percentage share of the vote can depend on the application of an electoral 
sociological model of the elections in the US and UK in the 1950s and 1960s to the 
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1870s. This point suggests the possible conflation of the use of the word 
‘psephological’ as used by Lawrence and Taylor and the use of electoral statistics, 
psephology, as used by most others.
78
 
In contrast, this thesis takes the view that this emphasis on locality has been 
taken too far in denying the ability to make cross-constituency comparisons and 
denying that aggregation can provide interesting and useful historical insights. This 
view is founded on two broad propositions. Firstly, the findings of this thesis 
concerning the nature of the issues debated by candidates at general elections and by-
elections during the period clearly show a significant consistency across 
constituencies, regions and countries. Secondly, it is difficult if not impossible to 
believe that the consistency of the patterns of voting and trends at local, regional and 
national levels of aggregation simply arise from the serendipitous aggregation of trends 
individually and randomly generated at single constituency level. The patterns of 
partisanship of particular constituencies similarly cannot be explained by independent 
local influences simultaneously producing the same results over time. As Parry has 
said ‘Historians of elections have discerned an increasingly uniform national pattern to 
swings in voter allegiance from the 1870s’.79 This remark is also supported by the 
work of Gary Cox who showed that there was a dramatic fall in the tendency of voters 
in multi-member constituencies to split their votes between candidates of different 
political parties from the general election of 1868 onwards.
80
 These trends offer 
powerful evidence of the nationalisation of politics in this period. 
There is no doubt that electoral statistics have to be used with appropriate 
caution and judgement but these conclusions suggest they are a valuable and useful 
tool. Having accepted this utility there, nevertheless, remain some significant practical 
difficulties in their computation and application to this period. As noted above, much 
of the statistical work on this period is based on two contemporary works by Biddulph 
Martin and Frisby, Hanham’s statistical analyses being almost wholly based on 
Biddulph Martin’s work. Both of these works are unsatisfactory, restricting the 
comparison of constituencies to those contested at more than two successive elections, 
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omitting constituencies without explanation and not extending their coverage to the 
three general elections in the period. Many of these problems arise from the difficulties 
of dealing with multi-member constituencies and uncontested seats and this 
dissertation offers a new methodology (described in Section IV below and Appendix 
1) for computing electoral statistics over the three general elections. This provides a 
new and much more comprehensive analysis of those statistics which shows new and 
different conclusions from those currently in the literature.  
IV Other historiographical issues 
 
Apart from this gap in the literature concerning electoral statistics there are a 
number of other substantive, issues concerning the analysis of electoral politics during 
the period. The first is that the 1870s have been comparatively neglected by historians. 
An example of this neglect is evident from the number of general elections in the mid- 
to late-Victorian period which have been the subject of individual publications. The 
general elections of 1895, 1900, 1906 and the two of 1910 have all received such 
attention whilst only that of 1880 has been the subject of individual study in the period 
1868-1880.
81
 There are a number of factors which have contributed towards this 
neglect. The most important of these is what Windscheffel has called the electoral 
climacteric of 1885/6 when the redistribution of seats, the extension of the franchise 
and the Liberal/Unionist split over Home Rule arguably transformed the political 
landscape, although this thesis would not regard this as so transformational as the 
events of 1867-1880. In addition, the move to single member constituencies and the 
redistribution of seats in 1884/5 resulted in the elimination of most two member seats, 
the disappearance of old constituencies and the creation of new ones together with 
many boundary changes to those constituencies which did remain. This makes the 
comparison of constituency results very difficult between the elections of 1868, 1874 
and 1880 and those which came after. One suspects that this may be an unspoken 
significant practical reason for historians’ lack of equivalently detailed engagement 
with the 17 years before 1885 as compared to the 25 years from 1885 to 1914. 
A second issue concerns Hanham’s Elections and Party Management which 
remains the principal work on the period and an invaluable source of reference and 
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 Inevitably, however, for a work written more than 50 years ago, it 
does not reflect more recent developments in the study of electoral politics.
 
Thus, the 
work does not cover new areas of interest such as the importance of language and 
ideology and Hanham’s emphasis on the importance of influence on electors’ voting 
preferences now appears to be overdrawn. This has been particularly important in 
recent work which has sought to present Conservative electoral success with the 
working-classes in a positive light, highlighting the importance of Conservative 
ideology and appeals to the electorate to show ‘how active, constructive and 
integrative the tories were, both on the public platform and in the press’.83 
IV Methodology and sources 
 
Section III of this Introduction has argued that electoral statistics remain an important 
and useful analytical tool in exploring the history of electoral politics. It briefly noted 
that a new methodology and calculations had been developed to provide more accurate 
electoral statistics than those hitherto available. Appendix I gives full details of the 
approach and shows it produces electoral statistics which are importantly different 
from those currently available. This approach is a stratified voter methodology which 
firstly, enables the stratification of statistics according to the size and location of a 
constituency and, secondly, proposes an approach to deal with the problems of 
measuring electoral statistics from the polls of multi-member constituencies where 
electors had more than one vote. Frequently, electors did not use all of their votes and 
as a consequence the number of votes cast in a poll in one of these constituencies does 
not bear any fixed relationship to the number of electors voting. The number of 
electors voting provides the usual basis for calculating statistics such as turnout , share 
of the vote (and, as a result of that, electoral swing) and whilst in a single member 
constituency where electors have one vote this is obviously the number of votes cast, it 
is much more difficult to determine in a multi-member constituency. 
This dissertation suggests a solution which builds on methodology put forward 
by Frisby and adds to this by using actual vote counts, when these are available, which 
show the actual number of electors voting because they give the numbers who 
plumped for a single candidate and the numbers who split their vote between different 
parties. Where these counts are not available the methodology uses certain surrogate 
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statistics on plumping and split-voting to enable a more accurate estimate to be made 
of the number of electors voting. This methodology has been used to adjust, where 
necessary, the poll results for every constituency in Great Britain for each of the three 
general elections in the period. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been done 
before for all three elections and provides for the first time overall statistics which are 
more accurately calculated and which are based on all constituencies. A corollary 
benefit has been that the database constructed to make these calculations may be used 
to readily provide different analyses of the data. For example, figures for turnout in 
northern English boroughs with an electorate in 1874 of over 7,500 can be readily 
calculated. This enables the preparation of many analyses based, for example, on 
regions and the size and nature of constituencies. This approach, accordingly offers a 
methodological toolbox and a database and, unless otherwise stated, all electoral 
statistics referred to in this thesis have been calculated using its techniques. 
A wide range of other historical sources have been used in the preparation of 
this thesis. The core data used in the preparation of the electoral statistics referred to 
above have been obtained from Craig’s work on British Parliamentary Elections and 
from McCalmont’s Parliamentary Poll Book.84 Where the two differ, in the absence of 
further and better information Craig has been preferred and the reader’s attention 
drawn to the discrepancy where this could be material. 
Much of the analysis in Chapter III on Issues, Chapter V on Organisation and 
Chapter VI on By-elections has utilised newspaper resources and reference has been 
made to physical holdings in the British Library Newspaper Library. However, the 
majority of research has been carried out using recently digitised newspaper sources. 
The recent digitisation of nineteenth-century British newspapers has transformed our 
ability to search large numbers of newspapers for relevant information in a time frame 
which would not otherwise have been possible using manual techniques.
85
 By way of 
example, this enabled the identification of nearly one thousand candidates’ election 
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addresses covering the three general elections. It has also, for instance, enabled the 
identification of local political organisations and some of their activities when there is 
little other evidence available from local and national archive sources. Whilst there is 
nothing new in using newspaper sources the ability to rapidly search such large 
volumes does qualitatively change the nature of the evidence obtained. 
Newspapers also present their own particular methodological issues when used 
as historical sources. Newspapers do more than report news: they document their 
producers own social attitudes and beliefs.
86
 To some extent the use of newspapers in 
this dissertation is less susceptible to methodological issues arising from the use of 
newspaper sources. Newspapers have been used as the primary source for candidates’ 
addresses but these were included in newspapers as paid advertisements, were 
independently written by candidates and their supporters and were, accordingly, 
wholly uninfluenced by journalists or newspaper owners (the placement of an address 
in a particular publication might naturally be influenced by a newspaper’s political 
adherence simply to target the likely supporters of a candidate). Thus, in the case of 
addresses there is no difference between finding these documents in newspapers and 
finding individual printed copies in the archive. 
Election results are in themselves purely factual and, therefore, unlikely to 
have been influenced by political bias (although, of course, the stories surrounding 
their reportage almost certainly are). Speeches, however, require greater care. Firstly, 
speeches tended to be reported mainly by the newspapers supportive of the political 
position of the candidate making the speech and when the speeches of opponents were 
reported they were often in truncated form where the editing had been undertaken by a 
perhaps less than disinterested reporter. Secondly, although the introduction of Pitman 
shorthand or the supply of pre-speech printed copies theoretically ensured greater 
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The remainder of this thesis seeks to develop the issues which have been sketched out 
in this Introduction. Chapter 1 gives some general information and analyses of the 
1867 Reform Act and the general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880. Electoral swing, 
turnout and other election statistics are analysed using the new methodology 
previously described.  
Chapter II explores further the changes in the electoral framework. It first 
explores the implementation and impact of the Ballot Act. It uses election results 
before and after the Act to question whether electoral influence was as important as 
some historians have suggested. It then considers changes in the impact of electoral 
violence and election expenses over the period. Chapter III discusses issues, ideology, 
political language and rhetoric in the context of the general elections. It utilises a 
survey of nearly 1,000 candidates’ election addresses to analyse issues at the elections 
and the language and rhetoric which was used to present them. It shows that these 
issues were overwhelmingly national and that there were important developments in 
Conservative political rhetoric. 
Chapter IV deals with party organisation particularly the way in which this had 
to respond to the changes in framework and language. It does this primarily by 
concentrating on local Liberal organisations and the development of Conservative 
organisations aimed at the working classes at constituency level which was much more 
extensive than previously thought. Chapter V considers by-elections in the period 
which have been largely ignored by historians in the context of changes in political 
opinion over the period and in the context of electoral issues and political discourse. 
Finally, Appendix I deals certain issues concerning multi-member constituencies and 
with the methodology used to calculate the electoral statistics used in this dissertation. 
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This chapter provides some background to the dissertation by undertaking a 
consideration of the 1867 Reform Act and of the results of each of the three general 
elections in the period. The chapter offers a number of original interpretations of the 
general election results in the period. Firstly, and most significantly the original 
methodology used for the calculation of election statistics has enabled accurate 
computations of such statistics as electoral swing and turnout than have hitherto been 
available. Indeed, as has been shown, there are few available statistics for this period 
and those that deal with all three general elections are misleadingly inaccurate. The 
statistics presented in this chapter and Appendix II present more accurately computed 
figures – more accurate, it is contended, than any of those previously presented by 
scholars. Secondly, the election results and related statistics are analysed in relation to 
constituencies of different size and geographical location. Again this has not 
previously been presented for all of the three elections; doing so enables a more 
analytical review of the results and their related causes.
1
 This analysis is, for instance, 
particularly relevant in analysing the results of the 1874 election and the supposed 
disaffecting impact of the Education Act on non-conformist Liberal voters, which is 
frequently quoted, following Gladstone himself, as a reason for the government’s 
defeat.
2
 As is shown later in the chapter the geographical analysis of election results 
demonstrates that in places where non-conformity was more prevalent the Liberals 
tended to do better in 1874, so showing that any non-conformist disaffection was, in 
fact, of little significance in 1874.
3
 
 A further feature of the chapter is an analysis turnout which is unique in its 
accuracy and its application to all three general elections. This analysis has been used 
to demonstrate Cornford’s proposition that Conservative success in late-Victorian and 
Edwardian elections was associated with low turnouts has no support in the three 
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general elections under consideration. The analysis of turnout also provides a 
corrective to the figures provided by Hanham which have been shown to be inaccurate. 
There has been little historical analysis of uncontested seats particularly the 
exploration of the factors which led to a lack of a contest and the political activity, if 
any, which took place.
4
 This section of this chapter seeks to remedy this position. 
Finally, the section on non-concurrent polling deals with another issue which has not 
been addressed by historians of electoral politics in this period.  
 
II The 1867 Reform Act and its implications 
 
The borough occupation franchise introduced by the 1867 Reform Act was the single 
most important development in electoral reform before 1918. Of the three Reform Acts 
of the nineteenth century that of 1867 produced the greatest proportionate increase in 
the electorate and laid the foundations for the extension of the borough household and 
tenant franchises to the counties in 1884/5.
5
 It has been remarked that the Act of 1867 
‘was one of the decisive events, perhaps the decisive event, in modern English history’ 
for whilst household suffrage in the boroughs was several steps removed from 
universal suffrage, ‘once this first step was made, no one seriously doubted that the 
others would follow’.6  
There were four main aspects of the Reform legislation. Firstly, the Act 
extended the franchise in the boroughs to all male rate-paying householders who 
satisfied a one year residence requirement. Secondly, the Hodgkinson amendment to 
the Act abolished compounding, the practice whereby landlords paid the rates for their 
tenants, a practice which, under the draft legislation to that date, would have 
immediately disenfranchised some 500,000 voters because they did not pay their rates 
personally. Now all tenants would have to pay directly and therefore qualify for the 
vote.
7
 Thirdly, a £10 lodger franchise was introduced for the boroughs, although this 
was to prove largely irrelevant because very few registered under its provisions. 
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Finally, the property rental value for the county franchise was reduced to £12. In 
addition, Disraeli sought to maintain the importance of the county seats, which were 
generally Conservative strongholds, in three other ways; firstly, he abolished the right 
of any borough householder to vote in the election for the county in which his borough 
was situated. Secondly, he packed the boundary commission with Conservatives so as 
to improve the geographical position of the counties and limit the impact of the 
increase in the franchise in smaller constituencies. Finally, the Act included significant 
changes in the distribution of seats, designed to particularly favour the counties where 
the Conservatives were strongest. 
The relative effects of these changes were the most dramatic of any reform 
legislation in British history. The Act resulted in a 97% increase in the electorate in 
Great Britain to approximately 2.4 million voters. The statute contained many 
anomalies and required some time to implement consistently, so that this increase was 
further augmented as the new provisions of the legislation were gradually adapted and 
by 1884 the electoral register had grown to approximately 2.96 million, an increase of 
23% that far outstripped the rate of growth of the adult male population over the same 
period. The nature of the franchise changes meant that by far the greater increase in the 
electorate was in the boroughs. Table I/1 shows the increase in electors in the UK split 
between the counties and boroughs. 
 





Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885, (Dartmouth: Parliamentary Research Services, 1989) and own calculations. 
 
There was concern amongst Conservative supporters that the newly 
enfranchised workers would more naturally support the Liberal party, but later writers 
have suggested that Disraeli was more confident about the immediate political impact 
of household suffrage because although the absolute figures for the increase in the 
borough electorate were large, their immediate impact needed to be considered in 
conjunction with the distribution of seats. A number of factors combined to dilute the 
potential impact of the franchise increase on the number of seats held by the 
Conservatives. Firstly, as we have noted, Disraeli’s redistribution was biased in favour 
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of the counties. The legislation made available 52 seats through a combination of the 
disenfranchisement of corrupt boroughs, the total disenfranchisement of certain small 
boroughs with a population of less than 10,000 and the reduction of the representation 
of certain other boroughs with a population of less than 10,000 from two members to 
one. Of these 52 seats 25 went to newly created county seats in England, of which 22 
were won by the Conservatives at the subsequent 1868 election. Some 17 seats went to 
newly created boroughs of which 4 were won by the Conservatives in 1868.
8
 Only 4 
additional seats were allocated to the existing large boroughs which were responsible 
for 100,000 of the increase in the electorate. At the same time the Act introduced the 
so-called minority clause which restricted an elector to two votes in three member 
constituencies (three in London which had four members). The practical effect of this, 
as was its intention, was to enable the minority party to gain a seat where they had not 
previously been represented. Finally, there were huge disparities in size between the 
constituencies unaffected by the distribution changes which meant that a significant 
part of the absolute increase in the electorate was confined to relatively few 
constituencies. As is shown in the following section the impact of these measures and 
the election campaign itself meant that in 1868, in Great Britain, the Conservatives 
only lost a net 8 seats to the Liberals compared to 1865. 
Although the reforms had dramatically increased the electorate there was a 
proportion of the adult male population which still failed to reach the electoral registers 
after the Act. The main provisions of the Act had been to extend the franchise in the 
boroughs by the establishment of the householder franchise. In 1871 the total 
population of the parliamentary boroughs in England and Wales was approximately 
10.6 million. Assuming similar distributions of ages and sexes in this cohort as in the 
population as a whole this means there were approximately 2.5 million men of voting 
age in the boroughs. After making an estimate for the number of plural voters, the 
borough electorate amounted to some 1.2 million men, meaning that approximately 1.3 
million men of voting age had not been captured by a franchise which was considered 
to have established, at least as far the boroughs were considered, universal suffrage.
9
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The characteristics of the nineteenth-century electoral system which led to the 
exclusion of adult males from the registers fell into two broad categories – exclusions 
arising from the nature of the franchise and those arising from the administration of the 
system. In order to obtain the vote an adult had to be male and could not be an alien, 
criminal, lunatic or peer of the realm and having satisfied these requirements had to 
show that he qualified under one of the franchises. Nineteenth-century reform 
legislation was additive such that each enactment added different franchise 
qualifications without repealing or amending previous qualifications. However, if a 
man did not qualify under one of these categories he was not entitled to vote and there 
were a number of categories of men who were likely to be excluded because of this. 
These included the young, because they were less likely to be married and as a result to 
have acquired their own qualifying residence; that is to say they were single men who 
lived with their parents or in circumstances where they did not occupy a room which 
was ‘occupied separately as a dwelling’. In principle, those living in other 
accommodation could seek to claim the tenant franchise but this required the tenement 
to have a clear yearly value of £10.
10
 Thus, those who could not afford accommodation 
of this value or who lived in areas of low property values could be deprived of the 
vote. 
In two important articles which have focussed on the impacts of the 1867 Act 
Tanner and Davis have argued that as the difficulties inherent in the practical 
application of the complexities of the Act were gradually overcome the borough 
electorate expanded at a rate significantly in excess of the population growth and that, 
whilst the franchise remained restrictive it was restrictive ‘in a random and vexatious 
way’ and ‘its own inadequacies prevented it from discriminating in the way that its 
authors intended and many later authorities have assumed’.11 However, whilst it is true 
that the borough electorate did grow faster than the borough population between the 
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Second and Third reform acts this did not occur at a sufficiently fast enough rate to 
impact materially on the level of ‘missing voters’ and the whilst the impact of the 1867 
Act could be random and vexatious’ it remained very largely notable for its ‘bias 
against the working class’ and the ‘residuum’.12 
The remainder of this chapter presents analyses of the results of the general 
elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880. The analysis of the results of these elections is 
complicated by the fact that a large number of constituencies returned more than one 
member, usually two. As was briefly described in the Introduction this gives rise to a 
number of difficulties in calculating certain electoral statistics such as electoral swing 
and turnout. This issue is discussed extensively in Appendix 1 which sets out the 
methodology created for this thesis. The electoral statistics analysed in this chapter and 
the remainder of this thesis are based upon this methodology. 
The chapter proceeds by a review of the results of each of the elections. There 
follows a brief discussion of the issue of turnout utilising the more accurate figures 
produced by the new methodology. Finally, there are two sections which deal with 
uncontested seats and the issue of non-concurrent polling. 
III The general election of 1868 
 
The 1868 election took place after one of the longest campaigns of any Victorian 
general election. The minority Conservative administration had been defeated in April 
on the issue of the disestablishment of the Irish Church and rather than resign 
immediately Disraeli waited until the new registers necessitated by the Reform Act had 
been completed, so that the election could take place under the new franchise. This 
was a complicated exercise carried out as of the end of June and took some time to 
complete. Eventually, parliament was dissolved in November and polling took place 
between 17 November and 7 December. 
As was almost universally expected the Liberals were victorious and their 
majority over the Conservatives in Great Britain was marginally increased to 87 
compared to 71 in 1865. They retained a majority in Ireland giving them a lead over all 
parties in the United Kingdom of 116 seats. Disraeli broke with precedent and resigned 
before parliament met, leaving the way open for Gladstone to form his first 
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administration. Table I/2 shows the distribution of seats between the parties in Great 


































Table I-2 The general election of 1868 - number of seats 
 
1865 Change 1868 
Great Britain 
   English Counties  
   Conservative 94 28 122 
Liberal 51 -3 48 
English 
Boroughs † † 
 0-1500 






















   Conservative 115 -28 87 
Liberal 200 -6 194 
Total England 
   Conservative 209 0 209 
Liberal 251 -9 242 
Wales 
   Conservative 14 -4 10 
Liberal 18 5 23 
Scotland 
   Conservative 11 -4 7 
Liberal 42 9 51 
Universities 
   Conservative 6 0 6 
Liberal 0 3 3 
Total Great 
Britain 
   Conservative 240 -8 232 
Liberal 311 8 319 
Liberal Majority 71 
 
87 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. In 1868 in the English Boroughs Bridgwater and 
Beverley returned two Liberals and two Conservatives respectively and were 
disenfranchised after petitions relating to that election; accordingly their results 
have been excluded from the 1865 and 1868 figures throughout this dissertation 
to provide easier comparison to the subsequent two elections. For the 
classification of English boroughs see Definitions. † Because of the 1867 Act’s 
franchise, disenfranchisement and redistribution provisions, a categorisation of 




It can be seen that the Conservatives strongly improved their position in their key 
stronghold, the English counties. In 1865 they held 64% of the seats in that category 
and in 1868 this had grown to 72% of the available seats. These gains in the counties 
were heavily influenced by Disraeli’s redistribution in favour of those constituencies. 
Certain boroughs were either disenfranchised entirely or had their representation 
reduced to one seat and certain large county seats were divided to create two 
replacement constituencies. As we have seen, the Act had made a net new 25 seats 
available for the English counties. In addition, 15 seats were abolished making 42 new 
county seats of which the Conservatives promptly won 36 and the Liberals only 6. The 
Liberals had previously held 6 seats in the abolished counties giving them a net gain of 
nil whereas the Conservatives had held 11 giving them a net gain 25 as a result of 
Disraeli’s reorganisation. However, the introduction of the minority clause for 
constituencies with three seats meant that the Liberals were able to make gains of 5 
seats out of the 7 constituencies in this category. Finally, the Conservatives made 
inroads into the existing Liberal seats in the counties capturing a net 8 seats as the new 
county electorate favoured the Conservatives. As a result of these changes the 
Conservatives made net gains of 28 seats in the counties and the Liberals net losses of 
3 seats. It does seem that there was a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Whigs and a 
reluctance to support the disestablishment of the Irish Church which Gladstone had 
made the main issue of the election although Parry has argued that Liberal 
performance was creditable in the circumstances and was to some extent helped by 




Liberal strength continued to be in the boroughs, although the Conservatives 
retained some strength in the smaller constituencies. The impact of redistribution in the 
category of constituency was also complex. After 1865 17 seats were made available 
by the total disenfranchisement of certain constituencies either because of corruption 
or because they were regarded as too small and disenfranchised under the 1867 
legislation. Of these 17 the Conservatives had previously held 9 and the Liberals 8 so 
that the impact on party strength was evenly balanced. The Act reduced the 
representation of 35 two-seat constituencies to one member. Again the impact was 
balanced as the Conservatives had held 17 and the Liberals 18 of these seats. Overall 
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18 additional seats were added to the English boroughs with 13 going toward the 
creation of new constituencies and 1 to an additional seat in Salford. Finally, two 
constituencies were created in London, Chelsea and Hackney, each with two members. 
Single seat constituencies were created in 9 new boroughs, almost wholly in the new 
industrial towns in the north except for Gravesend in the south. Of these 14 new seats 
the Liberals won 11 at the 1868 election. The remaining 4 seats went towards creating 
3 seat constituencies in the large industrial cities of Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool and 
Manchester. The minority clause had been designed to try and lessen Liberal gains in 
these constituencies but was not wholly successful. In Birmingham Liberal 
organisation ensured they won all 3 seats and in Leeds the Conservatives already held 
a seat. Finally, Liverpool was already a wholly Conservative constituency so it was in 
fact the Liberals who benefitted from the operation of the clause in the boroughs. The 
net result was the Liberals lost 13 seats in the changes to English boroughs compared 
to the Conservative losses of 21. 
Of particular interest, however, are the 131 remaining English boroughs which 
retained the same number of MPs as 1865 but whose aggregate electorate increased by 
440,000 or 117%. There was an exceptional degree of turnover in these boroughs; 51 
changed hands with the Liberals gaining 29 seats but the Conservatives also gaining 
22, for a net gain to the Liberals of 7 seats. In English boroughs with electorates of up 
to 1500 voters, the Conservatives, despite their fears, maintained a small advantage 
holding 31 seats compared to the Liberals’ 29. The Liberals held a distinct advantage 
in the larger English boroughs. In those with electorates between 1501 and 7500 the 
Liberals held 96 seats to the Conservative’s 34. They maintained a similar dominance 
in the largest English boroughs with electorates in excess of 7500 with 69 seats 
compared to the Conservative’s 22. Interestingly, amongst these largest boroughs the 
Conservatives held more in the North (16) than in the South (6), because of the 
Conservative success in Lancashire which accounted for 11 of these 14 seats.
14
 
The final effects of redistribution were in Wales and Scotland. Wales received 
an additional seat allocated to the borough of Merthyr Tydfil, which, unsurprisingly, 
the Liberals won. In addition, the Conservatives lost 4 more seats, which reduced their 
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 These were Stockport 1, Preston 2, Blackburn 2, Bolton 2, Salford 2, Manchester 1 and Liverpool 1. 
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representation to 10 seats in the principality. The Cheshire Observer was quite clear 
about the situation in Wales, reporting that: 
There [North Wales] nothing has prevailed against the popularity of the Irish Church 
measure, the Welsh Dissenters believing that the Liberal policy in Ireland foreshadows 
events in Wales. It cannot be imagined that the Irish are liked in Wales any more than 
Lancashire; the reason for the victories the Liberals have gained in the former can only 




Scotland was allocated 7 additional seats. Two went to the creation of two 
university constituencies. The burghs received three extra seats and two went to the 
counties.
16
 The Liberal dominance of the Scottish constituencies continued with them 
holding 51 of the 58 Scottish seats in 1868. The Conservatives lost county seats in 
Scotland largely because of continuing disputes between tenant farmers and 
landowners over land and game laws.
17
 
A contemporary writer, R. Dudley Baxter, published an analysis of the election 
results, although it should be remembered in considering his work, that he was a 
confirmed Conservative and a member of the law firm which dealt with the affairs of 
Disraeli and the Conservative party.
18
 He noted that in Scotland, Wales and Ireland, 
the church question was unfavourable to the Conservative party ‘since the bulk of the 
population are not adherents to the Established Churches’.19 However, he also noted 
that: 
In England, the Church feeling was against the Liberal party, bringing over many 
voters to the Conservative side, and counteracting much of the Liberal effect of the 
immense enfranchisement in the Boroughs, while it increased the Conservative effect 
of the rural enfranchisement in the Counties.
20
 It is interesting to note that as a 
Conservative he thought the Tory losses ‘a mere nothing’ given ‘so great an 




A novel part of his analysis was that despite having fewer members in the Commons 
the Conservatives represented a larger proportion of the population than the Liberals. 
Given that this arose because of the large unenfranchised population in the counties, to 
some this must have smacked of a desperate attempt to present the defeat in a better 
light. 
                                                 
15
 Cheshire Observer, 5 December 1868. 
16
 Michael Dyer, Men of Property and Intelligence: The Scottish Electoral System prior to 1884, 
(Aberdeen, 1996), pp. 100-121. 
17
 I. G. C. Hutchison, A Political History of Scotland 1832-1924: Parties, Elections and Issues, 
(Edinburgh, 1986), p.106. 
18
 R. Dudley Baxter, The Results of the General Election, (London, 1869). 
19
 Ibid, p. 6. 
20
 Ibid, p. 6. 
21
 Ibid, p. 11. 
46 
 
IV The general election of 1874 
 
Table I/3 below shows the number of seats held by each party after the general 












































Table I-3 The general election of 1874 - number of seats 
 
1868 Change 1874 
Great Britain 
   English Counties  
   Conservative 122 20 142 
Liberal 48 -20 28 
English 
Boroughs 
   0-1500 
   Conservative 31 6 37 
Liberal 29 -6 23 
1500-7500 
   Conservative 34 29 63 
Liberal 96 -29 67 
>7500 
   Conservative 22 15 37 
Liberal 69 -15 54 
Total English 
Boroughs 
   Conservative 87 50 137 
Liberal 194 -50 144 
Total England 
   Conservative 209 70 279 
Liberal 242 -70 172 
Wales 
   Conservative 10 4 14 
Liberal 23 -4 19 
Scotland 
   Conservative 7 11 18 
Liberal 51 -11 40 
Universities 
   Conservative 6 1 7 
Liberal 3 -1 2 
Total Great 
Britain 
   Conservative 232 86 318 
Liberal 319 -86 233 
Liberal Majority 87 
 
-85 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. In the English Boroughs Bridgwater and Beverley 
returned two Liberals and two Conservatives respectively and were 
disenfranchised after petitions relating to the 1868 election accordingly their 
results have been excluded from the 1865 and 1868 figures to provide easier 
comparison to the subsequent two elections. For the classification of English 
boroughs see Definitions. 
 
The by-election results of 1873 had been unremittingly bad for the Liberals. There 
were 34 during the year and of the 14 contested they lost 9. These contests showed 
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double digit swings against the Liberal’s 1868 position, including the loss of one 
Liberal seat in Gladstone’s own Greenwich constituency. These results had been of 
considerable concern to Gladstone as indicators of the general mood of the electorate 
and the growing lack of public confidence in his administration. Gladstone’s diary 
shows a first consideration of a general election as late as 18 January 1874 and on 
Friday 23 January the Cabinet approved the dissolution and, after amendment, 
Gladstone’s address.22 The first report of the unexpected dissolution was leaked, 
probably by Gladstone, so that it appeared in The Times of Saturday 24 January.
23
 The 
country moved into a short and sudden campaign, the new parliament being expected 
to meet in the first week of March.
24
 The period from dissolution on the 26 January to 
the final contest on 17 February gave a potential maximum campaign period of 21 
days. This was in practice much shorter and within 15 days 63% of constituencies had 
declared and the Conservative victory accepted. 
Overall the Conservatives gained 113 seats and lost 33 giving them a net gain 
of 80 seats compared to the 1868 general election result and turning a previous overall 
Liberal majority of 87 in Great Britain into a Conservative majority of 50 over all 
parties and 85 over the Liberals in Great Britain, the Home Rule party having gained 
60 seats, mainly from the Liberals, in Ireland.
25
 Further analysis shows that the 
Conservatives made net gains of seats in the United Kingdom as a whole and in all 
countries except Ireland, where they lost 5 seats and the Liberal vote permanently 
collapsed. In Great Britain the Liberal share of the vote declined by 5.1% to 54.0%. 
The Liberals continued to poll a majority of voters, as they did in each of the elections 
from 1868 to 1880 but this was an inevitable consequence of the widely different sizes 
of constituencies and because Liberal support tended to be concentrated in larger, 
northern, Scottish and Welsh boroughs with much higher electorates than the smaller 
southern Conservative seats. Accordingly, the Liberals always had to poll more voters 
per MP than the Conservatives until the redistribution changes of 1884-85 and, as a 
result, the geographical distribution of the parties’ strength was an important factor.  
Wales remained more Liberal along with the north of England although the 
swing to the Conservatives was higher. The Liberals lost three Welsh county seats and 
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two boroughs with one gain. Carmarthenshire was lost after the Conservatives 
organised themselves better and fielded only two candidates compared to three in 1868 
whilst the borough of Carmarthen was lost on a large 14% swing to the Conservatives. 
Monmouth District was lost and Pembroke District was gained. 
The Scottish boroughs had all been held by the Liberals in 1868 and were to be 
again in 1880. In 1874, however, they lost three seats; Ayr District by 14 votes as the 
borough went with the county. Wigton was lost by only two votes with a swing of 
3.6%. More surprisingly a seat was lost in Glasgow assisted by Liberal disorganisation 
and internal division as five Liberal candidates stood for the three seats. The Liberals 
fared much worse in the Scottish counties; in 1868 they had won 25 of the 32 seats. In 
1874 they lost 8 with an overall swing to the Conservatives of 7.2%. Ayrshire had 
been hotly contested since 1832 and this time the Conservatives gained both seats, in 
Ayrshire South the Liberal surrendering without a contest. The situation was similar in 
a number of other seats. The Conservatives also gained Roxburghshire which had been 
solidly Liberal since 1841.They now held all but one of the seats south of the Clyde 
and the Liberals in the Highlands were of the distinctly Whiggish variety.
26
 These 
results represented a high point of Conservative success in Scotland during the period.  
Above all, however, the Conservative victory was achieved in England and, 
most particularly, southern England.
27
 As can be seen from the table, 70 (81%) of the 
Conservative net gains were made in England, with 39 of these (49% of the total) 
being made in southern English boroughs. Indeed the Conservatives would still have 
held a parliamentary majority without any gains outside of southern England. The 
results also emphasised the continued Conservative dominance of the English counties 
where they gained a further 13 county seats in the south. Two seats, Surrey West and 
Sussex East were lost by the Liberals because they failed to find any candidates despite 
having returned members in a contest in 1868. Six others were won by the 
Conservatives in the Home Counties with large swings in their favour and the 
remainder were seats which had been marginals in 1868, and which were captured on 
swings of less than 2%.
28
 In total, 8 of the 13 gains were therefore in seats in the Home 
Counties where growing middle class influences were probably more important than 
the disaffection of Whig magnates.  
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The collapse of the Liberal vote in the south and its significant decline in the 
large southern boroughs (66% of which were in London) was much greater than the 
decline in turnout and suggests that there were significant conversions of Liberal 
voters rather than abstentions, resulting in a swing to the Conservatives in the south of 
some 10%, compared to 3.3% in the north and 8.4% for the boroughs in Great Britain 
as a whole. There was a swing back to the Liberals in 1880 but this was not uniform 
and helps provide some indication of what was happening in 1874. The small English 
boroughs swung back to the Liberals in 1880 and in these constituencies the 
Conservative share of the vote was marginally lower in 1880 than 1874. Scotland and 
Wales swung back in 1880 to their 1868 position but the home rulers maintained their 
position in Ireland. In 1874 there was a swing against the Liberals in all parts of the 
kingdom and all types of constituency except for the smaller English boroughs. 
In the northern English counties the Conservatives made net gains of 6 seats, 
winning eight but losing two in Durham and Derbyshire South. Gains were made in 
the marginal seats of Derbyshire East and the West Riding Southern Division. The 
remaining 6 seats were gained after the Liberals’ failure to contest seats they held in 
Lincolnshire (Mid and North), Staffordshire (East and North) and Nottinghamshire. 
In aggregate the small English boroughs showed a lesser swing than the larger 
boroughs, however this result needs to be treated with some caution. Of 44 southern 
English boroughs with an electorate of 1500 or less 12 were not contested in 1874 and 
four constituencies (Bridgnorth, Westbury, Abingdon and Bewdley) showed 
exceptional swings against the Conservatives and if these are excluded the swing in 
contested small southern boroughs was similar to those of greater size. The 
Conservatives lost 4 seats and gained 9 in the smallest southern boroughs. Three of the 
gains were in the Home Counties and one subject to clear patronage, Shaftsbury, 
changed hands as the largest local landowner, the Marchioness of Westminster, 
became a Conservative. In two other constituencies where patronage was thought to be 
influential one, Woodstock, showed a 3.7% swing to the Conservatives and the other, 
Hertford was uncontested in 1874. 
Parry suggests that apart from the smallest boroughs ‘the smaller and more 
southerly the borough the more marked the swing to the Conservatives was likely to 
be’. This, however, may be based on reviewing swings after excluding the four 
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constituencies with exceptionally large swings to the Liberals described above.
 29
 The 
swing to the Conservatives was greater in the larger constituencies both in the north 
and south of England. The Conservatives greatest gains were made in the medium 
sized southern English boroughs with electorates between 1,500 and 7,500 voters. 
There was a great deal of change in this category of seats with 31 of the 81 seats 
changing hands; the Conservatives losing 7 and gaining 31 for a net gain of 24, 38% of 
the gains they made in total across the country. Certain local factors undoubtedly 
influenced these results. Fear of redundancies from Gladstone’s potential reductions in 
defence expenditure probably led the naval dockyard seats (for example Chatham, 
Devonport, Plymouth, Portsmouth and Gravesend) to vote solidly for the 
Conservatives who, as a result, gained 6 seats in the medium sized of these boroughs 
and 2 in the largest. Proximity to London also provided a reliable guide. The 
Conservatives made 10 gains in the largest southern English boroughs and 9 of these 
were in London where the balance of the parties was now Conservatives 10 and 
Liberals 12. Liberal ill-discipline showed itself in London where in 3 constituencies 
(Chelsea, Southwark and Tower Hamlets) additional Liberal candidates split the 
Liberal vote allowing in a Conservative. The most striking changes, however, were in 
the larger English boroughs. Hanham suggested that ‘the big English boroughs after a 
comparatively small swing of three per cent in 1874 reacted so violently against the 
Conservatives in 1880 that the Conservative proportion of the poll fell below the 1868 
level’.30 This needs some modification because the larger southern boroughs recorded 
high swings to the Conservatives in 1874 and, significantly, many of these gains were 
held in 1880 and the Conservatives retained a significantly higher percentage of voters 
than in 1868 with a lower swing back to the Liberals in 1880.  
V The general election of 1880 
 
The 1880 general election resulted in a Liberal landslide. The Liberals more than 
reversed their losses of 1874, achieving an overall majority over all other parties of 52 
seats, despite the loss, since 1868, of 62 seats in Ireland to the Home Rulers. The 
Liberal majority in Great Britain was 123 seats, compared to 87 seats in 1868 and 67 
in 1865. The victory was achieved with an overall swing against the Conservatives of 
4.8%.  
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Table I/4 below shows the number of seats held by each party in 1874 and 1880 








































   English Counties  
   Conservative 142 -26 116 
Liberal 28 26 54 
English 
Boroughs 
   0-1500 
   Conservative 37 -8 29 
Liberal 23 8 31 
1500-7500 
   Conservative 63 -29 34 
Liberal 67 29 96 
>7500 
   Conservative 37 -19 18 
Liberal 54 19 73 
Total English 
Boroughs 
   Conservative 137 -56 81 
Liberal 144 56 200 
Total England 
   Conservative 279 -82 197 
Liberal 172 82 254 
Wales 
   Conservative 14 -10 4 
Liberal 19 10 29 
Scotland 
   Conservative 18 -12 6 
Liberal 40 12 52 
Universities 
   Conservative 7 0 7 
Liberal 2 0 2 
Total Great 
Britain 
   Conservative 318 -104 214 
Liberal 233 104 337 
Liberal Majority -85 
 
123 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. For the classification of English boroughs see 
Definitions. 
 
The Conservatives lost slightly fewer seats in the south (38) as compared to the north 
(44) and the swing against them was lower in the south at 4% as compared to 6% in 
the north. They remained strong in the English counties particularly in the south where 
they held 75 of the 100 seats, an improvement on their position in 1868, but in England 
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as a whole they lost 26 seats compared to 1874. In the north they came under heavy 
attack where they lost a further 17 seats in the counties. Four of those were lost in the 
traditional stronghold of Lancashire where Derby’s defection may have been an 
influence. Another four were lost in the West Riding of Yorkshire although these were 
traditionally more closely fought seats.   
A remarkable feature of the 1874 general election was the progress made by 
the Conservatives in the larger borough constituencies in the south of England 
especially in London. In Hackney, for instance, the Conservative share of the vote 
increased from approximately 13% in 1868,
31
 to 45.7% in 1874 and although this fell 
back to 34.7% in 1880 this position was still well in excess of the 1868 level. In 
boroughs in the south of England with an electorate in excess of 7,500 the 
Conservative share of the vote was 35.7% in 1868 and 47.0% in 1880. This was due to 
the maintenance of their vote in 1880 in the major London constituencies, as well as 
Brighton and Greenwich. As a result although the Conservatives lost 38 seats 
compared to 1874 they still held 38% of the total, an improvement on 1868. This 
together with a creditable showing in the southern counties reflected the maintenance 
of gains they had made in 1874 in London and the south-east. The constituencies that 
were gained in 1874 and retained in 1880 are set out in Table 1/5 and the 
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Table I-5 English constituencies in which the Conservatives made gains in 1874 
which were retained in 1880 
 
Canterbury Portsmouth 
Chatham Surrey, East 
Devonport Surrey, West 
Dover Sussex, East 
Essex, South Tower Hamlets 
Greenwich Westminster 
Guildford Wigan 
Hertfordshire Wilts, North 
Lincolnshire, Mid Wilts, South 
London Windsor 
Middlesex  
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations.   
 
In Wales the Conservatives were obliterated, ending up with only 4 of the 33 
seats. These 4 were all in the counties: Carmarthenshire, where Viscount Emlyn won 
one of the seats (with another Conservative splitting the vote against one Liberal), 
Denbighshire where Sir Watkin Wynn shared the seat unopposed with a Liberal; and 
Monmouthshire where the Conservatives won both seats. Cragoe noted that in Wales 
‘the focal point of the election was Gladstone’s campaign against the Turkish atrocities 
in Bulgaria and the foreign policy of the Conservative government which had 
sanctioned them’.33 In Scotland the outcome was similarly bleak for the Conservatives 
with a swing of 6% in favour of the Liberals. The Conservatives lost all of their gains 
made in 1874, including their solitary burgh seat, so that in 1880 they had no 
representation outside the counties, where the held only 6 of 33 seats.
34
 Overall the 
Liberals held 81 seats compared to the Conservative’s 10 in the British Celtic fringe. 
The election results came as a surprise to most commentators. It was certainly 
completely unexpected by Salisbury and even Liberal supporters, who had forecast 
victory, were surprised by its extent.
35
 Explanations for the Liberal success were, as 
usual, plentiful but there were some common themes. The prosperity of the early- and 
mid-1870s had been replaced by a trade recession together with a severe agricultural 
depression caused by a series of bad harvests and the transformation of the world 
                                                 
33
 Cragoe, Culture, Politics and National Identity, p. 73. 
34
 Dyer, Men of Property, pp. 122-145. 
35
 Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London, 2010), p. 238; 'The Past Election',  Fraser's 
Magazine,  (1880), 711-720; 'The General Election',  New Quarterly Magazine,  (1880), 432-443. 
56 
 
cereals markets due to the extension of the railroads to the American prairies.
36
 Liberal 
party organisation was considered to be much improved compared to 1874 – there 
were certainly fewer cases of Liberals fighting Liberals, as had happened in 1874.
37
 
The National Liberal Federation was active and, unsurprisingly, Joseph Chamberlain 
thought the impact of the influence of the Birmingham caucus across the 
constituencies had been significant.
38
 Salisbury seemed to accept that the result 
provided a condemnation of his foreign policy.
39
 Finally, this resurgence by the 
Liberals may have reflected greater Whig commitment to the Liberal campaign.
40
 
One of the consolations grasped by the Conservatives after this result was that 
the election had been a close run thing despite the size of the Liberal majority. 




It is undoubtedly the case that if some two thousand men, distributed over those 
constituencies where the contest was nearest, had voted otherwise than as they did, the 




This theme was reiterated by a contemporary statistical work which showed that there 
were some 72 seats won by the Liberals where the Conservatives were within 10% of 
the Liberal vote.
43
 It was also shown that there were 58 Liberal victories with an 
absolute majority of fewer than 100. These results were reproduced in Lloyd’s work on 
the 1880 general election and give the impression that 1880 was in some way more 
closely fought than other general elections of the period.
44
 In fact in 1880 there were 
71 seats in which the Conservative vote came to within 10% of the Liberal vote, which 
can be compared to 62 and 51 in 1874 and 1880 respectively.
45
 Whilst this shows there 
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were slightly more marginal seats (defined on this basis) in 1880 the previous two 
general elections were also closely run.  
VI Turnout 
 
Table I/6 shows the turnout at each election analysed by principal categories of 
constituency. 
Table I-6 Turnout at general elections 
 
 
1868 1874 1880 
 
Total Total Total 
English Boroughs South 
   0-1500 84.7% 87.0% 89.4% 
1500-7500 81.8% 83.7% 86.0% 
>7500 63.5% 58.8% 71.4% 
Total English Boroughs 
South 70.0% 67.7% 77.8% 
English Boroughs North 
   0-1500 85.6% 86.3% 87.2% 
1500-7500 83.7% 82.3% 85.4% 
>7500 74.9% 71.9% 77.0% 
Total English Boroughs 
North 76.8% 74.0% 78.7% 
Total English Boroughs 73.5% 71.2% 77.8% 
 
   
English Counties South 72.5% 71.0% 74.9% 
English Counties North 77.1% 80.5% 80.2% 
Total English Counties 74.8% 75.6% 77.8% 
 
   
Total England 73.9% 72.2% 77.8% 
 
   
Welsh Counties 78.9% 75.9% 79.8% 
Welsh Boroughs 82.5% 71.5% 85.6% 
Total Wales 80.9% 73.2% 82.6% 
 
   
Scottish Counties 80.0% 81.5% 86.0% 
Scottish Boroughs 77.1% 69.7% 80.7% 
Total Scotland 77.8% 72.4% 82.2% 
Great Britain 74.5% 72.3% 78.4% 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. See Definitions for the delineation of northern and 
southern constituencies. 
 
In Great Britain overall turnout was relatively high in 1868 at 75%, declining in 1874 
to 72% (at an election which also saw a significant increase in uncontested seats) and 
58 
 
climbing again to 78% in 1880. Turnover varied, perhaps unsurprisingly, according to 
the size of the constituency, it being much easier for the candidates and party workers 
to encourage, for instance, some 668 electors in Marlborough to the polls, compared to 
some 43,000 in Hackney. Thus, smaller boroughs with electorates of 7,500 or less 
tended to have higher turnouts both in the north and the south of England. It is also 
noticeable that in the larger boroughs and the counties turnout was nearly always 
higher in the north of England. 
Thus, in the smaller and medium sized English boroughs turnout was 
consistently over 80% and varied less than in other categories of constituency over the 
three elections. There was not a great deal of difference between the northern and 
southern boroughs but larger English boroughs, those with electorates in excess of 
7,500, generally had lower turnouts particularly if they were in the south. The lowest 
were the large London boroughs which often had turnouts of only around 55%. 
Turnout in Wales tended to be higher than in England, especially in the boroughs, 
although the largest fall in turnout in 1874 also occurred there. In Scotland turnout in 
the counties was higher than in the boroughs. Dyer suggested that turnout was higher 
in the boroughs where the Liberals held primaries and that it was higher than average 
in the county seats of the Borders and Clydeside. He thought this underlined ‘the 
strength and closeness of the two-party battle in these regions’.46 
A number of reasons can be advanced for the fall in turnover in 1874. It was, in 
Victorian terms, a snap election with a shorter campaigning period than in 1868 and 
1880 which may well have hindered local organisations in canvassing and getting out 
the electorate. In addition, it was the first election under the ballot which may have 
deterred some electors, particularly the illiterate - although there is evidence that many 
electors who could not read did exercise their vote.
47
 Turnout in the English counties 
was marginally higher in 1874 compared to 1868. Parry has suggested the Liberals lost 
out in the counties because of the apathy of disaffected Whigs which may be reflected 
more in the number of seats the Liberals left uncontested in the counties rather than 
turnout trends.
48
    
Turnover rose again in 1880, achieving levels in excess of 1868 and 1874 in all 
classes of constituency and geographical areas. It is certainly true that the 1880 
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election was expected and the parties were much better prepared than in 1874. Liberal 
organisation was considerably better and many registration difficulties had been ironed 
out. 
There has been considerable historical debate over the importance of turnover 
statistics in the interpretation of general election results. This debate largely stems 
from two propositions put forward by James Cornford in relation to the general 
elections of 1885 to 1906. The first of these propositions was that ‘the elections in 
which Conservatives were most successful were also those with most uncontested 
seats’. The second was that ‘the Conservative percentage of the poll varied in inverse 
proportion to the size of the poll; in fact the smaller the poll the larger the Conservative 
share of it, and that this was most true in the constituencies where the Conservatives 
were most successful’.49  Uncontested seats are discussed further in the following 
section of this chapter whilst this part deals with turnout and its impact, if any, on the 
Conservative share of the vote. Cornford’s analysis went on to suggest that ‘while the 
Conservative vote increased steadily from election to election whatever the result, the 
Liberal vote fluctuated sometimes by as much as ten per cent and, thus, whatever the 
reasons, the ‘effect was not that the Conservatives were able to persuade many 
erstwhile Liberals to join their camp, but that the Liberals failed to put forward 
candidates or to get out their vote’.50 These ideas, particularly the relationship of low 
turnout to Conservative victories went on to achieve a level of historical acceptance. 
Shannon suggested that ‘tight registers and low polls were classic axioms of 
Conservative electioneering’, whilst Green stated that ‘the Conservative party 
hierarchy also assumed that it was essential to keep as many of those on the register 
from turning out on polling day’.51 More recently these views have been challenged 
with historians questioning both the validity of the relationship of turnout to 
Conservative voting success and the degree of importance attached to these tactics in 
explaining Conservative manoeuvres.
52
 This debate and its associated analyses have 
almost exclusively focussed on the five general elections from 1885 to 1906, with little 
attention to the three general elections from 1868. Cornford briefly considered the 
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results of these elections utilising the electoral statistics contained in Hanham.
53
 His 
analysis suggests that the theory was not fully supported in this period except for the 
very largest constituencies with electorates in excess of 17,500 in 1880, where a 
‘distinct trend to Conservatism’ can be established by the increase in the Conservative 
share of the vote (from 37.5% in 1868 to 44.3% in 1880) rather than the seats gained 
over the same period which amounted to only two. This lack of translation of the 
increase in the share of the vote into seats was commented on by Frisby and lead to 
Cornford’s theory that what happened in 1885 was not a mass conversion to 
Conservatism but that because of redistribution ‘where Conservative supporters had 
formerly been swamped in huge constituencies, they were now high and dry on islands 
of their own’.54  However, Cornford’s analysis, for this period, is based on the statistics 
contained in Hanham, which are in turn extracted from a contemporary article by 
Biddulph Martin.
 55
 As discussed elsewhere these statistics can give a misleading 
impression and Cornford’s argument in respect of these elections is, as a result, 
potentially flawed.
56
 Accordingly, Cornford’s proposition has been reviewed using the 
statistics computed for this thesis. 
There were 38 constituencies in Great Britain with an electorate in 1880 in 
excess of 17,500. In 1868 the Conservatives held 21 of the 82 seats available in these 
constituencies and in 1880 they held 24, giving a net gain of 3 seats (as compared to 
Cornford’s two). In 1868 their share of the vote was 38.5% and in 1880 was 41.3% - 
an increase of 2.8% (as compared to Cornford’s 6.8%). Cornford’s analysis also fails 
to note the degree of variation within this group of constituencies and the important 
geographical trends it displayed. The Conservative’s net gain of three seats was made 
up of 7 losses and 10 gains. All 7 of the losses were from seats in the north of England 
and 9 of the gains were in the south of England, particularly London (Surrey, East (2), 
Middlesex (1), Greenwich (2), Westminster (1), London (2), Tower Hamlets (1)). A 
key part of Cornford’s argument was that the increase in the Conservative vote in these 
largest constituencies did not result in a commensurate increase in Conservative MPs 
because this larger group of Conservative supporters continued to be dominated by 
Liberals in larger constituencies. Hence, he argued, the redistribution of 1884/5 
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released this support so it was then ‘high and dry on islands of its own’. The two major 
flaws in this argument seem to be that firstly, it is based on Hanham’s erroneous 
statistics. As we have seen, the Conservative share of the vote in these constituencies 
increased between 1868 and 1880 by 2.8% not by the 6.8% quote by Cornford. The 
second issue is that his argument does not take account of the geographical shift in 
Conservative support. The analysis above suggests that the maintenance of elements of 
Conservative strength in 1880 was due to the development of support in London and 
the Home Counties. 
57
 
The application of Cornford’s reasoning regarding turnout to this period as a 
whole produces some interesting results. He expressed the relationship between the 
Conservative vote and turnout in English borough constituencies for the six general 
elections between 1885 and 1906 by calculating the correlation coefficient of these two 
variables. He classified the results by taking four groups of correlation coefficients, 
which showed that there were a large number of English boroughs where there was a 
negative correlation of over 50% between the Conservative share of the vote and the 
level of turnout. Cornford’s results are summarised in Table I/7. 
 
Table I-7 The relationship between the Conservative share of the vote and 
electoral turnout - summary of Cornford’s results 
 
 Number of constituencies with correlations of 









43 95 111 59 
Percentage of 
total of 308 
constituencies 
14% 31% 36% 19% 
Sources and notes: Readman, The 1895 General Election, p. 487; own 
calculations. 
 
This methodology may be applied to the period under consideration, Table I/8 shows 
the relationship between the Conservative share of the vote and electoral turnout in 
constituencies in Great Britain, in the three general elections from 1868 to 1880. 
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Table I-8 The relationship between the Conservative share of the vote and 
electoral turnout in constituencies in Great Britain in the three general elections 
between 1868 and 1880 
 
 Number of constituencies with correlations of 
 Less than -
0.2 
Between -
0.2 and -0.5 
Between -





4 3 0 4 
English Boroughs 
South 
    
0-1500 15 2 1 3 
1500-7500 21 3 7 9 
>7500 9 1 3 2 
Total 45 6 11 14 
Total South 49 9 11 18 
Total South % 56.3% 10.3% 12.6% 20.8% 
     
English Counties 
North 
2 0 3 5 
English Boroughs 
North 
    
0-1500 3 2 1 1 
1500-7500 9 3 4 6 
>7500 7 0 4 5 
Total 19 5 9 12 
Total North 21 5 12 17 
Total North % 38.2% 9.0% 21.8% 31.0% 
     
Total England 70 14 23 35 
Wales 4 1 3 2 
Scotland 12 1 0 3 
Total Great Britain 86 16 26 41 
Total Great Britain % 50.9% 9.5% 15.4% 24.2% 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. English Boroughs are classified according to their 
electorate in 1874. 
 
It may be observed that this table provides very little support for Cornford’s thesis 
when applied to these general elections. In over 50% of the constituencies there was 
little or no correlation between the Conservative share of the vote and turnout and the 
result is the similar in all of the classes of constituency. These results are borne out by 
other methods of examining the relationship of the Conservative vote to turnout. 
Surveys of later Victorian elections have calculated the correlation coefficient of the 
63 
 
change in the Conservative share of the vote and the change in turnout.
58
 Taking 
successive pairs of elections, that is to say 1868/74 and 1874/80, there is no significant 
correlation at all between changes in the Conservative vote and turnout. This is true of 
constituencies in Great Britain as a whole and for categories of constituencies in 
England.  
Finally, it is possible to compare the relationship of the change in the Conservative 
share of the vote and the change in turnout in constituencies by analysing the 
constituencies in which turnout rose and those in which turnout fell, and calculating 
the swing to or from the Conservatives in those constituencies. Plainly, if Cornford’s 
hypothesis is correct the swing to the Conservatives should be higher in those 
constituencies in which turnout fell. Table I/9 shows the results of this analysis and 
demonstrates the opposite conclusion that the swing to the Conservatives was higher 
(or the swing against them was lower) in constituencies in which turnout rose rather 
than fell. 
 
Table I-9 The relationship between the change in the Conservative share of the 
vote (electoral swing) and the change in electoral turnout in constituencies in 
Great Britain 1868-1880, by year 
 
 Swing where turnout 
rose 
Swing where turnout 
fell 
English Counties and Boroughs    
1868 – 1874 4.93% 3.37% 
1874 – 1880 -1.50% -3.47% 
Source: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885 and own 
calculations. 
 
The new data computed for this thesis enable a proper application of Cornford’s 
statistical methodologies to this period. These analyses show there is very little support 
for the association of low turnouts with Conservative success. Although turnover did 
go down at the 1874 election compared to 1868 it cannot be classified as an 
explanatory factor for the Conservative victory. 
VII Uncontested seats 
 
Uncontested seats were a familiar feature of British electoral politics both before and 
after the Second Reform Act and Table I/10 summarises the number of uncontested 
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seats in Great Britain from 1868 to the First World War - analysing these by the party 
winning the seat (thus the number of Conservative wins equals the seats left 
uncontested by the Liberals and vice-versa). 
 





Number of Uncontested Seats 
 Total Conservative wins Liberal wins 
1868 145 65 80 
1874 169 118 51 
1880 94 54 40 
1885 22 8 14 
1886 155 115 40 
1892 43 29 13 
1895 130 119 11 
1900 174 152 22 
1906 34 7 27 
1910 January 12 11 1 
1910 
December 
101 72 35 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. 
 
As the table shows, the number of uncontested seats showed significant 
variation in elections to 1910. It is noteworthy that between 1874 and 1910 a high level 
of uncontested seats was, as Cornford proposed, usually associated with a Liberal 
defeat, except for the increase in 1910 which most probably arose from the fatigue and 
expense of a second general election in that year.
 59
 It is also readily apparent that the 
majority of the variation in the aggregate of uncontested seats in these elections arose 
from variations in the number of Liberal candidates. In other words, from 1874, the 
number of seats contested by the Conservatives increased except for the temporary 
blips in the second elections of 1885-86 and 1910 so that even in the Liberal landslide 
election of 1906 they contested all but 27 seats. Only in 1868, when the Conservatives 
failed to contest 80 seats, is it likely that the Liberals were the beneficiaries of a 
Conservative failure to compete for a seat when they might have had a chance of 
winning.  
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Table I-11 gives a more detailed analysis of the uncontested seats at the general 
elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880, analysing them by country and, in England, by the 
type of constituency. The table further shows the significant variation over the three 
elections demonstrating the large increase in 1874 compared to 1868 and the even 
greater fall in 1880.
60
 It also shows that uncontested seats were not just a feature of the 
English counties because there were also a significant number in the boroughs. 
 
Table I-11 Uncontested seats by party taking the seat 
 
 1868 1874 1880 
 Con Lib Con Lib Con Lib 
Boroughs       
England 9 28 13 12 4 10 
Wales - 5 - 4 - 5 
Scotland - 10 - 7 - 5 
Total 9 43 13 23 4 20 
Counties       
England 45 18 87 14 43 9 
Wales 4 5 5 3 1 4 
Scotland 3 13 6 9 - 7 
Total 52 36 98 26 44 20 
Universities 4 1 7 2 6 0 
Grand 
Total 
65 80 118 51 54 40 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. 
 
Table I/12 shows the numbers of uncontested seats at each of these elections 
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Table I-12 Uncontested seats as a percentage of total seats 
 
 1868 1874 1880 
 Total 
Seats 
UC % Total 
Seats 
UC % Total 
Seats 
UC % 
Boroughs          
England 281 37 13.2 281 25 8.9 281 14 5.0 
Wales 16 5 31.2 16 4 25.0 16 5 32.2 
Scotland 26 10 38.8 26 7 26.9 26 5 19.2 
Total 323 52 16.1 323 36 11.1 323 24 7.4 
Counties          
England 170 63 37.1 170 101 59.4 170 52 30.6 
Wales 17 9 52.9 17 8 47.0 17 5 29.4 
Scotland 32 16 50.0 32 15 46.9 32 7 21.9 
Total 219 88 40.2 219 124 56.6 219 64 29.2 
Universities 9 5 55.5 9 9 100.0 9 6 66.6 
Grand 
Total 
551 145 26.3 551 169 30.7 551 94 17.0 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. UC = uncontested. 
 
It can be seen that most uncontested seats were located in the English and Scottish 
counties. They comprised the majority of uncontested seats both in absolute numbers 
and as a proportion of the available seats, which proportion reached a maximum in 
1874 when over 59% of the English county seats were uncontested. The English 
counties were a stronghold of Conservative representation and most of the uncontested 
seats in this category were held by them. A high proportion of the Welsh counties were 
also uncontested, particularly in 1868 when over 50% of the constituencies did not 
have a competition. The representation in uncontested Welsh county seats was 
relatively evenly split between the parties. Flintshire was notable in that it had no 
contest at any of the general elections. Lord Richard Grosvenor was elected in 1861 
and held the seat for the Liberals unopposed at all subsequent elections until his 
resignation in 1886. In the same way that the Conservatives dominated the English 
counties so the Liberals held the advantage in the uncontested Scottish counties, 
particularly in 1868 and 1880. Six Scottish counties, all held by the Liberals, had no 
contests at all at the three general elections. 
Although the English boroughs showed the lowest proportion of uncontested 
seats, there were a number which showed a strong tradition of eschewing contested 
elections. One, Huntingdon, remained uncontested over the three general elections and 
twelve others had no poll in two. There was also a degree of correlation between the 
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lack of contests in certain counties and the borough located within its borders. Thus, in 
1868, both Huntingdon and Huntingdonshire were uncontested, Dorsetshire did not 
have a poll and nor did its boroughs of Bridport, Shaftesbury and Dorchester. 
Lincolnshire appears to have been similarly quiescent – in 1868 the county 
constituencies of North and Mid Lincolnshire remained uncontested as did their 
boroughs of Stamford, Grantham and Lincoln. 
Generally, uncontested boroughs tended to have smaller electorates. Table I-13 
shows the seats uncontested in the English boroughs classified according to the size of 
their electorates. Larger constituencies were not immune, however, for in 1868 Stoke, 
Huddersfield, Dudley and Wolverhampton, constituencies all having more than 11,000 
voters, remained uncontested. Birmingham was not contested by the Conservatives in 
1874, and in 1880 one Liberal shared Liverpool with two Conservatives. 
 
Table I-13 Electorate in uncontested seats in English borough constituencies 
 
 1868 1874 1880 
 Seats Seats Seats 
Electorate in 1868    
Less than 1500 17 15 9 
1500-7500 12 5 3 
Greater than 7500 8 5 2 
    
Total 37 25 14 
 Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the Liberal dominance in the Welsh boroughs as a whole, all of 
the uncontested borough seats in Wales were held by Liberals. The most notable 
instance was Cardigan which was not contested at any of the elections. Given the 
electoral dominance of the Liberal party in the Scottish burghs it was noteworthy how 
many of the seats were, nevertheless, contested by the Conservatives. In 1868 and 
1880 the Liberals won all of the 26 burgh seats and in 1874 the Conservatives 
managed to win three. Despite this lack of success the seats left uncontested by the 
Conservatives were only 10 in 1868, 7 in 1874 and 5 in 1880. There is no evidence, 
however, that the Conservatives missed any opportunities in leaving these remaining 
seats uncontested. In contests that did occur in these constituencies their share of the 
vote rarely exceeded 40% and was normally below this. 
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There has been little historical analysis of the reasons for parties leaving seats 
uncontested and the nature of political activity, if any, which took place in those 
constituencies which were left uncontested.
61
 This is surprising since, as the 
paragraphs above demonstrate, they were a common feature of elections in this period, 
both at general elections and at by-elections (there was, for instance, for a considerable 
time, an agreement between the parties not to contest by-elections arising from 
appointment to ministerial positions).
62
 The examination of the politics of uncontested 
seats in this period is important because the level of and changes in the number of such 
seats can be important indicators of other trends and factors affecting electoral politics. 
For example, Lloyd thought that the increase in uncontested English county seats in 
1874, arising as it did from the Liberals not fielding any candidates where they had 
contested the seat in 1868, thus delivering 28 seats to the Conservatives without a 
fight, was symptomatic of the beginnings of Whig disaffection with the course of 




The analysis of the reasons for parties leaving seats uncontested is complicated 
because their motivations included both general considerations, such as the perceived 
national support for a party and local factors, such as the efficiency of local party 
organisation. The matter is further complicated by the fact that an uncontested seat did 
not necessarily mean the lack of representation of a particular party; in some cases the 
seats in a constituency were shared between the parties. For instance, in the English 
counties in 1868 10 of the 30 uncontested constituencies were shared in this way. 
Perhaps the first question to ask in these circumstances is whether the failure to contest 
a seat was really a potential loss to the party in question; in other words, to consider 
whether the party failing to put up a candidate had any realistic chance of winning the 
seat. If it turns out that the party failing to put up a candidate had very little chance, a 
new set of questions arise, such as why the Conservatives consistently decided to fight 
seemingly ‘hopeless’ contests, whereas the Liberal approach varied from election to 
election. Following from this the final question is what kind of political activity took 
place in constituencies which had no contest. 
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One way of assessing whether a candidate had a chance of winning is to look at 
what might have happened had there been a contested election. Such counterfactual 
questions are always risky but they can be helpful in directing attention to the likely 
factors leading to the lack of a contest. If one party had very little chance of winning a 
seat it is understandable that it would be difficult to find candidates willing to carry the 
cost and difficulty of a campaign in hopeless circumstances. However, if one party did 
seem to have a reasonable prospect the lack of a contest might point to other factors. 
There might have been a lack of, or a significant decline, in local party organisation 
resulting in local party agents underestimating the likely level of local support. It might 
also indicate where political elites in a constituency had decided on an uncontested 
election without regard to the possible outcome. One way of considering whether a 
party had a realistic chance of winning a contest is to compare the result of a contested 
election in the constituency concerned with the representation at an uncontested 
election and to review the share of the vote achieved by the respective parties as an 
indicator of the relative levels of support in the constituency. This is, of course, not 
possible for the 17 constituencies in Great Britain where there was no contest at any of 
the three general elections under consideration, but there are, nevertheless, 121 other 
constituencies where there was at least one uncontested election or at least one 
contested poll. An analysis of these constituencies shows that, on the whole, there were 
few occasions where the representation in an uncontested year was different from that 
resulting from a poll at a different election – suggesting that, generally speaking, the 
other party had made a rational decision in not contesting the seat. There were, 
however, 28 constituencies where the party not contesting the constituency did appear 
to have a chance of winning and which provide some interesting examples of the 
parties’ reasons for their decision. 
Some of the failures to contest seemingly winnable seats can be attributed to 
lack of party organisation, financial concerns and local support. For instance, 
Northamptonshire North had been held in 1868 and 1874 by two Conservatives 
without a contest. However, in 1880 the Liberals put up a single candidate against two 
Conservatives. The single candidate strategy was spectacularly successful with Bobby 
Spencer (the younger brother of Earl Spencer) coming top of the poll with 50.7% of 
the vote in close run contest. Hanham attributed the revitalisation of the Liberals in 
Northamptonshire to the release of the Whigs from government responsibilities after 
the change in government after the 1874 general election so that Earl Spencer was able 
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to return to a full time commitment to the county.
64
 Lincolnshire North was 
uncontested in 1868 and the representation shared by agreement between the parties. 
After that election the Liberal member, Sir Montagu Cholmely, indicated a wish to 
retire but little was done to find a successor and when he died shortly before the 1874 
election a Liberal organisation which had fallen into disarray was unable to find a 
replacement. Olney thought that the Conservative walk-over was a result of ‘the 
abdication by the whig party of the north division’.65 
Local factors could play their part in the decision to leave a seat uncontested. 
Bedfordshire was uncontested in 1868 and 1874 returning a Liberal and a 
Conservative, on both occasions. The Liberal seat usually went to a member of the 
family of the Duke of Bedford or his nominee and the Conservative interest had been 
represented by Sir Richard Gilpin since 1851. In a break from local influence, 
however, in 1880 the Bedfordshire Liberal Association decided to run a second 
candidate and selected James Howard, the founder of the Farmers’ Alliance.66 On 
receiving this news Gilpin stood down and the two Liberals coasted home capturing 
55% of the vote, suggesting perhaps that a good deal of the Conservative vote was a 
result of ‘political capital’ attaching to Gilpin personally. 
Another set of questions and explanations centre around the role of the parties 
in relation to uncontested seats. This question is particularly vital to the period 1868 to 
1880 because the transition to national party politics and the reduction of local 
influence does not necessarily lead to the reduction of uncontested seats. We have seen 
that Salisbury noted that had the party known the size of the defeat that they were 
facing in 1880 they might have focussed their resources more, whereas the 
Conservatives contested more seats at each successive general election in the period.
67
 
Similarly, as noted above, it is tempting to attribute the Liberal party’s failure to 
contest large numbers of seats in a period when historians might say party politics had 
reached ascendancy, to collapses in its organisation and its electoral unpopularity. The 
question of the correlation between uncontested seats and the persistence of strong 
local party influences particularly in the candidate selection process is important for 
this period. Carty suggested that in Ireland ‘the occurrence of uncontested seats at 
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general elections can be seen as indicating the persistence of a strong local component 
in candidate selection procedures’.68 The question of party organisation is also 
important in the estimation of the relative electoral strengths of the parties and 
candidates since this is usually crucially dependent on the canvass of local electors. 
Political science studies can provide valuable insights into the incidence and 
causes of uncontested seats in different electoral systems. Coats and Dalton have 
undertaken a survey dealing with 1,344 constituency elections at British Parliamentary 
general elections from 1852 to 1880.
69
 They suggest that in those elections from 1852 
to 1880 there were powerful barriers to entry which prevented opposition parties from 
contesting certain constituencies. They seek to explain these barriers by the importance 
of incumbency, the advantage of which is further explained by the power of what they 
term ‘brand name capital’. How well known a candidate was is seen to depend on a 
number of elements including a deference factor and the influence of local magnates in 
pocket boroughs and not least in the cost of new candidates making themselves known 
to voters. These costs are considered to be much higher in county constituencies 
because of their size and the wider distribution of the electors and as a result the 
barriers to entry are found to be significantly more powerful in county constituencies 
as compared to boroughs. As is discussed further below the cost of British 
parliamentary elections was significant, was much higher in the counties than the 
boroughs and was generally the personal responsibility of the candidate, who, of 
course, received no remuneration as a member of parliament. 
Thus, cost was another factor that may have deterred candidates, especially 
where support was evenly divided between the parties. Northumberland South had 
been uncontested in 1868 and 1874 when the parties agreed to share the representation. 
In 1880 two Liberals decided to contest the election against a single Conservative. 
They were both elected but the contest was close run with the Liberals winning 51% of 
the vote. The losing Conservative spent £6,600, more than double the average county 
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cost, perhaps demonstrating why there had been a lack of enthusiasm to contest the 
seat before.
70
 A contemporary writer in 1868 aptly summarised the attitude of some 
candidates when he wrote: 
The claims of the Irish Church may be very strong, but they give place, as we have 
before remarked, to considerations of family convenience. Country gentlemen have a 




There were no legal restrictions on the absolute amount of a candidate’s expenditure, 
although some forms of outlay were illegal. A notorious example was the provision of 
conveyances to take voters to the polls, which was a prohibition ignored more often 
than it was enforced, until it was temporarily made legal immediately prior to the 1880 
general election, only to be outlawed again in 1883. The increasing cost of elections 
was of mounting concern during the period from 1868 to 1880 and the cost of the 1880 
general election was undoubtedly a significant factor in prompting the 1883 Corrupt 
Practices Act.  
The average costs incurred in contested elections as declared in candidates’ 












Counties 11911 10392 8955 
Boroughs 3070 2382 3166 
Sources and notes: Source: PP, Election Expenses (424) (1868-69); PP, Election 
Charges  (358) (1874), PP, Election Charges (382) (1880). The actual cost of the 
1880 general election was much higher when the cost of conveyances was 
included. Their cost has been excluded above to make the 1880 figures 
comparable with 1868 and 1874 when conveyancing was technically illegal and, 
even if it did occur, would not have been included in the returns of expenses.  
 
It can be seen that the average cost of an election was not inconsiderable and, of 
course, could be much higher than these averages. It can also be seen that the cost of 
county contests was also much higher than boroughs not least due to the much greater 
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geographical size of the constituencies which, as we have seen, helps explain why 
more county seats were uncontested than boroughs.
73
 
Jaggard thought that the lack of contested constituencies in Cornwall up to 
1868 at least ‘was probably … an acknowledgement by the respective parties that it 
was pointless wasting money in Launceston, St Ives or Liskeard’.74 The minority 
clause of the 1867 Reform Act produced different reactions in a number of three 
member constituencies. Oxfordshire had a long history of uncontested elections. Only 
two general elections were contested between 1832 and 1880 and one of those, in 
1852, only resulted in a poll because there were four Conservative candidates. In 1865 
three Conservatives had been returned unopposed, however, in 1868, at a meeting of 
friends of the Conservative cause ‘numerously and influentially attended by 
landowners, occupiers and others’, it was decided that: 
Inasmuch as the number of votes to be given to each constituent was reduced by the 
Reform Act from three to two, it was decided to request Mr Henley and Colonel North 




The Liberal Committee, which had clearly fortuitously been meeting at the same time 
a few streets away, was then consulted and the record of their meeting shows that: 
It was agreed that in consequence of the decision arrived at by the Conservative Party, 





This arrangement did not prevent the candidates issuing addresses; indeed, that of 
Cartwright, the Liberal, went into considerable detail on a number of policy issues. 
The arrangement was maintained for the subsequent elections in 1874 and 1880 and 
the candidates continued to issue addresses at these elections. There are no reports in 
Oxfordshire of the candidates having given any speeches or having held any meetings 
in the period before their nomination and election. The nomination in 1868 was 
described as a quiet affair at which in a hall the body of which ‘was not half filled’ and 
the ‘Liberal candidate, occupied a place on the hustings, but appeared to be almost 
unknown’.77 Liberal organisation was so well developed that it was able to overcome 
the impact of the minority clause in Birmingham in 1868 securing the return of three 
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Liberals organising voting for candidates separately by wards so that Liberal votes 
were evenly distributed. After this resounding victory for the Liberal party caucus the 
Conservatives did not contest the 1874 election. 
Carty suggested that the impact of electoral reform in Irish constituencies was 
to increase the number of contested seats, taking the view that this was not surprising 
since: 
Changes in the rules of the electoral game disrupt well-established patterns of 
behaviour and increase uncertainty, conditions most conducive to political 




There is, however, little evidence to support this view in the British context (it should 
be remembered that changes in the Irish franchise were not connected with changes in 
the English franchise). The general elections between 1868 and 1914 did not 
consistently comply with this pattern. The general election of 1868, the first after the 
1867 Reform Act, produced a relatively high number of uncontested seats, and the 
1874 election, after the Ballot Act of 1872, produced the highest number of 
uncontested seats of the period. The 1885 general election, after the third reform act, 
conversely produced one of the lowest proportions of uncontested seats. Similarly, the 
very low levels of uncontested seats in 1892 and 1896 cannot be associated with any 
change in the electoral system. 
The degree of electoral political activity in uncontested seats in this period has 
not been investigated in any depth. Political activity for these purposes has been 
considered as what might be regarded as normal activities in a contested election such 
as canvassing, issuing election addresses, holding rallies and meetings, and making 
speeches. It could also include less structured political activity at election times such as 
debates in the local press, through editorials and correspondence, vigorous debate at 
the hustings and pamphleteering. Some studies have sought to demonstrate that there 
was significant activity despite the lack of an electoral contest. An example is North 
Lancashire where Foster sought to show that there could be political activity in 
uncontested constituencies.
79
 However, the politics he describes are the debates of 
local magnates and party activists seeking to avoid expensive election contests rather 
than any wider political activity. Political activity in a broad sense did not have to 
involve simply electoral contests between the Liberals and Conservatives. The 
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Conservatives failed to contest Wolverhampton between 1837 and 1861 and again in 
1868. This was hardly surprising given the derisory number of votes their candidate 
received in 1865, and they only fielded a token single candidate in 1874 and 1880 
(who was soundly beaten). However, as Lawrence remarks in his detailed study of 
Wolverhampton, there was a good deal of political activity between wings of the 
Liberal party although it is not clear whether these sorts of debate were as inclusive as 




Such other evidence as can be ascertained suggests that there was little political 
activity in uncontested seats. Cornwall West represented the most extreme example of 
an uncontested constituency, having returned two Liberal members unopposed at every 
general election from 1832 to 1880. Despite this dominance there was, as Edwin 
Jaggard has described, little complacency in the Liberal party organisation when in 
1868 it had to respond to the twin challenges of a new candidate from outside the 
county and the increase in the electorate, which as a result of the new county franchise 
had increased from 4,000 in 1866 to 8,500 in 1868.
81
 This showed the strength of the 
Liberal organisation in the county and its activity in voter registration such that its own 
estimates of its supporters showed a healthy Liberal majority. It appears that the 
Conservative organisation was to all intents non-existent and the constituency was 
conceded in all three general elections between 1868 and 1880, although whether this 
was simply by default or through a conscious policy decision is not clear. Apart from 
the Liberal organisational activity on registration there is little evidence of other 
political activity. 
In order to gauge the degree and nature of electoral political activity in 
uncontested constituencies in a more systematic way a sample of such constituencies 
was selected. This selection included counties and boroughs in both the north and 
south of England together with constituencies which were not contested at all at any of 
the three elections or were contested once or twice, so as to give coverage of a range of 
different constituencies.
82
 The assessment of the degree of political activity has been 
made through the means of review of local newspapers. This review sought to 
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determine the constituency was uncontested because of the late withdrawal of a 
candidate or whether there was no contested campaign at all. In addition, these sources 
were reviewed to determine if candidates issued election addresses and held political 
meetings or whether there was any other evidence of public participation in political 
debate during the campaign period, which was considered to be the four weeks prior to 
the date of nomination (or the 25 January for 1874, the election of that year having 
been called at short notice). 
The general conclusions of this survey were that there was very little, if any, 
political activity, in the sense described above, in uncontested constituencies. 
Sometimes a candidate for the other party was mooted or appeared only to drop out at 
the last minute before nomination but these appearances were generally short-lived and 
did not generate any activity. A good example of this was Wolverhampton in 1868. A 
Conservative candidate came forward at the last minute but withdrew on nomination 
day and as Lawrence remarked in his study of the constituency’s politics it was not 
surprising the Conservatives did not contest the elections as they had ‘neither the 
organisation nor the money to do so’, in fact, the only political activity was one 
address by the Liberal candidates.
83
  
In three southern English counties which were not contested at all at any of the 
three general elections there is no evidence of any political activity. The candidates do 
not appear to have issued any addresses or to have held any political meetings. It is 
perhaps relevant that the stability of representation was marked. In two of the 
constituencies the same members represented the county for all three elections and in 
the other there was only one change in 1874. There was a little more public activity at 
the 1868 general election when, prior to the Ballot Act of 1872, nominations were still 
made in public. Although, in the absence of any opposition the ceremonies were brief 
confirming the unopposed candidates as the members for the constituencies. The new 
MPs often made speeches and there was some attendance by the public.   
Uncontested seats were most commonly found in the counties, which was 
probably due to the cost of county contests (sometimes three times more than in a 
borough) together with the dominance of Conservative strength which made contests 
unattractive to potential Liberal candidates. There was a considerable variation in the 
policies of the parties towards uncontested seats. After 1868 the Conservatives 
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generally contested more seats at each successive general election whilst the number of 
seats contested by the Liberals could vary significantly from one general election to 
another. It is difficult to tell if this was driven by a different attitude to contests or 
otherwise. The nationalisation of politics may well have produced a decision by the 
Conservatives that as many seats as possible should be contested in order to spread the 
Conservative message. However, this did not seem to be a view shared by the Liberals. 
Equally, the type of seat where the Conservatives were electorally weakest, the 
boroughs, offered better chances and lower cost than the position faced by the Liberals 
in hopeless county constituencies. 
VIII Non-concurrence of polling dates in late Victorian and Edwardian general 
elections: The case of the 1874 general election 
 
Under the relevant Victorian legislation polls were held over a period of time 
following the dissolution of Parliament. For the three general elections in the period 
this varied between 13 and 26 days. The purpose of this section is to consider whether 
voters polling in later contests appear to have been influenced by earlier results. It was 
not until the 1918 Representation of the People Act amended the arrangements for 
elections that all polls at general elections in Britain were held on the same day. Under 
the relevant Victorian election legislation, writs were issued to the county sheriffs and 
borough returning officers when the announcement of a dissolution was made.
84
 These 
were generally received one or two days afterwards and in the counties the election 
day had to be fixed within two days of the receipt of the writ for a date not more than 
nine days after its receipt and if a poll was required that was to be held within six days 
of the election date. This gave a maximum period of 17 days (not including Sundays) 
before the last possible county polling date.
85
 After the receipt of the writ in the 
boroughs the returning officer was required to fix an election date not more than four 
days after the receipt of the writ and a polling date not later than three days after the 
election date; a maximum of seven days after the receipt of the writ.
86
 In practice, 
however, the period between receipt of the writ and polling for the majority of 
constituencies was much shorter, particularly in 1868 and 1880 when the campaigns 
had been anticipated and there was a desire to get on with the process. 
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The statutory timetables for the 1868, 1874 and 1880 general elections were 
not wholly dissimilar, although the 1874 election was shorter. In 1868 Parliament was 
dissolved on 11 November and the last contest held on December 7, a maximum 
campaign period of 26 days. The 1874 timetable was slightly shorter giving a 
maximum campaign period of 21 days. In addition, the dissolutions of 1868 and 1880 
had been generally anticipated whereas this was not the case in 1874, when the 
existing Parliament could have run to October 1875. The Liberals, despite by-election 
losses, still had a working majority and Gladstone’s decision was a genuine surprise. A 
timetable which gave a maximum of 13 days from the announcement of the dissolution 
to a poll in the boroughs was bound to put a premium on party preparedness and 
organisation and allowed little time for public debate and development of issues, let 
alone the canvassing of support. As The Times opined ‘there is good ground for 
believing that many candidates and constituencies will be found unprepared’.87 In 1880 
the dissolution was on 24 March and the last contest held on April 27, a campaign 
period of 33 days.
88
 
One of the reasons often advanced for the introduction of simultaneous polling 
is the concern that the declaration of one poll before another has taken place may in 
some way affect the voting behaviour of electors at the subsequent polls, either in 
adverse impact, or in a band-wagoning effect. This section presents a preliminary 
analysis of the declaration of results for the 1874 General Election and seeks to draw 
some conclusions showing that there was little, in any, band-wagoning as a result of 
early Conservative victories. 
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as a % 
Cumulative 
total of all 
constituencies 
Cumulative 
total % of all 
constituencies 
Cumulative 




total % of  
Conservative 
gains  
January        
30 to31 25 1 4.0% 25 6.0% 1 1.0% 
February        
2 21 5 23.8% 46 11.1% 6 6.0% 
3 46 13 28.3% 92 22.1% 19 19.0% 
4 37 10 27.0% 129 31.0% 29 29.0% 
5 64 25 39.1% 193 46.4% 54 54.0% 
6 31 12 38.7% 224 53.8% 66 66.0% 
7 39 9 23.1% 263 63.2% 75 75.0% 
9 31 4 12.9% 294 70.7% 79 79.0% 
10 18 5 27.8% 312 75.0% 84 84.0% 
11 12 3 25.0% 324 77.9% 87 87.0% 
12 15 1 6.7% 339 81.5% 88 88.0% 
13 22 1 4.5% 361 86.8% 89 89.0% 
14 to 19 44 11 25.0% 405 97.4% 100 100.0% 
Others 11 0 0.0% 416 100.0% 100 100.0% 
        
 416 100 24.0%     
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885; 
Stenton, McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book British Election Results 1832-1918 Eighth 
Edition and own calculations. Notes: ‘Others’ refer to constituencies where the exact 
declaration date is not known.  Declaration dates are the date of nomination and declaration 
in the case of uncontested seats and the poll date for contested seats. 
 
The table shows the declaration date and the number of constituencies declaring on 
that day. The next column shows the number of constituencies where the 
Conservatives gained one or more seats and the following column these gains as a 
percentage of the constituencies reporting. The remaining columns show the 
cumulative totals of Conservative gains and total constituencies declaring both in 
absolute terms and as cumulative percentages. The table throws into relief the 
shortness of the 1874 election timetable. The dissolution was announced on Saturday 
25
th
 January and, as will be observed, by 7
th
 February 63% of the constituencies had 
declared and the Conservatives had made 75% of their gains. The election was 
effectively over within 13 days of its announcement and the Conservative victory was 
known - the only remaining question was the size of the new administration’s majority. 
The statistics also show that the Conservatives tended to make their gains early in the 
contest, their cumulative gains running ahead of the cumulative declarations until late 
80 
 
in the timetable, suggesting, prima facie, that there was little if any band-wagoning and 
that some early victories did not cause a switch of support to bring a late surge in 
Conservative gains. Equally, there does not seem to have been any opposite reaction 














The question of secret voting had long been debated in British politics before 1872, 
particularly since the 1830s and 1840s.
1
 This debate reached its conclusion when the 
Ballot Act received royal assent on 18 July 1872 ending a troubled development which 
had taken two sessions of Parliament and a confrontation between Lords and 
Commons in order to complete its passage.
 2
 The Act applied to both parliamentary 
and municipal elections and made radical amendments to their operation which had a 
significant and continuing impact on the nature and conduct of electoral politics in 
Britain. It brought two principal changes in electoral methodology. Firstly, it changed 
the procedure for the nomination of candidates, requiring nomination in writing; a 
procedure which replaced the ancient system of public nomination and meant that 
prospective candidates would no longer be required to mount the hustings and face the 
public during the nomination process.
3
 
Secondly, and most importantly, it required the use of a secret ballot system for 
the conduct of any poll. The Act specified at great length the procedures to be used in 
the conduct of the ballot and the nature and form of the documentation to be used.  
Controversially, it required a method whereby each ballot paper was numbered with a 
like numbered counterfoil against which was recorded the identity of the voter, so that 
scrutiny and the consequent identification of the ballot paper of an identified voter, 
could be made by order of the court. This led to resistance by elements of the Liberal 
party and occasional subsequent intimidation of voters by suggestion that because of 
the counterfoil system the vote was not really secret.
4
  
There is remarkably little in the parliamentary debates or in the deliberations of 
the principal actors, during the period leading up to the passing of the Act, which 
suggests any party political advantages or disadvantages which might have been 
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expected to arise from the passage of the legislation. In fact, the most frequently 
voiced concerns that secret voting would have significant electoral consequences were 
made in relation to Ireland. In an 1872 speech to the Lords, Salisbury expressed his 
concern that secret voting would ‘destroy the moral influence exercised by the 
educated classes in Ireland and result in the election of a substantial body of Irish 
representatives whose ultimate goal would be the separation of Ireland from the United 
Kingdom’.5 He was right that secret voting became associated with political change in 
Ireland. Whilst calls for separation were to grow even more by 1880, Isaac Butt’s 
Home government Association had already achieved by-election success by the time of 
the 1874 general election when Home Rule candidates virtually eliminated the Irish 
Liberal representation with the Liberals losing 53 of their 64 seats and the Home 
Rulers returning 59 MPs compared to a single member in the previous parliament. 
Although Ireland provided a seemingly clear example of one of the 
consequences of the Act, its effects and implications for British electoral politics are 
less clear and have not been subject to detailed historical scrutiny. Whilst there have 
been a number of works dealing with the Ballot they have devoted most focus to the 
parliamentary politics of the development and passage of the legislation.
6
  Despite this 
difficulty and the apparent lack of scrutiny, historians have, nevertheless, proposed 
various assessments of the Act’s impact. For Seymour the Act undoubtedly reduced or 
eliminated ‘the factor of violence in elections’.7 He validly observes that contemporary 
predictions of problems with illiterate voters and personation turned out to be ‘trifling’ 
or ‘non-existent’.8 The impact of the Act on the amount of corruption or illegitimate 
influence over electors was, however, much more difficult to evaluate, both in terms of 
definition and of assessment. Seymour thought such influence was mitigated by the 
Act, observing the lack of any successful petition for intimidation after 1872 but 
nevertheless thought that ‘borough electors had not been liberated from pressure 
exercised by employers and fellow workmen’, and ‘county voters followed the orders 
of the landed aristocracy in 1874 and 1880 as implicitly as they did in 1868’.9 
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Bruce Kinzer thought the Act did little to change the incidence of bribery and 
treating but produced ‘greater order and respectability’.10 His assessment of the impact 
of the Act on undue influence as opposed to corruption is more optimistic, concluding 
that it dealt ‘a severe blow’ to its exercise, although he supplies very little in the way 
of argument or evidence to support this conclusion.
11
 Hanham concluded the 
immediate effect of the Act was to ‘suppress undue influence, not to put down 
bribery’.12 However, he suggests it did contribute to the fight against corruption by 
enabling reformers to argue that, for the first time, bribery did not pay. Also he thought 
the extension of the parliamentary law to municipal elections helped to ‘strike at the 
root of corruption’.13 Martin Pugh agreed that the impact of the Act was ‘apparently 
slight’, but argues this provides no evidence that undue influence did not exist, nor of 
its elimination by the Act. He notes the means that may have been used to undermine 
rural electors’ confidence in the secrecy of the ballot and argues for the continued 
power of deference in the polling booth.
14
 Cornelius O’Leary said: 
It is hard to see just how some of the effects which are attributed to it can be proved. 
Undue influence, violence and intimidation figured much less in later elections, and 
the substitution of the polling-booth for the hustings made the casting of the vote seem 




However, ‘the offences of bribery and corruption continued in a slightly different form 
in spite of it’ and the Act’s main effect was to ‘strike at yet another form of influence 
and privilege – the rule of wealthy landlords and factory owners over the political 
consciences of their tenants and workmen’.16 
Vernon and, subsequently, Lawrence proposed a different analysis, suggesting 
that the Act, especially the elimination of public nomination and the introduction of 
polling booths from which the public were excluded, were important steps in the 
restriction of public participation in electoral politics.
17
 Vernon saw aspects of 
electoral legislation as the progressive reduction of democracy in English politics by 
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 Lawrence has argued that the loss of the hustings ‘abolished a vital 
bastion of public accountability and pushed candidate selection into the arms of the 
political parties’.19 
It is apparent, therefore, that there have been a number of different, and often 
conflicting, views on the impact of the Act. One common factor, however, in these 
assessments is the lack of systematic evidence from which they draw their conclusions. 
This problem arises from two sources. Firstly, there is, as already noted, the difficulty 
of assessing the impact of a single piece of legislation in a dynamic political 
environment. Secondly, the nature of the evidence used is usually anecdotal and often 
presented in an unsystematic form. Much of this evidence is drawn from newspaper 
reports and the minutes of evidence for a number of parliamentary select committees, 
particularly the Hartington committee which reported in 1871 and the 1876 committee 
on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections, chaired by Sir Charles Dilke.
20
 Both of 
these committees heard evidence from a number of witnesses and their testimony 
provides valuable relevant material. However, the basis of selection of witnesses by 
the committees is not known and is not obviously designed to obtain coverage of a 
significant number of constituencies. Examples are given by selective quotation to 
draw more general conclusions, rather than by a systematic assessment of all of the 
evidence available. 
This chapter provides a different assessment of the impact of the Act by using 
more systematic assessments of the evidence. It does this by considering a number of 
different forms of evidential matters such as election petitions presented between 1868 
and 1880, the totality of relevant testimony presented to select committees and to trials 
of election petitions; election results at national, regional and constituency level and a 
systematic survey of reports of electoral violence in the period 1868-1880. The chapter 
is organised, first to consider the implications of the overall results of the 1874 general 
election, then to consider the impact of the Act on each of the areas of electoral 
violence, bribery and the application of undue influence. The final section considers 
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some of the Act’s broader implications particularly with regard to the restriction of 
public participation in politics and seeks to draw some overall conclusions. As a 
preliminary, however, it considers whether there were dramatic and obvious changes to 
the pattern of election results which could be attributed to the introduction of the 
legislation particularly in the results of by-elections between the introduction of the 
legislation in July 1872 and the general election of 1874 as well as the results of that 
general election itself. 
II By-elections and the general election of 1874 
 
The first poll using the secret ballot took place on 17 August 1872 at Pontefract. The 
constituency returned two members and in 1868 had returned a Liberal, H. C. E. 
Childers, and a Conservative, Samuel Waterhouse. Childers had a majority of 13 over 
Waterhouse and a second Liberal candidate was unelected in third place. Childers’ 
ministerial appointment as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1872 prompted a 
by-election which was contested by Viscount Pollington for the Conservatives. 
Childers retained his seat with a less than dramatic swing to the Liberals and the 
polling remained as tight as it had been in 1868 (and in previous elections).
21
 The 
Times reported how this first poll using the ballot was ‘characterised by remarkable 
tranquillity’. The paper’s reporter described the election day using such phrases as: 
‘throughout the borough a strange and unwonted quietude reigns’; ‘no bands of music 
paraded the town’; ‘no colours or banners were seen in procession;’ and ‘the church 
bells were silent’.22 
Thus, at its first outing, the ballot seemed to have had no dramatic impact on 
the electoral result and a calming effect on the electoral environment. This lack of any 
major impact on electoral results is borne out by comparing the results of by-elections 
immediately before and after the Act. This is a useful test because over a short period 
of time such as this other factors are most likely to remain relatively constant, allowing 
any effects of the legislation to show through more clearly. There were 35 by-elections 
between 18 July 1872 and the 1874 general election and 26 of these were contested, 
giving some reasonable experience of the operation of the ballot prior to its full scale 
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test in a general election, and Table II/1 shows the gains, losses and swings in by-
elections in each year for the 18 months before and after the passage of the Act.
23
 
Table II-1 By-elections in Britain held before and after the Ballot Act from 1 
January 1870 to 31 January 1874 
 
By Elections held from 1
st
 January 1870 to 18
th
 July 1872 








1870 22 5 2 6.3% 
1871 18 4 1 (0.3)% 
1872 – pre 
Ballot Act 
11 4 0 1.2% 
     
By Elections held from 19
th
 July 1872 to 31
st
 January 1874 
1872 – post 
Ballot Act 
7 0 0 (1.2)% 
1873 25 9 0 4.4% 
Sources and notes: Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results; own calculations. 
 
These results clearly show that the trend of Conservative gains which had been 
apparent before 1872, continued into 1873 and was confirmed in Disraeli’s victory in 
1874 and although there was a slight saving against the Conservatives in the 1872 
contests the tide flowed strongly back in their favour in 1873, continuing the overall 
trend since 1868. 
Similarly, the results of the 1874 General Election did not show any dramatic 
changes. If Conservative landowners and Liberal and Conservative factory owners had 
previously exerted significant influence, and this influence had been modified by the 
introduction of secret voting, then some significant changes in voting patterns might 
have been expected in the 1874 general election. Similarly, many supporters of secret 
voting had thought it was the solution to bribery and, thus, if bribery had been that 
extensive and secret voting had been the panacea then some disturbance in electoral 
results might have been expected. However, the results seemed relatively consistent 
across the country. As Chapter I demonstrated there was a swing to the Conservatives 
in nearly all parts of England, Scotland and Wales; only in the smaller northern 
English boroughs did the Liberals hold their own. The Conservatives extended their 
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grip on the English county seats particularly in the south, but generally speaking the 
swing to the Conservatives was remarkably consistent across Britain. 
It might be argued that the incidence of undue influence and bribery may have 
been localised and less extensive, so that its elimination, if such was the case, would be 
lost in overall national statistics. To test this, it is useful to examine the results of those 
constituencies which went against the trend, displaying a swing to the Liberals 
contrary to the national and regional trend of a swing to the Conservatives. Table II/2 
shows the constituencies showing the largest swings against the Conservatives. 
 
Table II-2 Constituencies displaying large swings against the Conservatives at 







Sources and notes: Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results; own calculations. 
 
These results offer no conclusive evidence for or against the impact of the ballot, often 
giving contradictory pointers to its possible impact. Bridgnorth appears to provide a 
remarkable example of the continuation of patronage despite the introduction of the 
ballot. The borough was dominated by the Apley estate and its owners, the Whitmore 
family, had long provided Conservative members for the constituency. After 1868 the 
estate was sold to the Fosters who were Liberals and W. H. Foster achieved a Liberal 
victory in 1874 against the Conservative tide in the rest of the country.
25
 Similarly, 
Droitwich appears to provide evidence of patronage continuing under the ballot. The 
seat had consistently returned, as Conservatives, members of the Pakington family, 
whose family seat was located in the borough. The rapid expansion of the local salt 
works in the 1860s and the enfranchisement of many of its workers under the 1867 Act 
enabled its owners, the Corbetts, to sustain a successful Liberal challenge in 1874, 
which carried through to 1880.
26
 If these two constituencies suggest that influence may 
well have continued to be important, Hartlepool on the other hand seems to give 
contrary evidence. The local magnate, Ralph W. Jackson, had held the seat with a 
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majority of three in 1868 but was swept away in 1874 by a Liberal majority of 918, 
suggesting that his electoral influence had been significantly diminished.
27
 
Weymouth had been the subject of a pact between the parties to share the 
representation, however, in 1874 and 1880, although both a Liberal and a Conservative 
were returned the Liberal share of the vote increased dramatically.
28
 Boston was 
subject to a petition regarding the distribution of free coal by the Liberal candidate. 
The case was upheld and the seat awarded to the Conservative, however, in doing so, 
the names of recipients of the free coal were matched against the register and 
counterfoils and their ballot papers produced to the court so that their votes could be 
discounted. This eliminated the Liberal majority resulting in the award of the seat to 
the Conservative and also demonstrated that the ballot was not secret if the court so 
ordered. 
In Wales, Pugh suggested that the secret ballot in ‘1874 brought gains for the 
Liberals’ although this was ‘no more than a continuance of a well-established trend’ 
since ‘the basis of political revolt lay in the fact that landlord and rural voter were 
frequently not of the same community’.29 In fact, the ‘political revolt’ in Wales in 1874 
consisted of the gain of one seat (Pembroke borough) and the loss of five others. Only 
three of the 13 Welsh county constituencies were contested and in those the swing 
against the Liberals was 5%, similar to that in the southern English counties. Of the 15 
Welsh borough constituencies 6 were contested and in aggregate showed a swing of 
8.2 % to the Conservatives compared to 11.2% in the southern English boroughs. The 
only exception was Pembroke, the only Liberal gain, which showed an 8.1% swing to 
the Liberals and was the only result offering some support to the supposedly liberating 
effect of the ballot in Wales. However, Pembroke’s position as an important naval 
dockyard offers a more plausible explanation of the result. The other naval dockyards 
in Chatham, Devonport, Plymouth and Portsmouth had been gains for the 
Conservatives as a result of dockyard employees’ concerns over government naval 
policy and Gladstone’s pressure for cuts in defence expenditure. Pembroke might have 
been expected to follow suit but the Liberal candidate, E. J. Reed, was a former Chief 
Constructor of the Navy and, despite being a Liberal, was a trenchant critic of the 
government’s naval policy. The Times was certainly of the view that these relevantly 
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special qualities were the reason for his success.
30
 It is also interesting that Cragoe 
notes ‘all the gains made by the Tories at this election occurred in counties where there 
had been reports of landowners evicting Liberal-voting tenants after the 1868 
contests’, suggesting they might have feared retribution in 1874, despite the ballot. 
However, he notes that this was ‘not a justification put forward by contemporaries’.31 
Accordingly, the results of the 1874 election in Wales therefore appear to offer no 
support at all to any change in the impact of influence because of secret voting. 
There had been a number of allegations of coercion by Conservative landlords 
in the Scottish counties but 1874 was one of the Conservative party’s most successful 
incursions into usually solid Liberal territory. Nine seats were gained by the 
Conservatives in the Scottish counties so they held 16 of the 34 seats; and three seats 
were gained in the Scottish boroughs where they had no representation previously. 
This again strongly suggests that coercion was not as important as some suggested or 
that secret voting had little effect on its impact. 
III The Hartington Committee and electoral violence 
 
The experiences of the general election of 1865 had already heightened 
concerns over the levels of electoral violence and expenses. The potential impact of the 
significantly increased franchise maintained this expectation for the general election of 
1868; indeed, 151 Liberal election addresses for the 1868 election proposed the ballot 
as a solution to corrupt practices.
32
 The 1868 general election justified these concerns. 
During a long campaign, canvassing and election expenditure reached record levels, 
but so did rioting and other violence.
33
 These difficulties were reflected in a flood of 
election petitions and, as a result, electoral malpractices again came under increased 
public scrutiny. This prompted the newly elected Liberal government to take action 
and the Queen’s speech, on the opening of the new Parliament in March 1869, 
recommended that Parliament ‘should inquire into the present modes of conducting 
Parliamentary and Municipal Elections, and should consider whether it may be 
possible to provide any further guarantees for their tranquillity, purity, and freedom’.34 
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H. A. Bruce, the Home Secretary, moved the motion for the appointment of 
select committee to carry out this enquiry, and in doing so provided a useful summary 
of contemporary concerns over electoral behaviour and the secret ballot.
35
 One of the 
greatest of election evils was, he said, ‘undoubtedly the enormous expenditure at 
elections’ and this included not only bribery but also its ‘sister crime of treating’, 
together with more general expenditure including travel expenses and the employment 
of paid canvassers, a practice which Bruce thought brought the ‘greatest annoyance 
and trouble’ to electors.36 In 1868 responsibility for election petitions was transferred 
from the House of Commons to the courts and the location of petition trials was moved 
from Westminster to the constituencies but Bruce was clear that the cost of petitions 
had not been materially reduced by localising the enquiries and their ‘very great cost’ 
and the risk of having to bear the costs of an unsuccessful petition, even where its 
reasons seemed ‘bona-fide’, acted as a great deterrent to contesting the validity of 
elections.
37
 He also thought that ‘the greatest of evils connected with elections, and one 
which most vitally affects the great body of electors, is that of intimidation’.38 Despite 
alleged improvements he thought that ‘intimidation exists and exists very widely’, 
noting that in many counties ‘you might put the letter “L” or the letter “C” against the 
names of the inhabitants of whole villages when you had ascertained whose property 
they were’. Influence also extended to that of the employer over the employed and that 
of customers over tradesmen.
39
 The list of electoral evils was completed with the 
scenes of ‘rioting and violence’ which ‘so frequently characterize a contested 
election’.40 
The House of Commons duly appointed a Select Committee on Parliamentary 
Elections on 16 March 1869 under the chairmanship of Lord Hartington.
41
 The 
committee had equal representation from both parties plus Hartington as chairman 
giving a total of 23 members.
42
 The Committee reported in March 1870 and it 
recommended the introduction of secret voting, the first official report to do so.
43
 A 
bill was introduced in 1871and was quickly passed by the Commons only to be thrown 
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out by the Lords on the grounds that it was too late in the session. However, the bill 
was reintroduced in the following year and was passed into law, although with no great 
enthusiasm from either chamber.
44
  
The remit of the Hartington Committee was to ‘inquire into the present modes 
of conducting parliamentary and municipal elections’ and to ‘consider whether it may 
be possible to provide any further guarantees for their tranquillity, purity and 
freedom’.45 The violence which was thought to have characterised the 1868 election 
made the pursuit of tranquillity one of the Committee’s most important tasks. It 
considered a number of proposals to reduce electoral violence and recommended the 
abandonment of the hustings both for nomination and for polling in order, inter alia, to 
reduce riot and disorder at elections. Certainly, so far as contemporary commentators 
were concerned electoral violence was a significant issue and its reduction was a 
frequently cited example of the effects of the Ballot Act - particularly because the Act 
eliminated the hustings both for nominations and for polling. 
In February 1876 the government set up a select committee to enquire into the 
operation of the existing machinery of parliamentary and municipal elections and Sir 
Joseph Heron, Town Clerk of Manchester, gave evidence that the principal advantage 
of the ballot was ‘the quietness and orderly manner in which the elections are now 
carried on’. He went on further to note that ‘there is no declaration of poll; there is no 
knowledge of how the poll is going on; and, therefore, the excitement is almost 
entirely done away with’.46 This was partly due to the removal of the requirement for 
public nomination but was also in no small part due to the change in the method of 
polling. 
Whilst these accounts give credibility and colour to the proposition that the Act 
did produce a fall in election violence they are, nevertheless, unsystematic. More 
recently Wasserman and Jaggard have carried out a study of electoral violence in 
English and Welsh constituencies over general elections and by-elections from 1857 to 
1880 with the creditable objective of remedying the ‘lack of statistical data and an 
over-reliance on anecdotal evidence within the historiography of election violence’, 
which brings ‘into question the validity of numerous statements regarding the 
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disruption of Victorian elections by outbreaks of violence’.47 Their results are of 
considerable significance in assessing the impact of the ballot on the degree of 
electoral tranquillity. Table II/3 shows the number of incidents of violence reported in 
their survey for each of the five general elections from 1859. 
 
Table II-3 Incidents of violence and the number of contests 1869 -1880 
 
Year   
Contested 
Constituencies 
Incidents of violence 
% of contested 
constituencies with incidents 
1859 124 10 8.1% 
1865 158 24 15.1% 
1868 223 59 26.5% 
1874 214 25 11.7% 
1880 250 26 10.4% 
Sources and notes: Wasserman and Jaggard, 'Electoral Violence in Mid-Nineteenth-
Century England and Wales', Historical Research, 80 (2007), 124-55.   
 
It seems both intuitively, and from the research by Wasserman and Jaggard, 
that there should be a correlation between the total number of incidents of violence and 
the number of contested seats. The table, accordingly, expresses the number of 
incidents as a percentage of the number of contested constituencies. Thus, for example, 
in 1868, over one quarter of the contested constituencies recorded incidents of 
violence. As Wasserman and Jaggard note ‘the particular circumstances of each 
general election played a role in the scale of violence’ and the 1868 election was 
undoubtedly influenced by the increase in the electorate and the length of the 
campaign.
48
 However, the expanded electorate applied equally to 1874 and 1880 and 
therefore it cannot be a distinguishing factor between 1868 and the following two 
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general elections. The very significant decline in incidents in 1874 both absolutely and 
relative to the number of contested constituencies is highly suggestive of an important 
impact of the Ballot Act. This is given further weight when the incidents are classified 
according to their timing during the campaign. For the 1868 election 13% of incidents 
took place on public nomination day, an event which was abolished by the Act, and 
which did not result in a compensating increase in violence during other phases of the 
election. 
Wasserman and Jaggard argue that the Ballot Act and the simultaneous passage 
of the Corrupt Practices Act in 1872
49
 ‘may have led to some hope for an improvement 
in electoral conditions’, but, they argue, ‘such hopes were soon to be proved illusory 
for the scale of violence in 1874 was second only to that of 1868, suggesting that 
alterations to the procedure of electioneering had little impact on the outbreak of 
violence’.50 However, their own figures hardly support this conclusion. The number of 
violent incidents in 1874 were less than half those in 1868 which is hardly a ‘little 
impact’. Similarly, although there were 3 more incidents in 1874 than 1865, the latter 
election was not held under the expanded electorate of 1868 and 1874.  
Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the Act had a significant impact in 
reducing electoral violence. This conclusion is supported by the anecdotal evidence of 
contemporaries who generally thought that elections were far more tranquil after the 
Ballot Act came into operation. It is also supported by Wasserman and Jaggard’s 
survey of reported incidents of electoral violence which shows a rising trend of such 
incidents in the general elections of 1865 and 1868 was reversed in 1874, when the 
rate of such incidents was half that of 1868. 
IV Bribery, election petitions and expenses 
 
The Hartington Committee’s second challenge was to consider further 
guarantees for the purity of elections. Bribery, treating and similar practices had a long 
history in British electoral politics. The earliest reference to treating was in 1467 and 
the first MP to be fined for bribing his electors served during the reign of Elizabeth I.
51
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O’Gorman has traced the occurrence of electoral corruption in pre-Reform England 
and ‘the way in which election rituals served to create a separate moral framework 
within which bribery and treating were acceptable’.52 The period from the Great 
Reform Act to the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 continued to show examples of 
corruption and the concerns of contemporaries were reflected in a series of Acts of 
Parliament aimed at its deterrence and punishment.
53
 Supporters of secret voting had 
high hopes that bribery would be eliminated by the introduction of the ballot, usually 
because they thought no candidate would incur the expense of bribery if he could not 
be sure how a man had voted. This section will show that this view was largely 
mistaken for two reasons; firstly, that candidates nevertheless did continue to bribe 
individuals despite having no certain knowledge of an individual’s vote, and, secondly, 
where direct bribery was curtailed corrupt expenditure continued in other forms such 
as treating. A contemporary writer made the latter point succinctly, describing the 
change as ‘formerly it was retail, now it is wholesale, expenditure’.54 
Constituencies of relatively small size also continued to provide practical 
opportunities for corruption and, despite the increase in the electorate as a result of the 
1867 Reform Act, there remained opportunities to bribe electors without the expense 
being prohibitive. In large constituencies the sheer size of the electorate made bribery 
and corruption much less feasible, and it is not surprising that almost all documented 
corruption took place in smaller boroughs. The expansion of the franchise had not been 
accompanied by a redistribution of seats in an attempt to equalise electorates across 
constituencies and the distribution of the electorate varied widely. Of the 353 
constituencies in Britain there were still some 69, returning 73 members, which had an 
electorate of less than 1500.
55
 There was, therefore, scope to affect the outcome of an 
election by influencing a relatively small number of voters in the smaller 
constituencies. As well as size, the location of the constituency made a difference, for 
it is striking how corruption was almost wholly confined to the English boroughs. Over 
the general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 there were 62 constituencies which gave 
rise to election petitions or were mentioned in evidence to the Hartington Committee 
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 Of these 62 constituencies, 59 were English boroughs and 49 
had an electorate, in 1874, of less than 5,000. Although landlord coercion and 
influence were frequently mentioned in Welsh and Scottish constituencies, corruption 
in the form of bribery and treating was very seldom mentioned and in Scotland was 
considered to be practically non-existent. Corruption was also still a practical 
proposition in marginal constituencies; in 1868, for example, there were 65 
constituencies where the winning majority was 150 votes or less.
57
 These marginal 
constituencies also often included those with larger electorates; for instance, contests 
in Blackburn, Norfolk South, Herefordshire and Southampton, all constituencies with 
an electorate greater than 6,000, were decided by fewer than 150 votes in 1880. It is 
clear, therefore, that the opportunity to influence an election by influencing relatively 
small numbers of voters was reasonably widespread. 
The assessment of the extent of corruption is complicated by its constantly 
moving definitions and practice, together with the ambivalent attitudes of MPs ranging 
from practical acceptance, through concern for their own expense, to moral indignation 
The practical and legal definitions of corruption were also complicated by the extent 
and frequency of the range of benefits which a prospective member might offer an 
elector in order to somehow influence his vote; a range which was limited only by the 
candidate’s imagination and the depth of his pocket. The range included, but was not 
limited to, the direct monetary bribing of a voter; bribery through gifts of articles or 
benefits in kind; and treating, where copious amounts of alcohol were made available 
to electors often through the provision of candidates’ committee rooms in public 
houses. The definition of bribery was an issue with which the Hartington Committee 
struggled and the problem of treating led the Committee to consider the closure of all 
public houses on election days. 
This changing background is well illustrated by the history of the treatment of 
travel expenses as potentially corrupt electoral payments. Providing the means for an 
elector to travel from their home or their place of work to their appointed polling 
station was very important in a period when there could be a considerable distance 
between these locations, especially in large county constituencies and boroughs with a 
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significant number of outvoters. Legislation in 1858
58
 made it lawful for a candidate to 
spend money on the conveyance of voters, but illegal for him or his agent to give 
money directly to their supporters for their fare.
59
 The moral ambivalence of members’ 
attitudes was shown when the effectiveness of this legislation was diluted by a House 
of Commons decision that a member could not be unseated for its contravention.
60
 The 
1867 Reform Act made illegal the payment of travelling expenses in nearly all 
boroughs but members could still not be unseated for violation of these provisions.
61
 A 
final absurdity was reached in 1880 when the final act of the Conservative 
administration was to pass what O’Leary has called ‘the only piece of reactionary 
electoral legislation of the century’.62 The dissolution of Parliament was announced on 
8 March 1880 together with a statement that a bill would be introduced immediately to 
remove all restrictions on the provision of conveyances. Despite protests from the 
Liberals and others, particularly in respect of the ‘increase, probably of vast 
proportions, in the cost of elections’,63 the bill was forced through, even though most 
members had already departed to campaign in their constituencies. This legislation was 
to have serious consequences for the cost of the 1880 election. The legislative position 
of travel expenses was finally given some decisive definition by the 1883 Corrupt 
Practices Act. This Act contained a clause ‘making payment for the conveyance of 
electors to and from the poll in either county or borough contests an illegal practice 
which jeopardised the seat of the member involved’.64 
If these problems of legal and practical definition make difficult the assessment 
of the impact of the Ballot Act on corruption, the matter is further complicated by the 
difficulty of assessing the quantum of corruption from the nature of the available 
evidence. Party records, press reports and private political correspondence provide 
valuable indicative background information but, unlike petitions and Royal 
Commissions, they inevitably suffer from a frequent inability to sustain any burden of 
proof. As a result this section focuses on the evidence of petitions, Royal Commissions 
and trends in election expenditure as a means of assessing the impact of the Ballot Act. 
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Petitions are not without their difficulties themselves as evidence for the extent 
of and trends in electoral corruption and two particular issues influence their reliability 
as potential indicators. Forming a judgement on the relationship between the extent of 
corruption evident from election petitions and its actual overall level is one of the most 
difficult. Many regarded these instances to be only the visible portion of a substantial 
iceberg but it is impossible to find a reliable basis for speculating how extensive the 
actual level of corruption might have been based on the evidence of petitions. 
Nevertheless, provided that the relationship of petitions to the unknown total amount 
of electoral corruption remained constant, then the trends in the level of corruption in 
election petitions ought to be an accurate indicator of the trends in the unknown 
totality of electoral corruption.
65
 
The second issue relates to the development of the legislative environment for 
election petitions and whether there were changes in this environment which may have 
affected the number and success of petitions so that changes in trends of election 
petitions were affected by issues other than the amount of corruption at elections. 
There were certainly difficulties in bringing election petitions including, primarily, 
their expense, their uncertain outcome, the unpopularity of petitions and the potential 
for a ‘lack of purity’ in the petitioner’s own campaign leading to recriminatory 
counter-charges.
66
 There is, however, as described below, a strong case that there was 
no significant change in these factors between 1868 and 1883 and subsequently, and 
that the environment for election petitions remained sufficiently stable for valid 
conclusions to be drawn about the overall level of electoral corruption from changes in 
the level of election petitions.  
Election petitions were indeed expensive. A petition had to be brought by an 
interested individual, who was potentially liable for the total costs of the action if it 
failed. These costs could be very significant. In 1868 jurisdiction for election petitions 
was moved from parliament to the courts with trials now to be held in the constituency 
concerned. These changes brought an additional uncertainty to costs and O’Leary has 
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suggested it brought an increase.
67
 Similarly, the uncertain outcome of petitions may 
well have been a deterrent to the bringing of petitions, although there is no evidence to 
suppose there was a change in the degree of that uncertainty during the period from 
1868 to 1880. The system introduced in 1868 was undoubtedly successful in achieving 
its aim of producing more consistency in the interpretation and application of the law. 
The 1875 Select Committee on Corrupt Practices recommended that two judges should 
try petitions but also recognised that the system had improved significantly in the 
consistency of judicial decisions.
68
 As O’Leary has shown, the judges ‘set about 
building up a corpus of election law’.69 This development of consistency, which 
provided further confidence for the petitioner, is illustrated by the consistency of 
judicial appointments to petition trials. The 97 petition trials between 1868 and 1882 
required in theory the appointment of 124 judges. In fact, over two thirds of all the 
cases were tried by just 5 judges who made significant contributions to the 
interpretation and consistency of application of election law. Thus, far from proving an 
increasing deterrent from petitioning over this period it is quite possible that the 
development of trial procedures and election law may have encouraged the bringing of 
election petitions. 
Thus, if the legislative environment for election petitions between 1868 and 
1883 and later may be regarded as stable, it is possible to use changes in the incidence 
of election petitions as a measure of changes in the overall level of electoral corruption 
over that period. Table II/4 shows the petitions made and their results in respect of the 
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Table II-4 Petitions in respect of elections in England & Wales 
 
Election Petitions Successful 
petitions 
Successful Petitions 
    Conservative Liberal 
 Number Number % Number % Number % 
1868 46 12 26 8 66 4 33 
1874 22 14 64 5 36 9 64 
1880 29 19 66 11 58 8 42 
Sources and notes: PP, 1874 (219) Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868. Return of all 
election petitions tried in England by election judges under the Parliamentary Elections 
Act, 1868, up to the 30th January 1874; and, similar returns for Ireland and Scotland. 
PP, 1883 (325) Election petitions. Return of all election petitions tried in England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, by election judges, or decided by the court on 
special cases, under "the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868," since 30 January 1874; 
&c. 
 
The table clearly shows the significant number of petitions generated by the 
1868 general election and helps put into context the supposed problems of the 1880 
contest. It also shows that the distribution of the successful petitions between the 
parties was relatively balanced – 24 for the Conservatives and 21 for the Liberals over 
the period 1868 to 1880. However, there was a clear increase in both the absolute 
number and the proportion of petitions which were successful. Seymour suggested this 
may have been because the new tribunals exercised ‘greater severity and demanded 
closer adherence to the law than had been the custom in times past’.70 Nevertheless, 
since the form of the tribunal was unchanged from its introduction in 1868 save only 
for the introduction of a second judge in 1879, the change may be attributable to the 
development of case law giving more certainty and predictability to the assessment of 
the likely outcome of particular cases which may have prevented less likely petitions 
coming to trial. More importantly, for present purposes, the decline in petitions in 1874 
occurs after the introduction of the ballot in 1872. Additionally, although there is a 
slight increase in petitions in 1880 this is most probably due to the increase in 
contested constituencies in that year compared to the relatively low level in 1874. 
Table II/5 shows the number of petitions presented as a proportion of contested 
constituencies and that the proportion declined consistently in 1874 and 1880. These 
statistics also show that whilst the proportion of petitions per contested constituency 
fell over the period the proportion of successful petitions increased. 
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1868 223 46 0.21 0.054 
1874 214 22 0.10 0.065 
1880 250 29 0.08 0.076 
Sources and notes: PP,1874 (219) Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868. Return of all 
election petitions tried in England by election judges under the Parliamentary Elections 
Act, 1868, up to the 30th January 1874; and, similar returns for Ireland and Scotland. 
PP, 1883 (325) Election petitions. Return of all election petitions tried in England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, by election judges, or decided by the court on 
special cases, under "the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868," since 30 January 1874; 
&c. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results. 
 
If election petitions gave some indication of the level of prosecuted bribery, 
candidates’ election expenditure is another potential source of evidence of trends in 
corruption. There were no legal restrictions on a candidate’s expenditure for the 1868, 
1874 and 1880 elections but candidates were required, under the Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1857, to submit for publication returns summarising their election expenses. These 
returns need to be treated with some care since they were undoubtedly subject to the 
natural temptations of creative accounting and as Thomas Hoskins, legal agent to the 
Liberal party, rather dubiously remarked in 1880 ‘I consider that the election expenses 
are the legal and proper election expenses, and that any illegal and improper payment 
is not an election expense which ought to be returned to the returning officer’.71 
Nevertheless, returns were generally received for most of the 421 constituencies giving 
a relatively large number of returns and whilst reporting malpractice may make the 
absolute levels of expenditure inaccurate it is a reasonable expectation that it was 
constant over elections. As a result some overall conclusions as to the trends in 
election expenditure would remain valid.  
The degree of analysis of expenditure required by the legislation gradually 
increased over time and the returns for 1880 give the best examples of the type of 
expenditure incurred by parliamentary candidates. Tables II/6 and II/7 illustrate this by 
showing the expenditure for Essex South at the 1880 general election. 
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Cost of polling booths 125 
Cost of Dies, Ballot Papers, Advertising Placards, Stationery, 
&c 
108 
Cost of Presiding Officers’ Clerks, Counting Clerks, &c 253 
Fee charged by Returning Officer or his Official  175 
All other charges of the Returning Officer 11 
Total Returning Officer’s Charges 672 
Sources and notes: PP, 1880 (382) Election charges. Return of charges made 
to candidates at the late elections by returning officers 
 












 £ £ £ £ £ 
Agents including Clerks, 
Messengers and Canvassers 
2,296 2,296 453 453 5,498 
Hire of Conveyances 754 754 421 421 2,350 
Printing and Advertising 4,060 4,060 617 617 9,354 
All other expenses 488 488 601 601 2,178 
Total 7598 7598 2092 2092 19,380 
Sources and notes: PP, 1880 (382) Election charges. Return of charges made to 
candidates at the late elections by returning officers 
 
The cost of conveyances, amounting to £2,350, is significant because of the 
change in legislation which made this expenditure legal for the 1880 election. The 
following Table II/8 summarises the results of an analysis of returns of candidates’ 
expenses as aggregated in the relevant parliamentary papers.
72
 This table shows that 
the aggregate cost of the elections declined in 1874 but increased substantially in 1880.  
The aggregate cost of elections is, of course, heavily affected by the number of 
contested seats and Table II/9 shows the average cost per contested constituency in 
England & Wales and demonstrates that 60% of the increase in the cost of the 1880 
general election, compared to 1868, arose from the increase in the number of contested 
constituencies rather than from any underlying increase in the cost of elections. 
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Table II-8 Aggregate election expenses from candidates’ returns for contested 
constituencies in England & Wales 
 
All £s 1868 1874 1880 
Counties    
England 599098 344251 651055 
Wales 56028 29856 79178 
    
Total Counties 655126 374107 730773 
Boroughs    
England 457067 369794 646517 
Wales  31069 28077 28623 
    
Total Boroughs 488136 397871 675140 
Grand Total 1143262 771978 1405913 
Sources and notes: PP, 1868-69, (424), Election expenses; PP, 1874, (358), Election 
charges; PP, 1880, (382), Election charges. 
 
Table II-9 Election expenditure per contested constituency in England & Wales 
excluding hire of conveyances in 1880 
 
All £s 1868 1874 1880 
Counties    
Total expenditure 655126 374107 564159 
Contested constituencies 55 36 63 
Average cost 11911 10392 8955 
Boroughs    
Total expenditure 488136 397871 566852 
Contested constituencies 159 167 179 
Average cost 3070 2382 3166 
Total average cost 5342 3803 4673 
Sources and notes: PP, 1868-69, (424), Election expenses; PP, 1874, (358), Election 
charges; PP, 1880, (382), Election charges. 
 
In Great Britain the 1880 election cost £1.7 million based on candidates’ 
returns, although its true cost has been estimated at £2.5 million.
73
  These aggregates 
represented the end of a trend which was to be arrested by the expenditure limitations 
imposed by the 1883 Corrupt Practices Act which was partially motivated by the 
desire of candidates to place some limits on the increasing cost of elections and the 
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Seymour sought to summarise the effect of the ballot on the incidence of 
bribery when he said: 
In the boroughs where the traditions of the old-time corruption were not strong, and 
where electioneering methods were generally honest, the ballot was said to have 
discouraged the spread of bribery. Many witnesses agreed that secret voting was 





Edward Lewis the member for Londonderry City and a lawyer and senior 
organiser for the Conservatives considered that ‘I have not the slightest hesitation in 
saying that the ballot has diminished bribery and I think that elections are far more 
pure than they used to be’.76  Sir Joseph Heron, the Town Clerk of Manchester, was of 
the view that ‘there is no doubt that if there was a temptation of bribery that is done 
away with to a very large extent by the secrecy of the ballot system’.77 The evidence 
presented above suggests that these conclusions were at best premature. It may well be 
that these comments were referring to direct bribery and there may have been some 
reduction in that, although the 1880 election showed it had by no means disappeared. 
Some of the statistics on elections petitions suggest that the Ballot Act did have an 
effect on bribery, treating and similar practices. The anecdotal evidence also suggests 
there may have been a reduction. Election petitions, however, show clearly that bribery 
could still occur in some constituencies. Election expenditure also suggests that 
although direct bribery may have reduced, treating and similar practices were still 
common. The excessive cost of the 1880 general election may have been exaggerated 
because of the ‘one-off’ effect of travel costs but it was nevertheless more expensive 
than 1874 and it seems clear that the Ballot Act did not have a great deal of impact on 
bribery, treating and similar practices, taken as a whole. 
V Influence 
 
The third task of the Hartington Committee was to consider further guarantees 
for the freedom of elections from undue influence. There are three major problems in 
considering the impact of undue influence at elections. All were recognised by the 
Committee and they have continued to effect the historical consideration of the issue. 
The first challenge was to establish what was exactly meant by undue influence in an 
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electoral context. The Committee discussed ‘intimidation of workmen by masters, of 
tenants by landlords, of tradesmen by customers, and of working men by each other’ as 
well as ‘intimidation by ministers of religion’.78 These were some of the most obvious 
examples, but the list can be extended. The Committee recognised the very wide range 
of behaviour that could be construed as undue influence and noted that ‘there exists 
during the canvass in most boroughs a system of working upon voters through private 
considerations whether of interest, hope or fear, for political purposes, and this system 
enables undue influence in a modified form to be constantly practised.’79 These were 
all different kinds of explicit intimidation, coercion and pressure but influence could 
also be much more subtle. Joyce’s work on Lancashire factory politics has described 
how ‘behind actual and threatened dismissals were a range of influences, potent in the 
intimate factory neighbourhood long after the institution of the secret ballot’.80 He 
suggested that influence in the mills operated on many levels from the obvious 
coercion of the screw, through the influence of factory supervisors until ultimately 
‘this influence…….shaped the identity of locales and their people’s sense of place’.81 
The second major issue was achieving some consensus on the dividing line in 
such a wide range of practices between acceptable and unacceptable influence. In 
addition, this had to be followed by the provision of an appropriate legal definition 
which was also capable of practical enforcement. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1854 
had defined undue influence as ‘the making use of, or threatening, any force or 
restraint, or in any manner practising intimidation upon a person in order to influence 
his vote’.82 This broad, and rather vague, definition was to remain in force until 
extended by the 1883 Corrupt Practices Act.
83
 
The election judges themselves were acutely aware of these difficulties. In his 
judgement on the 1868 Beverley election petition Baron Martin recognised that no law 
could, or ought to, prevent the influence of a personal relationship or, he thought, ‘the 
influence arising from high birth; from the candidate living in the neighbourhood of 
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the town, and being known and respected there’.84 Similarly, another election judge, 
Sir Samuel Martin, in giving evidence to the Hartington Committee, agreed that the 
terms of the 1854 definition represented a very broad test, but declined to give an 
opinion as to whether a threat by a priest that failure to vote in a certain way would 
incur penalties in the afterlife, would be caught by this legislation.
85
 
The final major issue which faced contemporary legislators, and which also 
faces historians, is the difficulty in determining the extent of undue influence. The 
Hartington Committee was in no doubt that intimidation was practised and that ‘the 
fear of it widely prevails among that class of voters who are liable to its influence’.86 
Edward Leatham, the member for Huddersfield and a member of the committee was 
even more certain when he moved the Second Reading of an early draft of a Ballot Bill 
in 1870, asserting that: 
Coercion by landlords, employers, and customers is as rampant as ever it was—that 
the whole electoral atmosphere is charged with it—and that, in many constituencies, 
the main element of political success is not the use of reason, or of eloquence, or even 
of money—but the use of pressure.87 
 
The Committee, however, did acknowledge that as soon as evidence of influence 
becomes: 
Known in the locality, applications have been received that witnesses on the other side 
should be examined, who have denied the charges brought against themselves, but 




Certainly, this absence of certain and overwhelming evidence of widespread improper 
influence appears to be reflected in the results of the trials of election petitions and the 
investigations of Royal Commissions between 1868 and 1880 when very few 
substantially supported examples of undue influence were reported. 
Without the reliable identification of the incidence and amount of undue 
influence it is less easy to provide a sound basis from which to try and ascertain the 
potential effects, if any, of the ballot. The basis of the Hartington Committee’s 
selection of witnesses is unclear and it appears that they often appeared by voluntary 
application. The evidence taken by the Committee is not, therefore, based on a 
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representative sample. Nevertheless, it remains the best available collection of 
testimony on this issue. It is accordingly instructive to look at the potential impact of 
the ballot on those constituencies which were mentioned in evidence to the Hartington 
committee as having experienced examples of the application of undue influence. 
Sixteen constituencies were discussed in this respect by the Committee covering 
boroughs and counties in England, Wales and Scotland. Table II/10 shows these 
constituencies, the party allegiance of members elected in 1868, 1874 and 1880 
together with the electoral swing to or (from) the Conservatives in 1874 and 1880. 
 
Table II-10 Constituencies which the Hartington Committee thought may have 



















Ashton C C C (0.6) (5.2) 
Blackburn CC CL LC (1.6) (1.3) 
Bradford LL LC LL Na (1.9) 
Carlisle LL LL LL (5.6) (1.6) 
Chippenham C C C 9.8 (12.3) 
Gravesend L C L 7.9 (6.3) 
Liverpool CCL CCL CCL 1.3 uncontested 
Oldham LL CC LL 0.7 (5.0) 
Stalybridge C C L (1.9) (3.3) 
Windsor L C C 13.5 (8.6) 
Cheshire Mid CC CC CC uncontested uncontested at 
previous 
Carmarthenshire LC CC LC 4.4 (15.3) 
Merionethshire L L L uncontested uncontested 
Monmouthshire CC CC CC uncontested uncontested at 
previous 
Dumfriesshire L C L 3.5 (3.7) 
Roxburghshire L C L 6.0 (1.2) 
Sources and notes: Hartington Report, PP, 1870, (115). Craig, British Parliamentary 
Election Results; own calculations. 
 
It is apparent from examination of this table that there were no dramatic 
changes of fortune for the parties in these constituencies after 1868 which suggests 
either that undue influence had not been a major factor, or that the ballot had failed to 
eliminate its impact. Closer review of some of the results suggests that the ballot might 
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have removed the impact of some undue influence, but in other constituencies it may 
well have continued to operate.  
The general election of 1874 showed a strong swing to the Conservatives in 
most British constituencies but Carlisle was notable in turning strongly to the Liberals. 
Carlisle was a long established borough, returning two members since 1832, and 
having an electorate of 4,693 in 1874. It had been generally Liberal since 1832 and 
returned two Liberal members in 1868 with 51% of the vote and who had a close run 
majority of 14 votes for the second seat. The Liberals retained both seats in 1874 with 
an exceptional swing of 5.6% against the Conservatives. They also retained both seats 
in 1880 with a small swing in their favour. The Hartington Committee heard evidence 
from a former Mayor of Carlisle about what was known as the railway screw.
89
 This 
referred to the activities of William Hodgson, Conservative candidate for Carlisle and 
also a director of the London and North Western Railway which was a substantial 
employer in the town. During the 1868 campaign Hodgson canvassed personally for 
support and obtained the vote of 136 of the 154 men from the railway who were 
electors. Subsequently, 5 of the 15 who had voted Liberal were dismissed. Hodgson 
nevertheless lost by 14 votes in 1868 but was still able to stand successfully for 
Cumberland East at the same election. In 1874 Hodgson retained his seat in the county 
constituency and did not stand for the borough. At this election the borough was one of 
the few English constituencies to swing strongly to the Liberals, the second victorious 
Liberal candidate achieving a majority of 310 over the first defeated Conservative, 
suggesting that the railway voters had swung back behind the Liberals because the 
ballot ensured their votes were not known to Hodgson. 
Chippenham, on the other hand, exhibited many features of a small 
constituency in which influence might have been expected to operate but in which the 
ballot appears to have had little effect on the electoral outcome. It was a small borough 
in Wiltshire with an electorate of 979 in 1874 and was classified by Hanham as a seat 
controlled by patrons; in Chippenham’s case, in 1868, Sir Gabriel Goldney, a notable 
landowner and banker.
90
 Almost all of the local landowners in Chippenham were 
Conservatives and allegations were made to the Hartington Committee that they had 
used substantial influence on the tenants of their houses and allotments to vote 
                                                 
89
 PP, Hartington Evidence, 1868-69, (352) (352-I), paragraphs 9359 to 9489; see also Hanham, 
Elections, pp. 88-89. 
90
 Hanham, Elections, p. 409. 
108 
 
Conservative. It was further alleged that a number of tenants who had voted  Liberal 
were evicted after the 1865 election. It was suggested that almost all such tenants had 
voted Conservative at the 1868 election and a number of the newly enfranchised were 
also intimidated by threat of loss of employment. The witness was convinced that the 
ballot was the only remedy to this state of affairs.
91
 
As with many of these cases, however, the introduction of the ballot appears to 
have had no substantial impact. Goldney was elected as the Conservative member in 
1868 with a majority of 59, and 54% of the vote. Despite the introduction of the Act, 
Goldney stood again in 1874 and was returned with an increased majority of 226 with 
64% of the vote. The swing in his favour of 9.8% was very much in line with the 
average swing to the Conservatives in all southern English boroughs. Goldney also 
held the seat in 1880, although the swing against him was larger than average at that 
election. Again, therefore, there is no evidence that secret voting substantially changed 
electoral patterns in situations where such influence was thought to exist, suggesting 
that either the degree of such influence could have been overestimated or that it may 
have continued to exist in ways which were not so obviously susceptible to the remedy 
of secret voting.  
Windsor was a small southern borough with an electorate of 1,951 in 1874. 
Colonel Robert Richardson-Gardner came to live in the borough in 1865 and, having 
purchased some 129 houses which gave their occupants the vote, decided to contest the 
1868 election as a Conservative, narrowly losing by 8 votes to the sitting Liberal 
member. Windsor did not have an outstanding reputation for purity – the winners of 
the 1865 election had been unseated on petition and the Hartington Committee had 
heard evidence of the susceptibility of some Windsor electors to bribery – and 
Richardson-Gardner petitioned against the election but was unsuccessful. After this 
defeat he promptly evicted the 20 tenants of his properties who had voted against him. 
Subsequently, Richardson-Gardner stood again and won the 1874 election with by a 
majority of 446 and a swing of 13.5% in his favour. The defeated Liberal candidate 
then petitioned on a number of grounds, including giving gifts to residents and bribery, 
all of which were dismissed. By far the most interesting charge, however, related to the 
eviction of Richardson-Gardner’s tenants after the 1868 election which, it was claimed, 
carried a threat through to the 1874 election. This was ultimately rejected by the judge 
                                                 
91
 PP, Hartington Evidence, 1868-69, (352) (352-I), paragraph 4958 and paragraphs 5040-5042. 
109 
 
on the grounds that Richardson-Gardner had not repeated the threat of eviction and, in 
a judgement of supreme irony, Baron Bramwell said that his tenants were protected by 
the Ballot Act. The Baron said any threat was prevented from being effective: 
Because the effect of the Ballot Act is that a man can vote with safety; he can vote 
according to his conscience with safety, and the threat can have no effect upon him, 





Thus, the petition was dismissed and Richardson-Gardner kept his seat. It is, of course, 
impossible to prove whether undue influence continued in this case and it might well 
be that Richardson-Gardner simply replaced his troublesome tenants with those with 
political views similar to his own. 
A number of examples of alleged coercion and intimidation were made in 
respect of certain of the Welsh counties but if such intimidation was extensive the 
ballot seems to have little effect on the election results in the Welsh counties. In 1874 
the Conservatives gained three seats and lost none so that they represented 11 of the 17 
Welsh county seats. None of the constituencies showed a swing toward the Liberals 
who also left 4 of the 13 county constituencies uncontested. 
The Scottish constituencies were unique in being free from bribery but that did 
not stop frequent accusations of undue influence directed at Conservative landlords in 
particular. The Committee heard evidence that considerable landlord pressure had been 
exerted on behalf of the Conservative candidates in both Dumfriesshire and 
Roxburghshire during the 1868 election, although in the case of Roxburghshire this 
was disputed during the duration of the Committee’s investigations.93 Nevertheless, 
both constituencies returned Liberal members in 1868 when these matters were 
complained of, and returned Conservative members in 1874 when the supposedly 
pressurised tenants had the benefit of the ballot. 
The by-election held for Shaftesbury on 30 August 1873 provides similar 
ambivalent evidence of the impact of the Act on undue influence. Shaftesbury was a 
market town with 1,188 electors registered for its 1873 by-election and had returned 
Liberal members since 1841, usually without a contest. The constituency contained a 
number of estates in the surrounding countryside, the most significant being those of 
the Grosvenor family centred on Motcombe Hall. The acquisition of these estates by 
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the Grosvenors had begun in 1820 with the purchase of 400 premises in the town and 
the Motcombe estate itself, made with the express intention of controlling the election 
of Shaftesbury’s representation through influencing the votes of the tenants, most of 
whom were tenants at will and therefore subject to potentially summary eviction. 
With the death of the second marquis, the estates came under the control of his 
wife, Elizabeth Leveson-Gower, a lady of impeccable Whig credentials (being the 
younger daughter of the first Duke of Sutherland). The Marchioness had become more 
reactionary in her later years to the point where she ‘feared and loathed Gladstone as a 
dangerous demagogic maniac’.94 Ironically, in 1873 Shaftesbury’s MP was George 
Grenfell Glynn, Liberal Chief Whip and one of Gladstone’s closest associates. Glyn 
had been returned unopposed at the previous four elections, but the death of his father 
in 1873 elevated him to the peerage and so triggered the by-election. It is difficult to 
believe that the views of the Marchioness of Westminster were other than instrumental 
in the Conservative’s decision to put forward a candidate. In a seat which had not been 
contested since 1837 and which had sent a Conservative to parliament for only 3 years 
in the previous 50 (and then by default because the Liberal victor in 1837 was unseated 
on petition), there must also have been some expectation that the Marchioness’s views 
would be influential in order to offer any prospect of success. As a result Stanford 
Benett, a well-known and popular figure in the neighbourhood, came forward as a 




Benett won the contest with 591 votes to the Liberal’s 562. One writer to The 
Times was in no doubt that this was due to the influence of the Marchioness, 
explaining that Shaftesbury had five polling districts, and that 624 electors (more than 
50%) were located in Shaftesbury town and the Motcombe estates where the 
Marchioness owned almost all the property. She had, he suggested, canvassed every 
tenant, through her land agent, in favour of Benett, and was in no doubt that the 
Conservative victory was attributable to the influence of the Marchioness.
96
 If that is 
true then it is a clear indication that the ballot had not removed such power; on the 
other hand the seat had not been contested since 1847 and it may well have been that 
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there was a strong undercurrent of Conservative support as there was in most similar 
southern English boroughs in the 1874 general election. 
The Ballot Act had been passed in 1872 with a provision requiring its renewal 
in ten years which, as the tenth anniversary of its enactment approached, gave a 
particular focus to public debate on its effectiveness. Contemporary views were 
similarly ambivalent about its impact on undue influence. The Edinburgh Review was 
still opposing the renewal of the ballot in 1881 and offered the view that ‘in 1872 it 
was still possible to contend that secret voting would put an end to bribery and 
intimidation; but the experience of two general elections has put an end to all such 
illusions’.97 The paper argued that bribery had never been confined to paying for 
individual votes and whereas the ballot had limited that form of corruption it was 
nevertheless still extensive through the general treating provided by candidates. The 
argument against the prevention of intimidation was less convincing. The writer 
suggested that ‘as for intimidation, we see no escape from the conclusion that the 
ballot is no protection, unless the voter chooses to tell a lie’. But the writer admitted 
that it nevertheless had been effective in those circumstances.
98
 Blackwood’s Magazine 
complained that one of the supposed benefits of the ballot was to have been the 
reduction of election expenditure, and this had singularly failed to occur.
99
 It was, 
however, more impressed with what it had thought was the elimination of undue 
influence: 
If by secret voting tenants are able to record their votes in opposition to the views of 
their landlords without fear of consequences, so also the working-men are independent 
of the grinding tyranny of their taskmasters and overseers, and are secure from the 
pains and penalties to which they were formerly subjected when they differed from 
their employers: they are no longer to be seen, in large manufacturing districts, 





We are still left with the dilemma, therefore, of whether the lack of apparent 
impact of the Ballot Act reflects the absence of significant undue influence prior to the 
Act or whether such influence continued after the Act, either because the Act was 
ineffectual or because influence continued in a manner which was less susceptible to 
the corrective effects of secret voting. 
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One tentative conclusion is that the more obvious and ostensible forms of 
threat and coercion were lessened. Nevertheless, as Joyce has noted, although a 
distinction may be drawn between coercion and influence, ‘the inadequacy of coercion 
as a main explanation of the nature and longevity of mass political attitudes must be 
insisted upon’ but ‘its presence ought not be underestimated. Behind actual and 
threatened dismissal were a range of influences, potent in the intimate factory 
neighbourhood long after the institution of the secret ballot’.101 
 
VI Changes in the nature of electoral politics 
 
This final part of this chapter briefly considers the possible effects of the Act in the 
wider context of the purpose and impact of electoral legislation in general. Two 
historians of this period have approached the Ballot Act from this direction, giving 
readings different from those hitherto discussed. The first was presented by Vernon, 
who suggested that the Ballot Act formed an extension of a process which saw the 
progressive reduction in democracy in English politics between the first and second 
reform acts, ‘as political subjectivities and the public political sphere were defined in 
increasingly restrictive and exclusive fashions’. In addition, he argued, the dynamics of 
political communication were changing so that individuals had ‘less and less power in 
the creation of their own political languages and identities’ and ‘a mass of legislation 
sought to discipline popular modes of political communication’. Thus, legislation 
enacted with the ostensible purpose of eliminating corruption ‘sought to discipline 
popular politics, tempting it out from its customary venue of the pub to purpose-built 
halls in which audiences could be better regulated’.102 
Under this thesis the Ballot Act becomes a specific part of this process, 
particularly through the removal of public nominations and the creation of indoor 
polling stations which only voters were allowed to enter. As a result the occasions 
when ‘the disenfranchised exercised most influence’ were ‘legislated out of existence’.  
This meant that ‘no longer could the disenfranchised vote at the nomination or hold a 
vigil beside the hustings to intimidate the voters, nor could they deploy exclusive 
dealing, for how were they to tell how the shopkeepers and tradesmen had voted; and 
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‘inevitably, the Act also precipitated the decline of a whole range of electoral 
ceremonies like processions to and from the hustings’.103 
One of the difficulties with this argument is that it fails to adequately account 
for the effect of the extension of the franchise in 1867. The argument for the 
importance of the hustings in hearing the voice of the disenfranchised is largely based 
on examples from elections before 1868. But many, if not most, of this group were 
enfranchised by the 1867 Act and, as a result, the 1868 election provides the only valid 
basis to support this claim. It is indeed true that certain groups, most particularly 
women, were still not enfranchised but there is no strong argument that they were 
significant participants in the hustings in 1868. The other major difficulty is that this 
argument presents a somewhat rose-tinted view of the political impact of the hustings. 
The paragraphs below argue that the political power of the hustings in 1868 was 
practically non-existent and, therefore, to argue that their loss was a major blow to the 
political power of the disenfranchised is misguided. 
Lawrence has suggested that the elimination of public nominations removed a 
valuable means of testing public opinion through the show of hands at the nomination. 
In addition, it is argued, the secret ballot also made it impossible to determine which 
electors were true party supporters, since it was not known how any individual elector 
had voted, and this, as a result, precluded the use of pre-election trial ballots to test 
candidates’ popularity for the subsequent election. These two factors, it is argued, 
emphasised the shift of candidate selection to local party organisations.
104
 It has also 
been argued that the loss of the hustings ‘abolished a vital bastion of political 
accountability’ by removing the only platform on which all candidates were present 
together and to which all electors had the right of attendance since candidates’ election 
meetings were essentially private meetings.
105
 This, taken together with the 
introduction of household suffrage made the show of hands at the hustings more or less 
indicative of the state of public opinion.
106
  
However, arguing that the hustings had an important role in testing the 
acceptability of candidates and in obtaining a view of public opinion suggests that this 
display of voters’ opinions could lead to the withdrawal of a particular candidate from 
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the contest. The evidence of the 1868 general election tends to suggest otherwise and 
leads to the conclusion that use of the hustings had very little impact on the conduct of 
elections, except that their elimination certainly reduced violence. It was virtually 
uniform practice for candidates to publicly announce their candidature well in advance 
of the election. Indeed, because a poll, if required, took place on the day of nomination 
or very shortly thereafter, such advance declaration of candidature was necessary for 
any campaigning to be organised and carried out. As a result the newspapers regularly 
carried listings of the declared, but not yet nominated candidates for each constituency 
and it is, accordingly, possible to compare the names of those candidates, immediately 
prior to the period of nomination and polling, with those who ultimately contested the 
constituency. Any differences arising because, for instance, a candidate was recorded 
in the newspapers as having declared their intention to stand but were absent from the 
poll or the presence of a candidate in the results of the poll who had not been recorded 
in the newspapers as having declared his intention to seek nomination, would be strong 
evidence that the hustings had influenced the selection of candidates. In fact, 
examination of the 260 English constituencies reveals no changes at all between the 
newspaper lists of intended nominations and the candidates actually nominated. This 
provides convincing evidence that, in 1868, the hustings had no effect on the selection 
of candidates and that suggestions that the Ballot Act removed an influential source of 
public influence are, accordingly, quite wrong. 
The additional argument that the secret ballot made it impossible to determine 
which electors were true party supporters with the consequent impossibility of holding 
trial ballots for candidate selection also runs counter to the views of contemporary and 
later commentators. The Fortnightly Review argued in 1870 that one of the 
consequences of secret voting would be the development of local party organisation 
which enabled the identification of party supporters so that they could be encouraged 
to the polls.
107
 Indeed, as Seymour remarked the protection offered the political 
conscience of the voter soon proved slight; by demanding pledges, the agent was often 
able to exert as strong an influence as in the days of open voting.
108
 Ostrogorski had 
also argued that the party organisations soon began to acquire an ascendance over the 
elector as great as, or greater than, that formerly possessed by the aristocracy.
109
 Thus, 
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Supporters of secret voting had high hopes for the beneficial impact of the 1872 Act on 
violence, corruption and coercion at elections. So far as concerns violence their hopes 
appear to have been fulfilled. There appears to have been a significant decline in the 
numbers of reported incidents of violence at the 1874 and 1880 general elections as 
compared to that of 1868. The anecdotal evidence from testimony given to 
Parliamentary inquiries by election officials strongly supports this view. Almost 
without exception they commented upon the far greater degree of tranquillity 
particularly on election day. Violence was by no means eliminated but the introduction 
of secure polling stations and the elimination of the public hustings certainly reduced 
its incidence. 
Corruption was a different matter and the evidence of election petitions and Royal 
Commissions showed that bribery and other forms of incentives continued despite the 
belief of the proponents of the Act that no agent would bribe an elector when he could 
no longer be certain which way the elector had voted. Petitions increased over the 
period but this was probably because of the increase in contested seats in 1880. 
Petitions per contested seat successively declined at each general election. Some 
anecdotal evidence also suggested that direct bribery had been reduced. Nevertheless, 
evidence given to Parliamentary inquiries and contemporary writers generally 
supported the view that the Act had done little to reduce corruption, although it may 
have partially changed its application from bribing individual voters to more general 
methods such as more extensive treating. 
Coercion is much more problematic since it is as difficult to prove its existence as its 
elimination. Certainly, the security of secret voting does not seem to have resulted in a 
significant change in voting patterns. It is equally true that undue influence was 
certainly more subtle and deep-seated than the more obvious examples of coercion by 
landlords and factory owners. Vernon and Lawrence argued that the Act was 
instrumental in reducing the public political sphere. The elimination of the hustings 
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and the focus on party meetings which were essentially private reduced, they argued, 
the participation of non-electors in the political process. The 1868 election is the only 
election which was fought on the new franchise whilst there was open polling and the 
hustings were still in use. The experience of this election shows that the hustings had 
no impact at all on candidates’ selection. There is also little evidence that the 
development of party organisation during the period reduced the access of the public to 
the political process. Meetings were generally open and the growth of newspapers and 










Understanding why electors voted as they did and identifying the issues and influences 
that affected their choice of candidate and party is, of course the holy grail of the study 
of electoral politics. In the second half of the nineteenth century there were no opinion 
polls or similar contemporary surveys of electors’ opinions. Electors were frequently 
canvassed so that their views could be known to candidates but canvas returns do not 
record the nature of those views and do not survive in significant quantities. We are, 
thus, forced to use indirect indicators to try and ascertain those opinions. One source of 
such indicators are the election addresses of candidates for, whilst election addresses 
cannot tell us the factors which would determine the  electors’ choices, they can at 
least ‘tell us more conveniently than anything else what issues the politicians thought 
would determine that choice’1. Gladstone thought they were important. He wrote to his 
chief whip, A. W. Peel, about what had gone wrong at the 1874 general election and 
asked for: 
An account of those Conservative members who have pledged themselves in their 
addresses (I do not say speeches because this might be more difficult to obtain) to the 




A number of studies of late-Victorian and Edwardian elections have used the addresses 
of candidates as important sources for demonstrating the relative importance of 
individual issues and as a way of elucidating the contemporary language of electoral 
politics, but no analysis has been published for the elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880.
 3
 
This chapter focuses on this gap and describes and analyses the results of a 
sample of candidates’ addresses for each of the elections. There is no central repository 
or collection of candidates’ addresses for these elections but it was common practice 
for them to be published in national and local newspapers. The addresses identified for 
this research have very largely been obtained by searches of newspapers and some 
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obtained from other archival sources. This means that addresses not published in 
newspapers of which copies survive or which are in other archives which not been 
consulted, have not been examined. By the same token it is not possible to be certain 
that all candidates in fact issued an address. If all candidates had issued addresses then 
the samples would represent between 35% and 40%, depending on the election, of the 
maximum number of potential addresses. Given the high degree of consistency in the 
issues contained in the sample addresses, as shown later in this Chapter, these 
percentages offer some confidence that the sample is reasonably indicative of the 
population as a whole. It has not been possible to select the sample on a completely 
systematic basis and all available addresses from surveys of national and regional 
newspapers and indices of other archival sources have been used. Nevertheless, an 
effort has been made to ensure, where possible, that there is a reasonable distribution 
of the sample items covering the parties, counties, boroughs and regions. In order to 
obtain overall results it is obviously necessary to categorise the views of individual 
candidates and clearly some degree of judgement has to be exercised in classifying 
different candidates’ descriptions of their policies and political views under a 
manageable number of headings. Some nuances of opinion are inevitably lost as a 
result of this process. In addition, this process has also ignored whether a candidate 
was for or against a particular policy. For instance, in 1868 a very high number of 
candidates mentioned the proposed disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. This 
was usually, although not exclusively, supported by Liberal candidates and usually 
opposed by Conservatives but all cases in which it is mentioned have been aggregated 
to summarise its importance as an issue. Issues have been ranked according to the 
number of addresses in which they were mentioned irrespective of the order in which 
they appeared in a candidate’s individual address.  
Most candidates issued a written address which was distributed in the 
constituency and frequently published, as paid advertising, in local and/or national 
newspapers. The length and detail of these addresses varied very considerably – an 
average statement might have been of some 300 words but some were much shorter, 
others much longer. Long-standing members, often Conservatives in county seats, 
sometimes issued perfunctory statements noting their length of tenure of office and 
that their views and opinions were well known to their constituents, but with no further 
elucidation of what these views actually were. Others, frequently radical Liberal 
candidates, could be very lengthy addressing a large number of issues in some detail. 
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One politician certainly given to lengthy addresses was Gladstone, which was perhaps 
unsurprising given the length of many of his speeches. In 1874 Disraeli described his 
opponent’s statement as a ‘prolix narrative’.4 
This chapter first considers the results of the review of addresses for each of 
the general elections in turn, tabulating the most frequently cited issues by party and 
broad geographical location and nature of the constituency in which the candidate was 
standing as well as briefly discussing their significance. It then considers some more 
general issues which become evident from the research. Issues have also been 
categorised by region
5
 to provide a more detailed analysis of any geographical 
variation in the frequency with which they were mentioned. These analyses are 
important in examining the consistency of the issues raised by candidates over a wide 
geographical spread of constituencies because it has significant implications for the 
debate over the nationalisation of electoral politics during the period. Indeed it shows 
there were few significant differences in issues between geographical regions which 
suggests that the emphasis on the importance of locality to electoral politics in this 
period may be overstated. The sample is then used to make some tentative suggestions 
concerning the importance of the leader’s address as a party manifesto. Finally, the 
evidence of the available addresses is used to examine the development of the use of 
patriotic language by Conservative candidates and, in particular, to review 
Cunningham’s suggestion that it was only during the late 1870s the Conservative party 




II Issues in the general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 
 
The following tables summarise the main issues mentioned in election addresses 
issued for the general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880, showing the particular issue 
concerned and the percentage of addresses in which it was mentioned. The incidence 
of issues is further analysed between Liberal and Conservative candidates, between 
southern and northern English constituencies and between English county and English 
borough constituencies and Wales and Scotland. 
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Table III-1 Issues in 1868 election addresses 
 
 % of addresses mentioning the issue categorised by party and type of constituency 




Boroughs Wales Scotland 
Irish Church 63.2% 64.8% 58.0% 54.9% 66.4% 61.6% 61.5% 81.3% 72.7% 
Education 40.7% 43.0% 34.1% 41.8% 37.2% 38.4% 40.4% 50.0% 54.5% 
Economy 33.8% 37.8% 27.3% 31.9% 34.5% 28.3% 38.5% 31.3% 45.5% 
Reform Act 31.2% 31.3% 30.7% 27.5% 32.7% 27.3% 33.7% 31.3% 45.5% 
Church of England 22.5% 12.6% 34.1% 18.7% 28.3% 31.3% 17.3% 12.5% 9.1% 
Ballot 21.6% 29.6% 10.2% 22.0% 23.0% 14.1% 30.8% 12.5% 18.2% 
Tax 19.5% 21.3% 11.4% 11.0% 26.5% 27.3% 12.5% 25.0% 9.1% 
Foreign policy 15.2% 10.0% 21.6% 15.4% 15.0% 14.1% 16.3% 0.0% 36.4% 
Record 12.1% 12.2% 13.6% 11.0% 12.4% 12.1% 11.5% 12.5% 18.2% 
Religious liberty 9.5% 12.2% 4.5% 5.5% 12.4% 10.1% 8.7% 18.8% 0.0% 
Malt Tax 5.2% 3.5% 5.7% 2.2% 8.0% 11.1% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 
Church rates 4.8% 7.0% 1.1% 4.4% 5.3% 4.0% 5.8% 6.3% 0.0% 
Ireland and union 3.0% 3.0% 2.3% 4.4% 2.7% 5.1% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
County Boards 2.6% 2.6% 1.1% 0.0% 4.4% 5.1% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 
Bankruptcy 2.2% 3.5% 1.1% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 12.5% 9.1% 
In Great Britain there were 877 candidates at the 1868 election. It is not known how many issued addresses. The results above are based on 
the examination of 303 addresses. 
Sources and  notes: Analysis of candidates’ addresses. Description of Issues: Irish Church: The disestablishment of the Irish Church; 
Education: The introduction of universal elementary education; Economy: Statements dealing with the need for economy and efficiency 
in government expenditure; Reform Act: Statements supporting, and usually claiming credit for, the 1867 Reform Act; Church of 
England: References to threats to the established church in England; Ballot: Statements supporting further electoral reform , often by the 
introduction of the ballot but also covering the repeal of the rating provisions of the Reform Act and the extension of the borough 
franchise; Tax : Statements of support for tax reductions and especially the burden of local taxation; Foreign Policy: Statements on 
foreign policy; Record: References to the candidate’s and/or the government’s record; Religious liberty: Freedom of religion; Malt Tax: 
Abolition of the Malt Tax; Church rates: Abolition of church rates; Ireland and union: Home rule; County Boards: Institution of county 



















Table III-2 Issues in 1874 election addresses 
 % of addresses mentioning the issue categorised by party and type of constituency 




Boroughs Wales Scotland 
Income Tax 36.3% 36.5% 36.1% 30.3% 47.6% 32.2% 46.3% 35.3% 5.7% 
Education 35.0% 25.2% 45.8% 25.8% 45.5% 37.9% 38.1% 44.1% 5.7% 
Local taxation 29.7% 28.9% 30.6% 20.2% 38.6% 35.6% 29.3% 35.3% 11.4% 
Record 29.4% 40.9% 16.7% 32.6% 34.5% 35.6% 32.7% 23.5% 5.7% 
Church of England 19.5% 6.9% 33.3% 20.2% 21.4% 19.5% 21.8% 20.6% 8.6% 
Franchise extension 16.5% 20.8% 11.8% 13.5% 17.2% 12.6% 17.7% 20.6% 17.1% 
Land law 15.2% 23.9% 5.6% 12.4% 13.1% 13.8% 12.2% 29.4% 17.1% 
Drinking 12.2% 8.2% 16.7% 12.4% 11.0% 14.9% 9.5% 23.5% 5.7% 
Foreign policy 11.9% 7.5% 16.7% 5.6% 18.6% 16.1% 12.2% 11.8% 0.0% 
Indirect tax 10.2% 17.0% 2.8% 9.0% 15.2% 4.6% 17.7% 2.9% 0.0% 
Game laws 6.9% 10.1% 3.5% 4.5% 5.5% 5.7% 4.8% 8.8% 17.1% 
Irish land 5.6% 4.4% 6.9% 4.5% 8.3% 8.0% 6.1% 2.9% 0.0% 
Employment law 5.3% 7.5% 2.8% 7.9% 5.5% 5.7% 6.8% 0.0% 2.9% 
Religious liberty 5.0% 8.2% 1.4% 2.2% 2.8% 0.0% 4.1% 26.5% 0.0% 
Economy 2.6% 3.1% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 23.5% 0.0% 
Ballot 2.0% 1.9% 2.1% 1.1% 2.8% 2.3% 2.0% 2.9% 0.0% 
Free trade 1.0% 1.9% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 2.9% 2.9% 
Others 2.1% 3.2% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 14.7% 0.0% 
In Great Britain there were 899 candidates at the 1874 election. It is not known how many issued addresses. The results above are based on 
the examination of 297 addresses. 
Sources and notes: Analysis of candidates’ addresses. Description of Issues: Income Tax: Abolition of income tax; Education: Clause 25 
and religious instruction in elementary education; Local taxation: Reduction of local taxation; Record: References to the candidate’s 
and/or the government’s record; Church of England: References to threats to the established church in England; Franchise Extension: 
Extension of the borough franchise to the counties; Land law: Changes to the land laws including tenant improvements; Drinking: 
Temperance; Foreign policy: Statements on foreign policy;  Indirect tax : Statements of support for tax reductions and especially the 
burden of local taxation; Game laws: Game laws; Irish Land: Irish land laws; Employment law: Employment Laws; Religious liberty: 
Freedom of religion; Economy: Statements dealing with the need for economy and efficiency in government expenditure; Ballot: 



















Table III-3 Issues in 1880 election addresses 
 % of addresses mentioning the issue categorised by party and type of constituency 




Boroughs Wales Scotland 
Foreign policy strength 32.3% 1.7% 64.5% 30.1% 41.2% 43.1% 29.7% 28.6% 16.7% 
Foreign policy moral 29.4% 55.6% 1.8% 33.8% 25.2% 32.8% 27.0% 25.7% 31.3% 
Land law 25.9% 35.4% 16.0% 31.6% 19.1% 35.3% 17.6% 14.3% 37.5% 
Economy 20.7% 30.3% 10.7% 24.8% 22.9% 25.0% 23.0% 11.4% 10.4% 
Record 19.0% 21.3% 16.6% 20.3% 20.6% 12.9% 26.4% 25.7% 6.3% 
Franchise extension 19.0% 34.3% 3.0% 21.8% 15.3% 21.6% 16.2% 11.4% 27.1% 
Depression 18.2% 13.5% 23.1% 18.8% 22.9% 31.0% 12.8% 20.0% 2.1% 
Drinking 17.6% 19.1% 16.0% 21.8% 14.5% 19.0% 17.6% 17.1% 14.6% 
Ireland 16.1% 1.7% 31.4% 15.8% 18.3% 19.8% 14.9% 20.0% 8.3% 
Church of England 15.0% 4.5% 26.0% 15.8% 11.5% 12.9% 14.2% 5.7% 29.2% 
Ireland criticisms 11.8% 23.0% 0.0% 19.5% 6.9% 12.9% 13.5% 5.7% 8.3% 
Local government 11.5% 19.1% 3.6% 15.0% 11.5% 24.1% 4.7% 5.7% 6.3% 
Burials 10.1% 19.1% 0.6% 10.5% 9.9% 13.8% 7.4% 11.4% 8.3% 
Education 4.3% 2.2% 6.5% 1.5% 5.3% 3.4% 3.4% 5.7% 8.3% 
Hypothec 3.7% 4.5% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.1% 
Local connections 3.7% 2.8% 4.7% 5.3% 2.3% 4.3% 3.4% 8.6% 0.0% 
Employer liability 2.0% 2.8% 1.2% 3.8% 0.8% 0.0% 4.1% 0.0% 2.1% 
Other 2.1% 4.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 17.2% 0.0% 
In Great Britain there were 919 candidates at the 1880 election. It is not known how many issued addresses. The results above are based on 
the examination of 335 addresses. 
Sources and notes: Analysis of candidates’ addresses. Description of Issues: Foreign policy strength: Robust foreign policy mainly 
Conservatives; Foreign policy morality:  Principled foreign policy mainly Liberals; Land law: Amendments to land law; Economy: 
Statements dealing with the need for economy and efficiency in government expenditure; Record: References to the candidate’s and/or the 
government’s record; Franchise extension: Extension of borough franchise to counties; Depression: References to economic conditions; 
Drinking: Temperance issues; Ireland : Home rule; Church of England: Protection of established church; Ireland criticisms: Criticisms 
of Irish policy;  Local government: Representation in the counties;  Burials: Nonconformist burials; Education: Generally school fees; 




Various aspects of the Irish question were major issues in British politics in this 
period. In 1868 the question of the disestablishment of the Irish Church was the most 
frequently mentioned issue, with more than 63% of the candidates referring to it. This 
may have been reflective of the success of Gladstone’s strategy to unite his own party 
by making disestablishment of the Irish Church a key issue. The Liberals did not have 
an obviously united policy platform in the later 1860s and it has been suggested that 
after leaving office in 1866 Gladstone turned to Ireland and the disestablishment of the 
Anglican Church of Ireland as ‘a sovereign method for reuniting the fractured forces of 
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Liberalism’.7 In a party which contained Radicals and Non-conformists the 
disestablishment issue became ‘the Liberals’ prime rallying-cry at the 1868 election’.8  
Most Liberal candidates, in one form or another, supported Gladstone’s 
proposals. Samuel Morley, one of the Liberal candidates for Bristol, commended 
Gladstone’s view that the Irish church was a ‘religious scandal, a political outrage, and 
a national injustice’.9 Morley reflected these remarks in his speeches and in a 
lunchtime address to printing workers when he rhetorically asked whether: 
The principles of the Liberal party and the manner in which they had carried out those 
great principles to a successful issue, and the dignified action taken by them in 
reference to Mr. Gladstone’s measure for doing justice to Ireland, had not deserved the 




Many Conservatives discussed the issue in the more general context of the union of 
Ireland and Great Britain suggesting disestablishment of the Irish Church threatened 
the establishment of the Church of England and in some cases the monarchy and the 
constitution. The general terms of this view were aptly summarised by Sir Richard 
Glass, the Conservative candidate for Bewdley, who said: 
The attempt to disestablish the Irish Branch of the Established Church as  an inroad 
upon our Constitution, and upon the Religious Principles established at the 




Other Conservatives like Walter Stanhope, the candidate for Yorkshire West Riding 
South, said that ‘an attack upon the property of the National Church, as well as its 
connection with the State, has been entered upon through the introduction of the Irish 
Church Bill’.12 
The issue was mentioned relatively equally in the counties and boroughs but 
tended to be mentioned slightly more in southern English constituencies (66.4%) 
compared to those in the north (54.9%). This difference may have been due to the 
higher incidence of nonconformist voters in the northern constituencies, but at any rate 
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it is dwarfed by the emphasis given in Wales to disestablishment, where despite the 
large number of nonconformist voters that issue was considered by far the most 
important. (This is dealt with further below in the section dealing with Wales which 
suggests that this issue may have tended to be important in Wales as a result of 
emergent Welsh nationalism). Nonconformist Scotland also regarded the Irish Church 
as the most important issue in 1868 only to a slightly lesser extent than Wales and 
more so than in England. 
1874 saw a decline in references to Irish issues. The Liberal government had 
completed the disestablishment of the Irish Church and passed the Irish Land Act in 
1870. Some Conservatives did not think this had achieved the pacification of Ireland. 
Henry Raikes, the Conservative candidate for Chester, took the view that the Liberals 
had been elected in 1868 ‘because they promised to conciliate Ireland’ but ‘Ireland was 
not conciliated’.13 Liberal candidates naturally took the opposite view, often claiming 
credit for the beneficial effects of the government’s legislation. On the whole, 
however, Ireland was not a significant issue in Great Britain in the 1874 general 
election, the Irish land issue being the most frequently mentioned but by only 6% of all 
candidates. In 1880 Irish issues became rather more prominent again, tending to be 
referred to in two main ways. Firstly, some candidates, mainly Liberals, made 
criticisms of the Conservative government’s failure to respond to what they regarded 
as genuine Irish grievances. Secondly, others, mainly Conservatives, sought to 
emphasise the danger that a Liberal administration might grant home rule. 
Beaconsfield had sought to make Ireland his key election issue, referring in his own 
address to the Irish movement for home rule, and noting that: 
A portion of its population is attempting to sever the constitutional tie which unites it 
to Great Britain’ and seeking to associate this with a likely Liberal acquiescence he 
said there were ‘some who challenge the expediency of the Imperial character of this 
realm. Having attempted and failed to enfeeble our colonies by their policy of 
decomposition, they perhaps now recognise in the disintegration of the United 




Many Conservative candidates echoed this view, professing their complete opposition 
to Home Rule. Very few Liberal candidates were prepared to support Home Rule but 
were then left with the dilemma of how to respond to Irish agitation. Many voiced 
criticisms of the government’s approach and urged them to respond to Irish grievances. 
                                                 
13
 Election address of Henry Cecil Raikes, Cheshire Observer, 31 January 1874. 
14
 Letter from Beaconsfield to the Duke of Marlborough, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, published in the 
Bury Post, 8 March 1880.  
125 
 
Frederick Gibbs, the Liberal candidate at Chichester, gave a typical exposition of this 
position when he said: 
I look upon what is called “Home Rule for Ireland” as an impossible scheme, opposed 
alike to the unity of the Empire, and to the best interests of Ireland itself. But while 
resolved firmly to resist the agitation set on foot in favour of the scheme, I think every 
reasonable demand of the Irish people should be met, and every grievance redressed, 





It has been suggested that ‘elementary education was not considered a 
significant or urgent issue in the 1868 election’.16 In fact, it was a major issue both 
then and in the 1874 general election. In 1868 the need to address the availability and 
accessibility of primary education was widely recognised and the subject was 
mentioned by over 41% of candidates. Gladstone had referred to the issue in his own 
address, noting that ‘all are agreed both upon its vital importance and upon its pressing 
urgency’.17 Disraeli produced an address at least equal in length to Gladstone’s, but 
had nothing to say about education. Nevertheless, 34% of Conservative candidates did 
mention the issue. It was also difficult to distinguish between the parties from 
candidates’ addresses, for the majority of those that did discuss education opted for 
bland statements such as ‘I would give earnest support to any measure tending to 
render it more general and efficient’, or ‘I am in hopes that the government will shortly 
be able to introduce a measure for the further extension and improvement of 
Elementary Education in Scotland’.18 Some Liberal candidates were prepared to go 
further and raise the issue of secular education – an issue that was to become important 
in 1874. Captain Sherard Osborn, the Liberal candidate at Birkenhead said he would 
‘strongly support legislative measures tending to bring a sound secular education 
within reach of every child in the United Kingdom’; and Edward Miall, a Liberal at 
Bradford promised to carefully examine every proposal put to parliament ‘for 
extending a sound un-sectarian education’.19After the passage of Forster’s Education 
Act in 1870, the issue was the second most important at the 1874 election, being 
mentioned by nearly 35% of candidates. Many historians have argued that 
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nonconformist dissatisfaction with the legislation was a source of electoral weakness 
for the Liberals because of Clause 25 of the Act.
20
 Hoppen, for example, felt able to 
write in 1998 that ‘discontent among significant sections of nonconformist opinion 
hurt Liberal candidates at by-elections and at the general election of 1874’.21 However, 
this view may be regarded as problematic. Parry has pointed out that the Liberals 
performed better in 1874 in seats where non-conformity was strongest. This was 
largely in the northern English boroughs where the swing to the Conservatives was 
lower than in the southern English constituencies.
22
  He also argued that by the time of 
the general election Clause 25 had ceased to be an issue for many nonconformists 
because they had won most School Board elections and were, therefore able to control 
its operation.
23
 Rather than Clause 25 alienating nonconformists, education was an 
important issue because the Conservatives used it to persuade Anglican Liberal 
supporters in the southern English constituencies to abstain or to vote Conservative. 
They did this by playing on those voters’ concerns of further Liberal changes to the 
Act to eliminate religion from education and their fear of the threat of vociferous 
Liberal extremists groups such as Chamberlain’s National Education League. This was 
conjoined with the Conservative allegations that the Liberals were a threat to the 
established church which were frequently couched in terms of patriotic ideology and 
imagery.
24
 This view is strongly supported by an analysis of candidates’ addresses in 
those seats which the Conservatives won in 1874. Their victory was very largely 
gained in the counties and southern English seats. In these constituencies a remarkable 
61% of Conservative candidates referred to education compared 46% nationally. Only 
31% of Liberals referred to the issue. 
The language of the Conservative addresses clearly demonstrates the attempt to 
play on voter concerns by implying that Liberals did not support religious education. 
Edward Green, the Conservative candidate at Wakefield, said: 
I am decidedly opposed to the repeal of the 25
th
 Clause of that Act: nor do I consider 
that it is consistent with liberty of conscience to compel parents, against their will, to 
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send their children to schools where Bible teaching is excluded. I am strongly in 




Arthur Mills, the successful Conservative candidate at Exeter, claimed that a strong 
Conservative element was required in the House of Lords so that ‘valid securities can 
be obtained for the maintenance of religious education, of the union of Church and 
State and the honour of England at home and abroad’.26 Parry acknowledged the 
importance of the issue noting that: 
Conservatives were the real beneficiaries of the alarm that disestablishment and 
secular education would promote ungodliness in Great Britain.  The increasing 
strength of the Conservatives in the 1870s and 1880s owed a lot to its appeal to those 
who identified it with respectability, order and the religious political and moral 




By 1880 passions concerning the issue had receded and despite the fact that there were 
no amendments to the legislation less than 5% of English candidates mentioned the 
issue.  
Franchise 
Various aspects of the franchise and electoral procedures continued to be issues at all 
three general elections. In 1868 candidates were plainly wary of the newly enlarged 
electorate and some 31% of candidates mentioned the 1867 Reform Act, many making 
a point of stating their support and pleasure at the Reform Act, with both parties often 
seeking to claim credit for its passage. James Ashbury, the unsuccessful Conservative 
candidate for Brighton, rejoiced ‘that the Reform Bill [had] been passed [so that] the 
great body of the intelligent working class [had] obtained the rights of citizenship’. 
Ashbury noted that he himself was ‘sprung from the people and glorified in their 
elevation’.28 Some of the remarks made by candidates may have been regarded as 
patronising. Henry Pochin, the Liberal member for Stafford, took pains to emphasise 
to the newly enfranchised voters the care that they should take when they: 
Exercise important political rights for the first time’, as well as the need ‘to sacrifice, if 
necessary, small private and personal considerations, for the nobler purpose of 
securing from the Legislature such laws as will be for the interests of the community 
as a whole, rather than such that favour the interests of any special class.
29
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The candidates making these points were certainly following Gladstone and 
Disraeli. Gladstone noted the prescience of the Russell government’s resignation ‘as 
the most becoming method’ by which they could secure the early triumph of reform.30 
According to him the bill introduced by the Conservatives was ‘amended and almost 
transformed by the opposition’.31 Disraeli had no doubt where the credit lay. He noted 
that reform was an issue which had ‘embarrassed and enfeebled successive 
administrations’, and went on to say: 
The Conservative government decided to terminate this state of affairs and by a series 
of measures, in the course of two years, we brought about a settlement of the question, 
broad in it principles, large and various in its provisions, but, as we believe, in unison 
with the character of the country and calculated to animate the spirit of the community 




Captain Sherard Osborn had no doubt that Gladstone deserved the credit stating that 
‘but for the earnestness and disinterestedness of Mr Gladstone we should never have 
extorted from the fears of the Tories the new Reform Bill and its extended franchise’.33 
The issue was mentioned about the same number of times by Liberals (31%) 
and Conservatives (31%) alike. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of the 
changes, in England the issue was raised slightly more often in boroughs (34%) than in 
counties (27%). N. M. Rothschild, the Liberal candidate for Aylesbury, thought that 
the question of reform had ‘now been settled on a broad and comprehensive basis’. 34 
Miall, when standing in 1868, was at pains to point out that the Reform Act had given 
marked prominence to a line of policy in the direction of which [he had] laboured for 
many years with unflagging interest’.35 Some Conservative plaudits for the Act were 
less than fulsome, however. Lord George Manners, the successful Conservative 
candidate for Cambridgeshire, could only say that he looked ‘without dismay at the 
consequences of that Act’.36Apart from congratulating newly enfranchised voters and 
seeking to take credit for the Reform Act, a number of candidates commented on 
aspects of further electoral reform. The most common proposals were support for the 
introduction of the ballot, the redistribution of seats and the abolition of the Reform 
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Act clauses requiring the direct payment of rates. Slightly fewer commented on the 
extension of the borough franchise to the counties, whilst the Birmingham Liberal 
candidates predictably advocated the removal of the minority clause. Such further 
electoral reform was overwhelmingly a Liberal issue, with their candidates raising the 
issue three times more often than Conservatives. In England, these were also issues 
which tended to be raised by candidates in boroughs (31%) rather than counties 
(14%).The franchise was less of an issue in 1874, being mentioned only by 18% of 
candidates. It is clear, however, that the major aspect had now, after the Ballot Act in 
1872, become the extension of the borough franchise to the counties. The extension 
was generally argued for by Liberals and 22% of Liberal candidates mentioned the 
issue compared to only 13% of Conservatives. Those Conservatives who did mention 
the subject were cautious in their approach. Philip Twells, one of the Conservative 
candidates for the City of London, was representative of this when he stated: 
We have so recently had an extensive measure of electoral reform, that it does not 
appear to me politic at present to deal with such sweeping changes as would be 




By the time of the 1880 election the campaign for the extension of the franchise in the 
counties had gained further momentum. However, the issue was still almost wholly 
discussed by Liberal candidates, with 34% mentioning it compared to only 3% of 
Conservatives. As might be expected, the issue was discussed more in the counties 
(22%) than in the boroughs (16%). Whilst the most common topic was the extension 
of the borough franchise to the counties, other issues in this category included the 
renewal of the provisions of the Ballot Act (which had only been originally passed 
with a life of ten years), the introduction of measures to deal with corruption, and the 
redistribution of electoral districts to create constituencies of more equal size. These 
issues were to see action from the incoming Liberal government in the 1883 Corrupt 
Practices Act and the 1884 Reform Acts. 
Church of England 
The question of the continued establishment of the Church of England was an 
issue at all three general elections. It was also a subject considerably more favoured by 
Conservative candidates. In 1868 it was often mentioned in connection with the 
question of Irish Church disestablishment with the implication that the Church of 
England could be next in line for such treatment. Thus, P. M. Egerton, returned 
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unopposed as a Conservative for Cheshire West, referred to the ‘insidious manoeuvres 
to undermine the Established Church and dissever it from State connection’.38 Other 
Conservatives went further by joining the issue to the protection of the constitution. In 
1874 disestablishment of the Church of England only appeared in 7% of Liberal 
election addresses, but was represented in 33% of Conservative messages. This 
demonstrates the negative scaremongering use to which the Conservatives put the 
issue in the southern English constituencies. Even more significant is the rhetoric they 
employed on this issue; for the Conservative language on the disestablishment issue 
frequently invoked nationalist and patriotic images. Sometimes the defence of the 
established church was bracketed with the defence of other institutions such as the 
monarchy and the House of Lords. As a consequence, Conservatives thought, the 
result of Gladstone’s government had been to ‘overthrow or undermine institutions 
previously held sacred and to disturb the settled institutions of the country both in 
Church and State’.39 One candidate promised to ‘support the institutions of the country 
- the Throne, the House of Lords, the union of Church and State, the Army and Navy, 
and the rights of the people’, for the church was ‘the Church of the people’.40 Another 
was committed to ‘preserve our Constitution and Liberties, to continue undisturbed the 
union of Church and State’.41 The Church of England continued to be an issue at the 
1880 election, albeit at a reduced level. It appeared in only 18% of addresses as 
compared to 34% in 1874. It had also by this time become an almost exclusively 
Conservative issue tied to their patriotic appeal to the defence of the established church 
and the constitution. Only 4% of Liberals mentioned the issue and some of these 
discussed it as radical proponents of disestablishment. 
Taxation 
In 1868 taxation appeared as an issue in 23% of addresses, and pledges to support the 
abolition of the malt tax appeared in 7%. Taxation as a generic title covered a wide 
range of issues covering such items as the abolition of the income tax, generalised 
pledges to reduce tax, reduction of income tax on trade and the abolition of various 
other indirect taxes.  
The most frequently mentioned issue by far, however, was the representation 
of ratepayers in decisions on expenditure and the setting of rates in the counties. The 
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local government of the counties was the most unrepresentative system in Great 
Britain. The ‘august and powerful’ Quarter Sessions of the magistrates, which 
assembled sometimes for judicial, sometimes for administrative business, levied a rate 
on the parishes which then collected this from the occupiers of land.
42
 They were 
responsible for, inter alia, bridges, jails, the Militia, the prosecution of offenders, the 
police force and the coroner. The undemocratic nature of the Quarter Sessions was 
well expressed by John Stuart Mill who said: 
The mode of formation of these boards is most anomalous, they being neither elected, 
nor, in any proper sense of the term, nominated, but holding their important functions, 
like the feudal lords to whom they succeeded, virtually by right of their acres; the 
appointment vested in the Crown (or, speaking practically, in one of themselves, the 
lord lieutenant) being made use of only as a means of excluding any one who is 
thought would do discredit to the body, or, now and then, one who is on the wrong 
side in politics. The institution is the most aristocratic in principle which now remains 
in England; far more so than the House of Lords, for it grants public money and 





In 1836 the Royal Commission on County Rates
44
 had recognised that the 
ratepayers ought to have a voice in county business, and recommended the creation of 
County Councils, to include both elected members and magistrates, ex officio.
45
 
However, it was not until 1888 that successive governments were able to get 
Parliament to address this issue and the continuing problem was detrimental to a 
number of pieces of legislation in in the 1870s. Both Gladstone and Disraeli attempted 
to introduce measures to reform county government but withdrew in the face of strong 
resistance, especially from the Lords.
46
 
The significant growth in public expenditure from 1870 to 1880 exacerbated 
the problem. County rates increased by 66% over this period whilst Treasury 
expenditure, which formed 20% of total expenditure, grew only 28%. These were as a 
result of constant calls for additional grants from Imperial taxation as well as for 
reductions in rates and greater representation in the determination of county rates and 
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 Over 60% of the addresses in which the subject was mentioned were 
from candidates in county constituencies. In 1868, Arthur Pendarves Vivian, one of the 
unopposed Liberal members for Cornwall West, thought that ‘the burden of Local 
Taxation has become very heavy’, and he declared that he would ‘advocate the 
adoption of such a system as will ensure the representation of the ratepayer by the 
establishment of County Financial Boards’.48 The particular issue of the representation 
of local ratepayers in the counties was raised equally by members of either party. 
Notably, however, it seems to have been a particular issue in the south. Robert Gurden 
was an unsuccessful Liberal candidate for North Norfolk in 1868 and Norfolk South in 
1871 and 1874, finally being elected for Norfolk South in 1880. His 1868 address aptly 
summarised the views expressed by many candidates on the question of local taxation, 
explaining that he would devote his attentions: 
To the removal of those burdens which press so heavily on the agriculturalist, and 
whether by a new adjustment of the law affecting real and personal property in the 
matter of rating, by the creation of financial boards or the extinction of the malt tax, I 
shall support to the best of my ability every measure which may appear to be 





In 1874 taxation was by far the most frequently mentioned issue. Abolition of the 
income tax and reforms of other taxes were Gladstone’s great surprises in his election 
manifesto, apart from the dissolution itself, and he hoped they would provide another 
‘great idea’ to restore Liberal unity and provide an electoral rallying cry similar to 
‘justice for Ireland’ through the proposals for the disestablishment of the Irish Church 
had done in 1868. The scheme for the abolition of income tax had been supported and 
motivated by the government’s large expected financial surpluses and W. E. Forster, in 
a speech at Bradford on 26 January 1874, suggested the dissolution arose because the 
cabinet wished to consult the people on the propriety of applying the surplus to the 
income tax reduction. The Times, however, took a rather more cynical view, opining 
that the simple truth was ‘the Ministry could stand the annoyance of repeated defeats 
no longer, and resolved to win the country by a sudden and wholesale offer to remit 
taxation’.50 Whatever Gladstone’s true motivations the cabinet approved his election 
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address which proposed the ‘relief, but relief coupled with reform, of local taxation’, 
‘that the country may enjoy the advantage and relief of [the income tax’s] total repeal’ 
and ‘some marked relief in the class of articles of popular consumption’. There was, 
therefore, something for everyone. However, by this point in his argument the Prime 
Minister had to concede that he had relieved more than the surplus he had available 
and parliament would have to look at ‘what moderate assistance could be had from 
judicious adjustments of existing taxes’, whilst admitting that these were ‘general 
declarations’ and the matter was for the moment ‘one of confidence’.51 These 
generalities set alarm bells ringing and gave the Conservatives the opportunity of 
accusing the government of planning increases in other property taxes. Disraeli 
claimed that the core proposals of the Prime Minister were those policies which the 
Conservative party had always favoured and which Gladstone had opposed. Disraeli 
was clear that these ‘judicious adjustments’ meant an ‘increase of existing taxes’.52 He 
also suggested that a Conservative administration could be better trusted to abolish the 
income tax and emphasised the need for local taxation reforms, an issue that resonated 
with many candidates and constituencies. Ghosh has persuasively argued that, by 
1874, both Gladstone and Disraeli had reached similar positions, albeit by very 
different routes, in favour of low taxation and low spending.
53
 As a result the similarity 
of positions taken by candidates of either party, which is particularly noticeable from 
campaign addresses and speeches, is perhaps not surprising and suggests that they 
were consistent in following the line of their leaders.
54
 Plainly, in terms of the result, 
Gladstone’s plan was a complete failure. Almost all candidates supported the proposal 
to abolish income tax and many Conservatives used the issue to make the reform of 
local rates a well-supported key topic; an opportunity which seems to have been 
missed by the government. Apart from the inability of the Liberals to distinguish 
themselves from the Conservatives on the taxation issue, it still remains an open 
question as to why Gladstone thought it would be electorally popular. It was with some 
justification that the Economist remarked that: 
Nothing can be much more surprising than that, just after a great extension of the 
suffrage to the poor – so great an extension indeed as to give the poor, should they 
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choose to use it, absolute sovereignty – the most popular measure for electioneering 




In 1860 the proportion of adult males in English and Welsh parliamentary boroughs 
who paid income tax, and consequently had an income in excess of £100 per annum, 
was approximately 20%. This varied, of course, throughout the country from under 
10% in the northern industrial towns such as Bolton, Bury and Stockport to areas of 
greater wealth in the south such as Cambridge (22%) and Brighton (23%).
56
 
Nevertheless, there was only a small proportion of the electorate who ever paid income 
tax during this period. 
In 1880 taxation had ceased to be a major issue although many comments by 
candidates on local government, which often sought proper representation in the 
counties for the setting and collection of rates, also included references to the 
excessive nature of local taxation.  
Foreign Policy 
In 1868 the conduct of foreign policy was an issue discussed by nearly 19% of 
candidates. It tended to be mentioned marginally more often by Conservative 
candidates who accounted for 60% of instances. It was also an issue equally divided 
between southern and northern constituencies, and boroughs and counties. Fewer 
candidates (23.2%) mentioned foreign policy as an issue in 1874. Parry has argued that 
the government’s lack of response to the Prussian victory over France in 1870 and the 
Alabama affair made the government seem weak in defending British national interests 
and the Conservatives took advantage of this. Although Disraeli had agreed with 
Gladstone’s approach in relation to the Alabama, the Conservative’s patriotic attack on 
these failures became bound up with the government’s difficulties on education and 
the debate on secularism and disestablishment.
57
 Defence of the Anglican Church 
accordingly became associated with defence of other national institutions as part of the 
attack on a government accused of weakness in foreign policy and the defence of 
Britain’s national interests. This was reflected by Gathorne Hardy at a banquet given to 
mark his election as the Conservative member for Maidstone. In giving his opinion on 
the Liberal slogan of ‘Peace, Retrenchment and Reform’ he said Conservatives ‘do not 
wish to obtain it [peace] by the sacrifice of honour’, but, ‘rather have it with the manly 
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dignity that becomes a great nation’58In 1880 foreign policy was the dominant issue of 
the election, appearing in aggregate in 85.1% of all addresses. The commentary on the 
Conservative government’s conduct of foreign policy was split almost completely on 
party lines. Conservative candidates’ support for the government’s policy used 
language which frequently involved both manly and patriotic terms. To some extent 
Beaconsfield had chosen to respond to the challenge to his foreign policy, noting in his 
own address that the ‘ineffable blessing’ of peace could not be ‘obtained by the 
passivity of non-interference’ for peace ‘rests on the presence, not to say the 
ascendancy of England in the councils of Europe’.59 Foreign policy debates provided 
particularly fertile ground for the use of patriotic appeals and this issue is discussed 
further below. In addition, foreign policy was a dominant issue at by-elections in the 
later 1870s and this subject is discussed in Chapter V. 
Land 
Issues concerning land covered a number of topics. The most commonly raised was the 
law relating to the sale and transfer of land including primogeniture and strict 
settlement, and the more general reform of the cumbersome land transfer system. 
Compensation for tenants’ improvements and the game laws were also frequently 
mentioned issues directed at the smaller tenant farmer. Questions relating to the 
ownership of land, the rights to game, agricultural wages and similar issues were well 
established in British politics by the late 1860s. However, in the 1850s and 1860s they 
had not been at the forefront of political debate.
60
 This tends to be confirmed by the 
experience of the 1868 general election when there were very few references to the 
issue in candidates’ addresses. F.H. Muntz, one of the Liberal candidates in 
Birmingham, was an exception in calling for an ‘alteration of the Laws of 
Primogeniture and Entail’ but there were few other references to the issue.61  
By the time of the 1874 general election, however, the issue had moved up the 
political agenda. Over 28% of candidates mentioned the issue in their addresses for the 
1874 election. The cause at this time was strikingly a Liberal one with nearly 45% of 
Liberal candidates mentioning the issue compared to only 2 % of Conservatives. This 
perhaps suggests that the 1874 election saw the development of a set of issues which 
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were subsequently to become an important part of the Liberal platform. Edgar 
Bowring, the Liberal candidate at Exeter, succinctly summarised the issue at hand for 
many Liberals when he stated: 
The Land Laws of this country appear to …. demand important alteration in three 
respects. We must give the occupiers greater security of tenure than they now possess; 
we must cheapen and facilitate the transfer of land, and we must review the laws of 
Primogeniture and Entail. The abolition of the Game Laws in their present form 
appears to me to be imperatively called for, in the interests of the tenant farmers 




The formation of Mill’s Land Tenure Reform Association also gave impetus to the 
development of the issue at this time. 
The politics of land continued to be an increasingly important issue in British 
elections and received some impetus when the publication of and the debate on the 
Return on the Owners of Land brought into the open the concentration of the 
ownership of land in Britain.
63
 Rather curiously, however, in 1880 the issue did not 
achieve particularly greater prominence than in 1874 with mentions by 49% of Liberal 
candidates in 1880 compared to 45% in 1874. There were, however, in 1880, far more 
references to land issues made by candidates in county constituencies (although 25% 
continued to be made in the boroughs). As in previous elections the issue was 
prioritised by the Liberals and over two thirds of the time the issue was mentioned by a 
Liberal candidate. The nature of the references by Conservative candidates tended to 
be non-committal or to support the legislation introduced by the Conservative 
government in 1875. This legislation, the Agricultural Holdings Act, had provided for 
a form of lease for tenant farmers which would give compensation for improvements if 
the lease was terminated but was widely criticised for being only voluntary. One 
Conservative candidate in Cornwall did go as far as advocating that the requirements 
be made compulsory but still lost.
64
 More typically Conservative candidates tended to 
be patronisingly vague especially in rural constituencies where the issue could assume 
more direct importance. Henry Scott, a Conservative who was returned unopposed for 
Hampshire South, thought that the next government should suggest some measures 
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aimed at ‘removing such restrictions as may be found to exist in the profitable 
cultivation of land’.65 
Sir Frederick Winn Knight was a Conservative member for Worcestershire 
West in 1868, 1874 and 1880 and described himself in his address as ‘one of the 
largest occupiers of land in the South of England. His address consisted almost entirely 
of issues relating to the land including the agricultural depression, a commendation of 
the Contagious Diseases Animals Act of 1872 and the commendation of the 
Agricultural Holdings Act which he had adopted on his own property. He finally 
pronounced himself in favour of ‘a well-considered revision of the Game Laws’ which 
would give fair compensation to Tenants for damage done by Game’.66 
Wales 
Table III/4 shows the top six issues contained in candidates’ addresses in Welsh 
constituencies in each general election. For comparative purposes, the ranking of each 
issue in Britain as a whole is also shown. 
Table III-4 Analysis of Issues – Wales   
Election Top six issues 
1868 Irish 
Church 







1 2 3 4 7 - 
1874 Education Local 
taxation 






2 1 5 - 3 - 
1880 Foreign 
policy 






1 5 4 - 13 7 
Sources and notes: Candidates’ addresses. The total candidates were 1868:49; 
1874:55; 1880:54. The addresses examined were 1868:16; 1874:34; 1880:37. A 
summary of the issues is shown in Tables III/1 to III/3.  
 
In Wales the issues discussed by candidates in the 1868 election were almost the same 
as those discussed in Great Britain as a whole. The four most frequently mentioned 
topics were exactly the same as in Great Britain. Local connections were more 
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frequently mentioned but there were very few references to what might be regarded as 
specifically Welsh issues, the only notable reference being the issue of land ownership 
by nonconformists. Morgan Lloyd, the unsuccessful Liberal candidate for the 
Beaumaris District of Boroughs, noted that ‘the state of the law as regards the holding 
of real property by Dissenters, and the acquisition of building sites for their Chapels, is 
eminently unsatisfactory’.67 Nevertheless, this issue was mentioned by only one other 
candidate. 
The conformity with national issues was reflected in the campaign speeches of 
candidates. For instance, Watkins Williams, the successful Liberal candidate for the 
Denbigh District of Boroughs, addressed the Wrexham Working Man’s Liberal 
Association and took the opportunity to devote almost his whole speech to the Irish 
Church question.
68
 His Conservative opponent, Townshend Mainwaring, subsequently 
spoke at a town meeting at which almost all the speeches and debate were confined to 
the question of Ireland and the disestablishment of the Irish Church.
69
 Indeed, a 
notable feature of Liberal addresses in 1868 was the degree of support given to the 
disestablishment of the Irish Church. The issue was mentioned by 81% of candidates, 
more than in any other part of Great Britain. The language used by some Liberal 
candidates also suggests they were prepared to draw a parallel between the position of 
Irish Catholics and Welsh nonconformists. Cragoe has suggested that this meant that 
for the Welsh radicals, for the first time, ‘“Wales” itself had become an issue in Welsh 
politics’. In 1874 the pattern of issues discussed by candidates is similar to those in 
England. There were, however, some distinct differences. The abolition of income tax 
and taxation issues in general were not in the top six issues in Wales in 1874. Issues 
connected to Welsh non-conformism also continued to surface so that references to 
religious freedom and equality were more common than in England. There were also 
several references to Osborne Morgan’s Burials Bill which sought to give dissenters 
the right to burial in parish church-yards. 
1880 saw foreign policy as the most important issue in Wales, as it was in 
England. There were few distinctly Welsh issues although religious liberty and burial 
rights continued to be mentioned. It is noteworthy that Ireland appears to have failed to 
engage the Welsh candidates with just a few Conservatives mentioning their 
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opposition to Home Rule. 
70
  Indeed, Welsh electors were never to have much interest 
in the disestablishment of the Irish church or in home rule as issues in themselves. 
 
Scotland 
Table III/5 shows the top six issues contained in candidates’ addresses in Scottish 
constituencies in each general election. For comparative purposes, the ranking of each 
issue in Britain as a whole is also shown. 
Table III-5 Analysis of Issues – Scotland 
 
  
Election Top six issues   
1868 Irish 
Church 
Education Economy Reform 
Act 




1 2 3 4 8 9 
1874 Game 
Laws 
Land law Franchise  
extension 




11 7 6 5 3 2 
1880 Land Foreign 
Policy 




3 1 - 15 10 7 
Sources and notes: Candidates’ addresses. The total candidates were 1868:89; 
1874:99; 1880:102. The addresses examined were 1868:11; 1874:35; 1880:48. A 
summary of the issues is shown in Tables III/1 to III/3.  
 
In 1868 Scottish candidates dealt with almost exactly the same issues as their English 
and Welsh counterparts. There were, however, some references to the Game Laws and 
the uniquely Scottish issue of hypothec. The Conservatives had steadily lost seats in 
the Scottish counties in 1865 and 1868 as they received the dissatisfaction of tenant 
farmers concerned with these issues.
71
 The disestablishment of the Irish Church was 
the most frequently mentioned issue both nationally and in Scotland where it tended to 
be supported by Liberals and opposed by Conservatives. Conservative objectives were 
different since no issue over threats to the established church, instead they thought 
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disestablishment unfair or that it would promote the growth of Catholicism in 
Scotland. 
In 1874 Scotland had different priorities in the ranking of issues compared to England 
and Wales. Amendments to the game laws, the law of hypothec (the right of Scottish 
landlords to take security over crops and livestock) and the extension of the franchise 
were by far the most important issues in Scottish candidates’ addresses. Almost all 
candidates of all political persuasions were in favour of the abolition of hypothec and 
amendments to the game laws. The references in this table to the church refer to the 
disestablishment of the Church of Scotland and the healing of the great divide. Land 
again dominated Scottish issues in 1880, despite hypothec being classified separately 
as an issue, even pushing foreign policy into second place.
72
 Disestablishment 





Of course, election addresses were only one way in which candidates sought to 
make their views and opinions known to electors, and they were a particularly 
abbreviated method of doing this. The other major means of communication from 
candidates to electors during the 1870s was the formal speech. The circumstances in 
which politicians made their speeches ranged from major public occasions which could 
be attended by many thousands to small local addresses. The audiences could be party 
workers or party supporters; or else the speeches could be open to the general public. 
Crucially, from the beginning of the period, they were reported, usually verbatim in the 
newspapers. As a result speeches became as much directed at their publication in the 
newspapers as they were to the audience to whom they were delivered. As we have 
seen in the Introduction the spread of and the massive growth of the newspaper 
industry became an important factor in the nationalisation of politics in this period. As 
was shown in that discussion it meant, for instance, that a speech made by a major 
politician in Manchester could be breakfast reading for Cornish electors the following 
day.
74
 These developments had a fundamental impact in creating the primacy of 
national issues in political debate and in leading to the consistency of political 
language across Great Britain. This was equally true of candidates’ election addresses. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly the issues and language used by candidates in their election 
addresses were totally consistent with those used in their campaign speeches. This is 
demonstrated by a comparison of the keynote speeches and addresses given by a 
selection of candidates which showed complete consistency in terms of content and 
language. It also tends to suggest that candidates’ addresses are a valid and particularly 
useful way of understanding the issues and language which were given such 
widespread distribution across the country. It also means that the consistency of 
content of candidates’ addresses is good evidence for the nationalisation of politics in 
this period and for the rapid decline of the importance of local issues and influences on 
electoral outcomes.  
This view of the national nature of electoral politics in Great Britain from 1868 
onwards is by no means universally accepted. Hanham remarked that the general 
elections contested by Gladstone and Disraeli were not general for ‘only about half the 
seats were contested by both parties, and even where both parties were in the field with 
the same number of candidates local or regional or “national” issues tended to be as 
important as those which agitated the three kingdoms’.75 Chapter II and Appendix I 
explain Hanham’s mistake in regarding the failure to field candidates, either at all or in 
numbers less than the seats available, as indicative of the lack of generality of 
elections. So far as concerns the nature of issues, it is difficult to be certain of what 
Hanham meant in contrasting national issues with those ‘which agitated the three 
kingdoms’. He surely cannot have meant that for elections to be regarded as ‘general’ 
in some modern sense, there needed to be the same issues debated in Ireland as in 
Great Britain. Election debates in Ireland throughout this period were dominated by the 
issues of home rule, land reform and education. In Great Britain, however, candidates’ 
addresses show clearly that the most frequently discussed issues did tend to ‘agitate’ 
constituencies in all of England, Scotland and Wales. As has been shown, whilst there 
may have been differences of emphasis between the countries in Great Britain, but the 
portfolio of issues dominating the election debates was essentially the same. The 
analysis below shows that the same was also true of different regions in England. 
More recent developments in historical approaches to electoral politics have 
emphasised the ‘importance of locality, or the ‘politics of place’ in influencing 
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electoral behaviour into the twentieth century’.76 Other historical studies have focussed 
on the unique characteristics of individual constituencies and the importance of local 
influences in explaining electoral outcomes.
77
 The analysis of candidates’ addresses 
offers an opportunity to test these assertions particularly the hypothesis that local 
issues were much more important than the strength of any national issue. To do this the 
sample of candidates’ addresses was further examined to determine if there were any 
issues which were unique to particular regions and if there was any apparent difference 
in the importance attached to issues according to the region in which the constituency 
was located. For these purposes the English constituencies were classified by the 
regions used by Pelling in his Social Geography of British Election 1885 – 1910, 
which were in their turn based upon those identified by Fawcett.
78
 Pelling, of course, 
conducted his analysis using the constituencies resulting from the 1885 redistribution 
and for the purposes of this exercise the constituencies existing for the three general 
elections of the period have been traced through to the 1885 redistribution and have 
then been allocated to Pelling’s regions. As discussed previously, issues were ranked 
according to frequency with which they appeared in the addresses. This method can 
only be a crude indicator of what candidates thought were the more important issues 
and this factor may account for some of the variation between regions. However, the 
striking consistency of the results across the regions suggests that it is not wide of the 
mark. The following tables show the top four, ranked on this basis, of the issues 
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Table III-6 Regional Analysis of Issues – 1868 
 
Region Top four issues 
Bristol Economy Reform Act Church of 
England 
Irish Church 
Central Irish Church Church of 
England 
Economy Tax 
Cornwall Reform Act Irish Church Education Ballot 
Devon Record Irish Church Tax Church of 
England 
East Anglia Irish Church Tax Education Malt Tax 
East Midlands Irish Church Education Reform Act Church of 
England 
Lincoln †    
London Irish Church Economy Reform Act Tax 
Lancastria Economy Education Irish Church Bankruptcy 
North Church of 
England 
Ballot Irish Church Tax 
Peak Don Irish Church Education Economy Church of 
England 
South East Boroughs Irish Church Education Economy Church of 
England 
Greater London Irish Church Tax Education Reform Act 
South East Rural Irish Church Tax Economy Reform Act 
Wessex Irish Church Education Tax Economy 
West Midlands Irish Church Education Ballot Economy 
Yorkshire Irish Church Education Economy Ballot 
Sources and notes: Candidates’ addresses. A summary of the issues is shown in Tables 
III/1 to III/3. † There were no candidates’ addresses available for this region. 
 
As may be seen from the table there was a remarkable degree of consistency in 
the issues discussed in 1868 and regarded as most important in each region. In the top 
four issues only nine issues were mentioned over all of the regions, and two of these 
issues relating to the abolition of the Malt Tax and the reform of the Bankruptcy laws 
were mentioned only once. The pervasiveness of the issue of the disestablishment of 
the Irish Church also perhaps indicates Gladstone’s success in setting the agenda for 
the 1868 election. There are some discernible regional variations, in particular the 
issue of taxation tended to be mentioned by candidates in the south. It seems clear that 







Table III-7 Regional Analysis of Issues – 1874 
 
Region Top four issues 






Central †    
Cornwall †    




East Anglia Religious 
Liberty 
Land Law Local 
Taxation 
Income Tax 
East Midlands Education Church of 
England 
Income tax Local 
Taxation 
Lincoln Income Tax Indirect 
Taxation 
Game Laws Land Law 




Lancastria Income Tax Indirect tax Religious 
Liberty 
Free Trade 
North Church of 
England 
Income Tax Local 
Taxation 
Education 
Peak Don Church of 
England 
Income Tax Local 
Taxation 
Education 








South East Rural Education Income Tax Local 
Taxation 
Land Law 




West Midlands Income Tax Local 
Taxation 
Education Ballot 




Sources and notes: Candidates’ addresses. A summary of the issues is shown in Tables 
III/1 to III/3. † There were no candidates’ addresses available for these regions. 
 
Similarly to 1868, the issues raised in the 1874 general election show a remarkable 
degree of consistency across the regions. Only 11 issues cover the 72 possibilities and 
of these, the references to franchise reform and the amendment of the game laws are 
mentioned only once. 
The pervasiveness of Gladstone’s proposal to abolish income tax once again 
shows his success at setting the agenda for elections, although in 1874 this was less 




Table III-8 Regional Analysis of Issues – 1880 
 
Region Top four issues 
Bristol Foreign 
Policy 




Record Depression Drinking 
Cornwall Foreign 
Policy 




Depression Drinking Local 
government 




East Midlands Foreign 
Policy 
















Record Drinking Land Law 
North Foreign 
Policy 













Record   

















Land Law Local 
government 
West Midlands Foreign 
Policy 









Sources and notes: Candidates’ addresses. A summary of the issues is shown in Tables 
III/1 to III/3.           
 
The 1880 analysis shows a similar pattern to the previous two general elections 
with a marked lack of variation in issues across the regions. Remarkably, foreign 
policy was regarded by candidates as the most important issue in all but one of the 
regions; and in East Anglia, where it was not ranked first, it was regarded as the 
second most important issue. This is, perhaps, not so surprising when it is recalled that 
foreign policy was an issue on which both parties had strong, if opposed, views at the 
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1880 election. Similarly to previous elections, although the order of importance of 
different issues varied across the regions only eight different issues covered the entire 
range of 72 different possibilities. Similarly, an analysis of the next four most 
important issues in each region reveals a similar pattern with essentially the same 
issues arising in each region with small variations in the degree of importance attached 
to each one. These analyses provide persuasive evidence that there were no major 
issues which were confined to particular regions and that there was very little variation 
in the importance of issues on a national and regional basis. 
The conclusions that may be reached on the importance of individual 
constituency issues are even starker, for the evidence suggests that they may have been 
very little significance. Of the nearly 1000 addresses reviewed over the three elections 
only 20 contained an issue which was unique to the constituency to whose electors it 
was addressed. At the same time, as is readily apparent from the analysis of the issues 
at each general election, there was a variation in those issues which candidates thought 
were important. The nearest approach to total coverage came in the 1880 general 
election when the issue of foreign policy appeared in one form or another in over 85% 
of candidates’ addresses. More generally at the three general elections the most 
frequently discussed issues appeared in 20%-40% of addresses but this did not mask a 
large number of subsidiary issues. It simply reflected the fact that not all candidates 
mentioned every issue but this selectivity was a reflection of the political judgement of 
the individual candidate rather than the locality of the constituency. 
III The party leaders’ addresses 
 
The addresses issued by the party leaders received a great deal of contemporary 
attention and were regarded as official statements of party policy. They were published 
in full in many newspapers, both national and regional, and played a critical role in 
setting the agenda for the election campaign and in providing key messages that would 
be adopted by the candidates. The importance of the leader’s message was also 
established at the 1868 general election when the Liberal central organisation printed 
and widely circulated copies of Gladstone’s first campaign speech setting out the key 
themes of the campaign.
79
 The subsequent addresses of Disraeli and Gladstone were 
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 Disraeli’s address was issued from Downing Street on 1st 
October 1868 to the electors of Buckinghamshire, and as the Standard noted, through 
them to the United Kingdom.
81
 The Standard regarded it as ‘a statepaper’ and a 
‘manifesto of policy’.82 The Times thought he had given ‘the Conservative account of 
political affairs’.83 Gladstone’s response addressed to the electors of South West 
Lancashire came on 8 October 1868 and was greeted with similar comments on its 
importance, The Times devoting a three column leader to an analysis of the relative 
positions of the two leaders.
84
 
The importance attached to the leader’s address as a statement of party policy 
was again shown by the way in which Gladstone and Disraeli prepared their addresses 
in 1874. Gladstone’s address was technically to the electors of Greenwich but a full 
cabinet meeting was held on Friday 23 January 1874 for its consideration and 
approval. The meeting made some amendments and it was agreed that there would be 
absolute secrecy as to its contents that evening. Gladstone then promptly leaked it to 
The Times so that it could be carried in full in the Saturday morning edition of the 
paper along with the shock news of the dissolution.
 85
 Disraeli, caught off guard by 
Gladstone’s surprise announcement, immediately summoned Gathorne Hardy and the 
Earl of Derby to London to assist in drafting his own address which he got into 
Monday’s newspapers.86 
The status of the leaders’ addresses as statements of party policy and their 
importance to candidates of both parties is also clearly shown by the remarkable 
correspondence between the issues raised by Gladstone and Disraeli in their own 
addresses at each of the three elections and the frequency with which these issues were 
mentioned by the candidates of their parties. The tables below show the issues raised 
by each of the party leaders in their addresses for each of the elections and the 
frequency with which they were mentioned by the candidates of their own parties. 
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Table III-9 Gladstone and the addresses of Liberal candidates 
 
Issues raised by Gladstone in his 
address 
Percentage of Liberal candidates 
 mentioning the issue 
1868  
Irish Church 74% 
Education 50% 
Economy 43% 
Reform Act 37% 
Record 14% 
1874  
Income Tax 74% 
Record 65% 
Land Law 34% 
Local Taxation 29% 
Education 25% 
Drinking 8% 
Foreign Policy 7% 
1880  
Foreign policy moral 56% 
Land 35% 




Local government 19% 
Sources and notes: Election addresses of Gladstone to the electors of 
Lancashire, South West (1868), Greenwich (1874) and Midlothian (1880). 
Statistics for the Liberal candidates are taken from Tables III/1, III/2 and III/3 
above. The issues are ordered according to the frequency with which they 
were mentioned by Liberal candidates. They may have been referred to in a 










Table III-10 Disraeli and the addresses of Conservative candidates 
 
Issues raised by Disraeli Percentage of Conservative 
candidates 
 mentioning the issue  
1868  
Irish Church 58% 
Reform Act 31% 
Economy 27% 
Foreign policy 22% 
Reference to predecessor – Earl of 




Income Tax 36% 
Church of England 33% 
Franchise extension 12% 




Foreign policy strength 64% 
Ireland Criticisms 31% 
Sources and notes: Election addresses of Disraeli to the electors of 
Buckinghamshire (1868 and 1874) and his published letter to the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland (1880). Statistics for the Conservative candidates are 
taken from Tables III/1, III/2 and III/3 above. The issues are ordered 
according to the frequency with which they were mentioned by Liberal 
candidates. They may have been referred to in a different order in the 
addresses of Disraeli and individual candidates. 
 
It can be seen that in 1868 Liberal candidates fairly solidly followed Gladstone 
with his top four issues being the same as those adopted by the Liberal candidates. 
Prospective Liberal members did show some independence with 30% mentioning 
further electoral reform through the introduction of the ballot and the extension of the 
borough franchise to the counties and 21% raising issues concerning taxation. 
Conservatives were similar in the way they followed Disraeli although a little less 
consistently. The issues raised by Disraeli were all in the top six of those mentioned by 
Conservative candidates. They also mentioned the threat to the Church of England 
presented by the disestablishment of the Irish Church (34%) and education (34%). The 
latter point suggesting that the battle lines were already being drawn over the religious 
aspects of any future legislation on education. 
Disraeli had some justification when he called Gladstone’s 1874 address a 
‘prolix narrative’; running at over 4,000 words it was quite the longest of any leader in 
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the three general elections between 1868 and 1880, and probably of any candidate. 
Nevertheless, most Liberals followed their leader and there were no major issues 
referred to by Liberal candidates which were not also covered by Gladstone in his 
comprehensive address. Conservatives as well adopted a strong party line with the key 
issues referred to by candidates all following Disraeli except for opposition to 
temperance laws which was addressed by 16% of Conservatives but not mentioned by 
their leader. 
In 1880 matters were rather more complicated by the status of each of the main 
protagonists. Beaconsfield sat in the House of Lords and by constitutional convention 
of the time was precluded from dealing ‘otherwise than indirectly’ with the 
approaching appeal to the electorate.
87
 As Premier he decided upon the date of the 
dissolution, which came as a complete surprise to almost everyone, and was, therefore, 
able to issue his manifesto on the same day as the announcement of the election. In 
view of his constitutional position and perhaps reflecting his desire to make Ireland the 
key issue of the election, his manifesto was produced in the form of a letter to the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, and, of course, was simultaneously released to the press. 
Whatever the constitutional niceties it was treated as the Conservative manifesto and 
was reproduced in full in most principal national and regional newspapers. The 
Conservatives were led in the Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
Stafford Northcote, and at the same time his address to his constituents in North Devon 
received considerable publicity as a second official manifesto for the Conservative 
party.
88
 On the Liberal side, after his Midlothian campaign, Gladstone’s address was 
given much attention; it was, as the Birmingham Daily Post put it, ‘Mr Gladstone’s 
electoral manifesto’.89 However, the Leader of the Opposition was Lord Hartington 
and his address to his constituency electorate was given national attention in the same 
way as Northcote’s. The following tables show the issues raised by Hartington and 
Northcote in their addresses compared to the frequency with which those issues were 
mentioned by Liberal and Conservative candidates respectively. 
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Table III-11 Hartington and the addresses of Liberal candidates 
 
Issues raised by Hartington Percentage of Liberal  candidates 
 mentioning the issue  
1880  
Foreign policy moral 56% 
Land 35% 
Franchise Extension 34% 
Economy 30% 
Ireland Criticisms 23% 
Local government 19% 
Sources and notes: Election address of Hartington to the electors of 
Lancashire, North East. Statistics for the Conservative candidates are taken 
from Tables III/1, III/2 and III/3 above. The issues are ordered according to 
the frequency with which they were mentioned by Liberal candidates. They 
may have been referred to in a different order in the addresses of Hartington 
and individual candidates. 
 
Table III-12 Northcote and the addresses of Liberal candidates 
 
Issues raised by Northcote Percentage of Conservative  
candidates 
 mentioning the issue  
1880  
Foreign policy strength 65% 
Ireland 31% 
Economy 11% 
Sources and notes: Election address of Northcote to the electors of Devon, 
North. Statistics for the Conservative candidates are taken from Tables III/1, 
III/2 and III/3 above. The issues are ordered according to the frequency with 
which they were mentioned by Conservative candidates. They may have been 
referred to in a different order in the addresses of Northcote and individual 
candidates. 
 
It may be seen from these tables and those relating to Gladstone and Disraeli 
that the issues raised by the party leaders were also followed with some frequency by 
the candidates of their parties. There were also some issues which were popular with 
candidates but were not mentioned by the leaders. Liberal candidates gave additional 
emphasis to subjects such as temperance, local government and taxation and burial 
rights for nonconformists. Conservatives also mentioned the economic depression and 
the Church of England. Substantially, however, there was broad agreement between 
the leaders and their candidates.  
Apart from its constitutional status, Beaconsfield’s 1880 manifesto proved to 
be somewhat unusual compared to prior elections. It was relatively short and focussed 
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solely on Ireland and foreign policy with the greater attention given to Ireland. It may 
be read as an attempt to make Home Rule the key issue of the election (which perhaps 
explains why only 1% of Liberals mentioned Ireland as an issue) and it sought to relate 
weakness toward Ireland with weakness in foreign policy. He said: 
There are some who challenge the expediency of the Imperial character of this realm. 
Having attempted, and failed, to enfeeble our colonies by their policy of 
decomposition, they may perhaps now recognise in the disintegration of the UK a 




Many Conservatives followed him with 65% mentioning foreign policy and 31% 
Ireland. Northcote’s address was relatively short compared to others but was consistent 
with that of his leader except that he included considerably more on the nation’s 
finances as might be expected from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Gladstone’s 1880 
address was also unusual because, by his standards, it was relatively brief. Hartington 
on the other hand seemed to respond to his official position as leader of the party, by 
issuing an address of great length which was certainly more expansive than 
Gladstone’s. There was no great disagreement, however, and they broadly covered the 
same territory.   
It is apparent, therefore, that contemporaries, both politicians and the media, 
regarded the party leader’s address of significant importance in the context of general 
elections. They were regarded, certainly by the press, as a statement of party policy, 
and the consistency with which candidates followed their leader suggests that by now 
the leader’s address was firmly considered to be the party manifesto. 
IV The appeal to patriotism 
 
Patriotic language was extremely important to the discourse of electoral politics during 
the period. We have seen in the preceding sections that issues such as the preservation 
of the established church, foreign policy, education and the governance of Ireland were 
amongst the important issues at all three general elections. Candidates frequently 
couched their statements on these matters in language which appealed to patriotic 
beliefs. For example, Conservatives frequently used this language in their defences of 
the established church. A good illustration of this was the address of Henry Raikes, the 
Conservative candidate at Chester, who said: 
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I cannot but anticipate serious danger to the Church of England as well as to our other 
Protestant Institutions, possibly even a shock to the rights of all property, from such a 




Equally, Liberals could also use such language, for example at the 1880 general 
election Liberals frequently criticised the government’s treatment of Parliament as 
‘underhand’ in their pursuit of their pro-Turkish policy.92 This was exemplified by 
Samuel Plimsoll, a Liberal candidate at Derby, who said of this behaviour that the 
government had ‘unpatriotically sought to undermine the authority of Parliament’. As 
a result there have been a number of questions which have arisen concerning the use 
and efficacy of patriotism in electoral politics. The style and content of election 
addresses can provide a useful means of shedding some more light on these points but, 
in order to do this, it is necessary to clarify some matters important to this debate. 
Firstly, it is important to observe that patriotism without content is a vacuous 
proposition.  Patriotism as love of country or patrie simply begs the question of what is 
meant by country or patrie in each circumstance and what exactly is loveable about it. 
To have any significant content or appeal patriotism has to be underpinned by a 
concept of nation but it is equally true that this could vary significantly between 
politicians - so that patriotic appeals could be expressed in very different languages 
with very different underlying concepts of nation. This question of the content of 
patriotic appeals points to a second issue because once it is recognised that there can be 
very different forms of patriotism, expressed in very different languages, then it 
becomes apparent that these appeals could be used by both parties. Parry and others 
have shown that the Conservative employment of nationalistic language and appeals to 
patriotism as a central part of the Conservative message to the new working-class 
electorate were not the exclusive preserve of that party and these appeals could be 
frequently used by Liberals.
93
 For example, Paul Readman has noted that from the late 
1870s to the outbreak of war in 1914 ‘non-Conservative languages of patriotism not 
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only existed, but could at times exert at least a strong a pull as their Conservative 
counterparts’.94  
Finally, Cunningham famously argued in his article in the History Workshop 
Journal that the Conservatives ‘stole the language of patriotism from Palmerstonian 
Liberalism for the Conservative party, through his bold foreign initiatives’.95 He 
identified the timing of this transition with considerable historical precision: ‘The 
decisive shift came suddenly in the space of few months in late 1877 and early 1878. 
The occasion was the Eastern Question’.96 This appeal, he argued, was a jingoistic plea 
based on the strength of the Conservatives’ foreign policy and it was associated with 
the defence and celebration of the Empire together with the notion of imperialism. 
There has been considerable discussion as to whether such imperialistic appeals were 
at all worthwhile and whether the electorate, particularly its working-class element had 
any interest or paid any attention to the Empire and its related issues.
97
  
Examination of candidates’ addresses for the three general elections throws 
additional light on these issues in a number of interesting ways. Firstly, it provides an 
insight into the nature of the patriotic language that was used by the parties. The most 
frequently used Conservative appeals during the period were based on the patriotic 
virtue of protecting the historical protestant settlement, the constitution and all the 
institutions of England and its Empire. The emergence of this usage can be clearly seen 
in the Conservative approaches to the questions of the disestablishment of the Irish 
Church and religious instruction in state supported educational institutes which were 
such important issues in the 1868 and 1874 general elections. The language used in 
addresses also tends to confirm the existence of non-Conservative languages of 
patriotism and indeed a robust Liberal language of patriotism came to the fore in the 
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extensive debate over foreign policy at the 1880 general election.
98
 The distinction 
between the patriotic languages of Conservatives and Liberals, especially in 1880, 
shows that what were considered one’s country’s merits and achievements could be 
very different indeed. This point was well summarised by Parry: 
British national identity between 1850 and 1880 was not much celebrated reference to 
the empire as such, and certainly not by reference to ‘imperialism’, but was conceived 





Thus, ‘a very important vein in English patriotism’ and an important part of both 
Conservative and Liberal patriotic appeals were to what J. H. Grainger has termed the 
‘patria of laws, customs and institutions of the country’100 
Secondly, the examination of addresses suggests that the Conservatives use of 
the language of patriotism developed significantly over the period 1867-1880 and 
much sooner than the timing that was proposed by Cunningham. The discussion that 
follows suggests that Conservative patriotic appeal was strongly established by the 
time of the time of the 1868 general election but it was not jingoistic or imperialist in 
nature. Finally, the addresses provide an insight into the development of imperialism 
and the Empire in the language of British politics – suggesting that there were very few 
references to the Empire at the general elections of 1868 and 1874 and that even in 
1880 there was only limited discussion. 
Turning first to the nature of patriotic appeals, during the 1868 election 
campaign the key issue was the disestablishment of the Irish Church. Conservative 
candidates contesting the disestablishment played on fears of ‘other more insidious 
manoeuvres to undermine the Established Church and dissever it from State 
connection’ as a means of opposition and they often phrased this appeal in terms of 
protection of historic national institutions.
101
 Henry Raikes, the successful 
Conservative at Chester, provides a good example of the phrasing of these appeals. He 
said: 
The freedom and prosperity of this great empire have been for the last three hundred 
years so closely bound up with the principles of the Reformation, that I cannot believe 
the cause good government is likely to gain by a national renunciation of 
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Protestantism. And I cannot but anticipate serious danger to the Church in England as 
well as to our other Protestant Institutions, possibly even a shock to the rights of all 





Other Conservatives attacked disestablishment by raising ultramontanism, thus seeking 
to play on patriotic fears of control from a foreign power as well as threats to the 
Church of England and property rights. Sir Henry Wolff, a Conservative candidate at 
Christchurch, thought it was:  
A scheme fostered by the Ultramontane section of the Roman Catholic clergy, in 
combination with those who, in this country, are bent on getting rid of the Established 
Church at any price. It is a blow aimed at that Church as a whole, and will if 
successful, endanger not only the union of Church and State, but the laws regulating 




In many cases Conservative candidates sought to link the defence of the established 
church with the preservation of the English constitution and the defence of the 
monarchy. Edward Leigh Pemberton, a successful Conservative at Kent East was the 
most direct when he pledged ‘to support the supremacy of our Queen and the integrity 
of our Constitution’.104 
A distinctly Liberal variety of patriotism, less muscular and more based on 
principle and morality, can be seen in some of the addresses of Liberal candidates in 
1868. Samuel Plimsoll, one of the successful Liberals at Derby, presents one:  
The English government exists to give the people of this country peace, security, and 
liberty, and to conduct its relations with other nations. Taking that last first, it appears 
to me of vital importance that it should most anxiously guard against giving any cause 
of offence; that it should exercise great forbearance when offence arises, and that it 
should carefully avoid any but absolutely necessary interference with the affairs of 
other people. I believe that Christianity and the Constitution will be alike strengthened 




Liberals also appealed to traditional patriotic symbols. John Bright at Birmingham 
showed this when he said: 
A Protestantism which is in alliance with Christian kindness and with justice, and my 
loyalty to the Constitution leads me to wish for the hearty union of the three kingdoms 
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Others saw the merits of their country in abiding by ‘the principles of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of our neighbours’, and claimed that ‘the just influence of 
England will ever be powerful in the Councils of Europe on the side of right, freedom, 
and civilisation’.107 Whigs were not quite so moved to principle; in supporting the 
Abyssinian operation, Earl Grosvenor noted that ‘old England has a long arm still, and 
hands and hearts ready to carry out her just and chivalrous enterprises’.108 
The general election of 1874 saw a continued use and development of patriotic 
themes by the Conservatives. The disestablishment of the Irish Church did not prevent 
them from using the patriotic defence of the English church, the constitution and the 
monarchy in an even more robust way than in 1868, which adds some weight to the 
view that their 1868 policy merely used the issue of disestablishment of the Irish 
Church as a convenient peg on which to hang their development of this theme. This 
deployment of patriotism by the Conservatives, in a more enhanced way than during 
the 1868 election, is also shown by their preferred issues. After taxation, to which they 
were obliged to respond because of Gladstone’s income tax pledge, the issues 
preferred by Conservative candidates were protection of religious education, the 
Church of England and foreign policy. These were all areas which enabled the display 
of patriotic credentials. Conservative language became more robust. Disraeli in his 
own address suggested some Liberals wished to ‘assail the Monarchy, others impugn 
the independence of the House of Lords, while there are those who would relieve 
Parliament altogether from any share in the government of one portion of the United 
Kingdom’.109 Other candidates thought that the result of the Liberal administration had 
been ‘to overthrow or undermine institutions previously held sacred, and to disturb the 
settled institutions of the country both in Church and State’ and Conservative policy 
was to ‘maintain the rightful position and honour of the country’.110 Thomas Cordes, 
the successful Conservative candidate at the Monmouth District of Burghs, gave a 
rounded exposition of the Conservative position as well as showing the importance of 
national issues in Wales, when he said: 
                                                 
107
 Election address of Sam S. Marling, a successful Liberal candidate in Gloucestershire South, Bristol 
Mercury and Daily Post, 7 November 1868. 
108
 Election address of Earl Grosvenor, a successful Liberal at Chester, Cheshire Observer, 8 August 
1868. 
109
 Election address of B. Disraeli, Daily News, 26 January 1874.  
110
 Election address of Edward Green, Leeds Mercury, 28 January 1874; Election address of Lewis R. 
Starkey, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 29 January 1874. 
158 
 
I am firmly attached to the Constitution of the country, and believe that, in the 
maintenance of the Throne, our hereditary Second Chamber, a National church, and a 
system of Education in connection with Religious Teaching, are to be found the 




John Johnson, a Conservative candidate at Exeter gave another example when he said: 
I would steadfastly maintain the connection between Church and State, I desire to 
uphold the House of Lords as a vital branch of the Legislature; and, while ready to 
lend my aid to the removal of any proved abuse, I am anxious to preserve in its 
integrity that Constitution to which we are indebted for our national prosperity, and 




In 1874 foreign policy provided fertile ground for Conservatives. The 
successful Conservative candidates at Portsmouth, thought that the Liberal government 
had conducted ‘a foreign policy of imbecility and mismanagement which has tended to 
degrade England in the eyes of Europe and the world’.113 Others thought that British 
foreign policy should be ‘worthy of the ancient renown of England, and has in past 
years made her respected amongst the nations of the world’, and ‘conducted with a 
dignity and firmness which, while avoiding any undue interference with the affairs of 
other countries, shall secure to England the influence and respect abroad which are due 
to her rank among nations’. 114 Thus the Conservatives had continued to build on their 
patriotic approach which placed them as defenders of the constitution, the established 
institutions of the country, especially the throne and the church, together with a robust 
and manly foreign policy which firmly upheld England’s dignity and rightful place 
among the nations of the world. 
In 1874 the use of patriotic language by the Liberals in their election addresses 
was extremely rare. An exception was provided by Evelyn Ashley, who narrowly lost 
in the Isle of Wight, and said in his address: 
The determination to maintain in our Foreign Policy an attitude of conciliation and 
respect for the rights and feelings of other nations is quite compatible with a keen and 
watchful jealousy for the honour and interests of our common country. Should I be 
elected as your Member, I shall not be disposed to forget that Patriotism in a public 
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On occasion references to foreign policy could produce some patriotic allusions. W. H. 
Stone, a Liberal candidate at Portsmouth, was in favour of ‘such a policy toward 
foreign nations as, while maintaining her due position, may keep this country clear of 
the unspeakable calamities of war’(emphasis added).116 These, however, were 
exceptional examples. Most Liberal candidates focussed on their record in government 
and what they saw as key legislative issues such as taxation, education and land law. 
Some Liberals sought to answer the question of disestablishment of the Church of 
England by declaring in its favour. However, some declared themselves in favour of 
disestablishment.
117
 This variety of views reflects Parry’s argument that by the time of 
the 1874 general election ‘there was hardly any policy on which the Liberal party 
could unite’.118 The infrequent use of patriotic language also reflects his view that the 
government’s apparent impotence in European security had rendered it impossible to 
continue the uplifting international rhetoric of the 1860s and the inability to agree on 
an ‘uplifting civic republican agenda’ had made it impossible to replace this 
domestically. Liberal patriotism was at a very low ebb in 1874.   
Following the Eastern Question and Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign, foreign 
policy was the most frequently mentioned issue in the 1880 campaign and gave 
significant opportunities for both parties to display their very different forms of 
patriotic language. The Conservatives again focussed on the strength and firmness of 
their policy and honour of England. One candidate said the previous administration 
was: 
A government which, during a time of great danger and anxiety, has upheld the 
position and honour of England, and at the same time averted the evils of a European 




 Others noted that policy had been ‘firm and vigorous’ and it had ‘left England strong 
in Europe and powerful and respected over the World’.120 At Dudley Alfred Waterman 
stood unsuccessfully as a Conservative and noted in his address that ‘No true 
Englishman will be content that his country shall accept a second place in the Councils 
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of Nations’.121 It is noteworthy that many of these phrases had been used before by the 
Conservatives. 
Liberal language again showed a more principled approach. Sir John Simon 
succinctly outlined a common Liberal view. He stated: 
The Prime Minister asks the country to support him in securing the “ineffable blessing 
of peace” by “the presence, not to say the ascendancy of England in the Councils of 
Europe”. Yes! But let our “presence” or our “ascendancy,” be manifested by our 
justice and wisdom, by a policy that shall appeal to the moral consciousness of 





Another noted that ‘These wars have been commenced and carried on without 
any reason that can be justified by the codes of Christianity, or morality, or even by the 
lower standards of necessity or expediency’.123 Others referred to a policy which 
‘without dictation or offence to other powers, shall maintain the place which England 
occupies in the estimation of all great nations, much to the advantage of freedom and 
civilisation’.124 
The adjectives used by Conservatives, particularly in the 1880 campaign, in 
relation to patriotic topics often focus on such qualities as strength, firmness and 
power; a ‘manly’ approach which is interestingly consistent with the development of 
other Conservative languages after the 1867 Reform Act.  Accordingly, Cunningham’s 
argument might have been stronger if he had suggested that the Conservative brand of 
patriotic language associated with strength, power and manliness became, as he put it, 
a key component of the ideological apparatus of the imperialist state.
125
 These 
addresses provide substantial evidence for the view that: 
During this period, the conservative concept of the nation became a key weapon in the 
ideological and electoral armoury of the Conservative Party. Burke's conservative state 
patriotism was translated into an official state-based nationalism, based on the 




                                                 
121
 Election address of Alfred Waterman, Birmingham Daily Post, 16 March 1880. 
122
 Election address of Sir John Simon, the successful Liberal candidate at Dewesbury, Leeds Mercury, 
20 March 1880. 
123
 Election address of Joseph Whitwell Pease, one of the successful Liberal candidates in Durham 
South, Northern Echo, 20 March 1880. 
124
 Election address of W. E. Forster, one of the successful Liberal candidates at Bradford, Bury Post, 16 
March 1880. 
125
 See also Lawrence, 'Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914'; Lawrence, 
Speaking. 
126
 Philip Lewis Lynch, 'British Conservatism and the Concept of Nation', (Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of Warwick, 1992), pp. 79-82. 
161 
 
This policy was a deliberate shift instituted by Disraeli in which there would, amongst 
other things, be: 
A concerted use of appeals to patriotism and national unity, in which the Conservative 
Party was portrayed as the national party and contrasted with Gladstone's "anti-
patriotic" Liberal party; the portrayal of the Conservative Party as the party of empire, 
and the spread of imperial myths into popular culture and the further development of 




This thesis is further supported by the rhetoric of Disraeli as prime mover of the use of 
this form of patriotism by the Conservatives. His ‘one England’ views were already 
well established by 1868 and in 1867 he had always thought that the Tory party was 
the national party of England.
128
 His subsequent addresses and speeches show the 
development of the patriotic message well before the Eastern Question. This direction 
of Conservative policy was signalled in a speech in 1867 when Disraeli said: 
I have always looked upon the interests of the labouring classes as essentially the most 
Conservative interests of the country…and I have always thought that those who were 
most interested in the stability and even the glory of the state are the great mass of the 
population, happy to enjoy the privileges of freemen and good laws, and proud at the 
same time as inhabitants of a great country to give their name an honourable and 
glorious reputation in every quarter of the globe. 
 
The rousing finale to his speech told the audience that he expected: 
That you will exercise [your popular privileges] to maintain the institutions of your 




We have seen how important the leader’s address became as a statement of 
party policy and further signs of the development of Disraeli’s policy can be seen in 
his address for the 1868 election. He claimed Conservative credit for the Reform Act 
asserting that the legislation had been in ‘unison with the character of the country’, and 
was ‘calculated to animate the spirit of the community and add strength and stability to 
the State’. Similarly, in the field of foreign affairs the government’s conduct had meant 
that ‘the just influence of England’ had been established as well as maintaining the 
honour of the Crown’ and obtained ‘for her Majesty’s forces the admiring respect of 
Europe’.130 His famous speech at the Crystal Palace in 1872 had similar implications 
and language. He declaimed that the Conservative Party ‘has three great objectives’. 
These were ‘to maintain the institutions of the country’, ‘to uphold the Empire of 
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England’ and ‘the elevation of the condition of the people’.131 His view of the 
importance of patriotism to the Conservative appeal to the newly enfranchised working 
classes was made explicit when he said: 
When I say ‘Conservative’, I use the word in its purest and loftiest sense. I mean that 
the people of England, and especially the working classes of England, are proud of 
belonging to a great country and wish to maintain its greatness – that they are proud of 
belonging to an Imperial country, and are resolved to maintain, if they can, their 
empire – that they believe on the whole, that the greatness and the empire of England 




The place of the established church in this developing concept of Conservative nation 
was also emphasised when he said ‘I see in the church, as I believe I see in England, an 
immense effort to rise to national feelings and recur to national feelings. (Cheers.) The 
Church of England, like all our institutions, feels that it must be national’. His speech 
was full of other references to the importance of empire and to pride in the honour, 
power and glory of England and how it should command the respect of the world. The 
references to the Empire and imperialism in this speech have played a role in the 
considerable historical debate over the importance of Empire and imperialism in 
British cultural and political life.
133
 
An examination of election addresses can make a contribution to this debate. 
The progression of Disraeli’s personal election addresses is interesting in this respect. 
We have seen that his 1868 address he referred to ‘the just influence of England’ and 
obtaining ‘for her Majesty’s forces the admiring respect of Europe. However, he does 
not refer to Empire or imperialism at all, the nearest he gets is a reference to ‘her 
Majesty’s dominions’ when he is drawing attention to the differences in conditions in 
Ireland with those in other dominions. In his 1874 address Disraeli does mention the 
empire once but very much in the context of presenting the Conservative party as the 
defender of national institutions and presenting the Liberals as potential enemies of 
those institutions. This was consistent with the general tenor of the party’s patriotic 
language in 1874, and he said: ‘There is hope… that he [Gladstone] is not, certainly at 
                                                 
131
 Disraeli, speech at the Crystal Palace, 24 June 1872 in T. E. Kebbel, Selected Speeches of the late 
Right Honourable the Earl of Beaconsfield, (London, 1882). 
132
 Disraeli, speech at the Crystal Palace, 24 June 1872 in ibid. 
133
 The literature on this subject is extensive. Some important works include: Porter, The Absent-Minded 
Imperialists; Porter, '"Empire, What Empire?"'; Price, An Imperial War; Readman, 'The Conservative 
Party, Patriotism, and British Politics'; Richard Price, 'One Big Thing: Britain, Its Empire, and Their 
Imperial Culture',  Journal of British Studies, 45 (2006), 602-627; Rose, Intellectual Life; Richard 
Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-
1960, (Cambridge, 1964); Cunningham, 'Language of Patriotism'; Cunningham, British Public Opinion 
and the Eastern Question; Cunningham, 'The Conservative Party and Patriotism'. 
163 
 
present, opposed to our national institutions or to the maintenance of the integrity of 
the Empire’.134 
In his 1880 address Beaconsfield did not use the words Empire or imperialism. 
He made opposition to Home Rule a key theme of this address and in this context he 
does accuse the Liberals for seeking the disintegration of the empire. He said: 
And yet there are some who challenge the expediency of the Imperial character of this 
realm. Having attempted, and failed, to enfeeble our colonies by their policy of 
decomposition, they may perhaps now recognize in the disintegration of the United 
Kingdom a mode which will not only accomplish, but precipitate, their purpose’.135 
 
Gladstone did not mention the Empire or imperialism in either of his 1868 and 
1874 addresses. His lengthy statement of 1880 gave a Liberal response to 
Beaconsfield’s accusation that the Liberal’s sought the dismemberment of the empire. 
His comments bear repetition because they represent a rare statement by him on the 
issue and give a good summary of the Liberal view. He began by reminding electors 
that they had to decide upon whether they were content or otherwise with the way the 
Conservatives had governed ‘this great empire’ and went on to say: 
In the electioneering address which the Prime Minister has issued an attempt is made 
to work upon your fears by dark allusions to the repeal of the Union and the 
abandonment of the colonies’. He added ‘As to the colonies, Liberal Administrations 





Hartington too responded to Beaconsfield’s attack stating that the strength of the 
colonies was because Liberal governments had given them self-government and taught 
them dependence on Britain for their defence was not compatible with their ‘dignity or 
freedoms’. He reprimanded the Prime Minister for, he said, ‘no patriotic purpose …is 
gained by the use of the language of exaggeration in describing the Irish agitation for 
Home Rule.’ 137 
In the examination of 303 election addresses for candidates of both parties in 
county and borough constituencies in England for the 1868 general election, only one 
reference was found to the empire. Examination of the election addresses of some 367 
candidates for the same constituencies in 1874 showed 15 mentioned the empire or 
imperialism. Candidates’ addresses in 1880 showed a marked increase in the use of the 
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words ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’, probably because of the emphasis on foreign policy 
at that election. The response to that stimulus was not, however, overwhelming. Only 
55 candidates out of the 423 whose addresses were examined made reference to the 
empire. These results suggest that Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Smith are correct 
in their proposition that Disraeli’s references to Empire in his speeches of 1872 at the 
Crystal Palace and Manchester: 
Fell flat in its effect on public opinion in England. It met almost no response in the 
press. Disraeli drew the consequences and never returned to the subject of the empire 




Indeed, the references to Empire were not only ignored but as Parry has powerfully 
argued, were not intended to be followed, for Disraeli was merely berating ‘what he 
saw as Liberal failures in the past to ‘safeguard the colonial relationship’.139  
V Conclusions 
 
Candidates’ election addresses are an important source of historical evidence of what 
politicians, and by extension, electors thought were the key issues to be decided at 
election time. Apart from the issues themselves they provide valuable insights into the 
discourse of electoral politics through the expressions and language they contained. 
Analysis of the issues contained in addresses for the three general elections of the 
period show a remarkable degree of consistency and lack of variability – purely local 
issues are referred to very infrequently. This provides strong evidence for the 
nationalisation of electoral politics in this period and that this apparent lack of 
importance of ‘locality’ was established as early as the first contest in 1868. The 
congruity, both in ideas and language, between the addresses issued by the party 
leaders and those issued by a party’s candidates reinforces this finding. The addresses 
of the party leaders were regarded as party manifestos from 1868 onwards. 
The language and expressions used in these addresses enables us to track 
certain themes that developed during this period. Certainly they show that appeals to 
patriotism were an important part of the message of both parties and these appeals 
could be based on different expressions of patriotism and concepts of patrie. It seems 
clear that the Conservatives, led by Disraeli’s beliefs and examples, sought from the 
expansion of the electorate after the 1867 Reform Act, to develop a patriotic appeal 
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which was, at root, an appeal to uphold the historic values of England. This involved 
the defence of her historic institutions and the defence of the constitution. A firm and 
manly foreign policy was part of this in the context of maintaining England’s status 
and her respect in the eyes of other nations. They also show this appeal was not 
jingoistic. The Empire and the concept of imperialism were not significant features of 
the discourse of electoral politics in this period. Despite the importance that some have 
attached to Disraeli’s references to Empire in his 1872 speeches and to the impact of 
the Eastern Question, references to the Empire were uncommon in 1880 and extremely 













Chapter II described how the 1867 Reform Act created a mass electorate for the first 
time in Great Britain with those eligible to vote dramatically increasing from 
approximately 930,000 to 2,257,000, an increase of 242%. The increase in the borough 
constituencies was even more pronounced and created some very large urban 
constituencies; for example, Manchester now boasted an electorate of some 48,000, 
Glasgow 47,000 and Hackney 40,000. This increase in the electorate had profound and 
lasting effects on party organisation both at a local and national level. The Reform Act 
of 1832 had initiated the development of some constituency organisation because of its 
registration requirements and this had led to the formation of national party 
organisations dedicated to the support of that process.
1
 For both parties the huge influx 
of new voters meant that ensuring their supporters were on the register became even 
more important after the 1867 Act. The Act also meant that by the time of the general 
election of 1868 there was, in many constituencies, much more to electoral 
organisation than the maintenance of the registers, however important that may have 
been.  
Such a substantial increase in the electorate meant that at election time the 
campaign would require the engagement of significantly more canvassers, ‘watchers’ 
and other assistants; the organisation and provision of transport to convey electors to 
the poll; the organisation of adequate refreshments and meeting rooms at local inns 
and, in some constituencies the provision of monetary incentives to numbers of 
electors. These activities required not only increased funding but a significant increase 
in the numbers of local volunteers to assist. This meant, in turn, that the strength of 
local organisations became much more important. At the same time, there had been a 
decline, since 1832, in older organisational methods in which local influence was the 
most important factor. This reduction in the power of the magnates without it being 
‘superseded or adequately supplemented’ left the electoral territory ripe for the 
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creation and implementation of new approaches.
2
 As a result there was, in many 
constituencies, a step change in party organisation and the funding which it required. 
These developments continued to gather momentum in the 1860s as further reform 
came to be expected and, afterwards, continued to be fuelled by the impact of the 1868 
general election and the Ballot Act of 1872. This act represented a further step change 
in the development of party organisation as the parties needed to help electors operate 
the new system of voting and had to develop new techniques to monitor and manage 
the progress of the party’s vote on election day. Finally, the gradual refinement of the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Reform Act meant that party agents and 
solicitors became even busier fighting cases before the revising barristers to ensure 
their supporters were on the electoral register.  
But it was not just the need to get greater numbers of electors to cast their 
ballots under an altered electoral system which drove the need for greater party 
organisation. The introduction to this thesis described the reaction by historians to the 
pervasive influence of electoral sociological approaches to the study and explanation 
of electoral politics and the creation of a new orthodoxy which has placed greater 
emphasis on the role of party organisational structures in enabling an interactive 
system of mediation and adaptation between the voters, local political participants and 
the central party leaders.
3
 Organisation therefore had a key role to play, not just in the 
practical organisation of much greater numbers of electors, but also at a fundamental 
level in forming a system for dynamically arbitrating and reformulating people’s sense 
of political and social meanings as well as fabricating practicable programmes and 
deep-rooted foundations of political adherence.
4
 
This chapter seeks to examine some of the ways in which the development of 
party organisation sought to achieve these objectives. It commences with a brief 
review of the development by both parties of their central organisational structures but 
suggests that, whilst these have received the primary if not exclusive attention of 
historians in the analysis of party organisation in this period, the exclusiveness of their 
study is in fact a result of an emphasis on electoral sociological approaches. It suggests 
that in order to understand the importance of party organisation in dynamically 
communicating and defining the party’s message and, hence, its effect on the language, 
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rhetoric and ideas of electoral politics it is necessary to look further at the development 
of grass roots organisation. Despite this there has not been a great deal of work on the 
local organisations of either party in the early part of the period whilst much of the 
work done on the development of central party structures by Hanham and 
Feuchtwanger remains sound.
 5
 For these reasons the chapter concentrates on the 
development of local organisations. To do this it offers some new research on local 
Liberal associations and the growth of Conservative working men’s organisations in 
the 1860s.  
II Central party structures 
 
The rapid ‘nationalisation’ of party politics from 1868 to 1880, together with the 
structural pressures of franchise and redistribution reform meant that party hierarchies 
became increasingly interested in organisational activities, seeing them both as a 
means to win elections and also as a necessary means of influence over local 
arrangements. Developments in this period accordingly put additional pressure on all 
aspects of central party organisation. The response of the parties was different both in 
timing and extent, and the Conservatives certainly seemed to be quicker off the mark. 
Conservative developments were undoubtedly provoked by the Tory fear of the 
consequences of enfranchising such a significant proportion of the working classes and 
by Disraeli’s less publicised, but undoubted interest in, party organisation. 
Organisation was certainly regarded as crucial by contemporaries evidenced not least 
by the money that candidates spent in their efforts to be elected and on the interest and 
comments of leading politicians. Even Gladstone, who was always more convinced of 
the superior power of ideas, admitted the necessity of appropriate arrangements.
6
  
The importance of organisation seemed self-evident to the Conservatives and 
the response of the party to these developments occurred at both a national and 
constituency level. As Windscheffel has put it ‘organisational efficiency and 
sophisticated, modernising techniques of party management have long been pivotal to 
explanations of the revival in Conservative fortunes after 1867’.7 At a central level 
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there were a number of developments in response to the changed electoral 
environment. In the mid-1860s central Conservative organisation was overseen by the 
Chief Whip who from the formation of the Derby ministry in 1866 until 1868 was 
Thomas Edward Taylor.
8
 He was, as part of his duties, responsible for the supervision 
of Markham Spofforth who was the party’s Principal Agent and a member of the firm 
of solicitors of Baxter, Rose, Norton who acted as parliamentary agents for the party as 
well as looking after Disraeli’s personal affairs. R. Dudley Baxter, another member of 




Disraeli took a close interest in party organisation. This interest had been clear 
from the very early development of his political career; in 1835, for instance, he had 
considered the security and maintenance of party organisation should be one of the 
three key aspirations of the Conservative party.
10
 It was therefore no surprise that after 
the election defeat in 1868 he took steps to revitalise the central functions of the 
Conservative party.
11
 Spofforth’s tenure as party agent ended in March 1870 and J. E. 
Gorst was appointed in his place. Gorst had been a formative influence in the earlier 
formation of NUCCA (which is described below) and he established his offices in 
those of the Conservative Registration Association where C. Keith-Falconer was 
secretary. Gorst and Keith-Falconer subsequently in March 1871 became joint 
secretaries of the National Union of Conservative Associations.
12
 With the gathering of 
these organisations under the same leadership and at the same premises the title of 
Conservative Central Office began to be applied to these arrangements.
13
 Gorst, 
particularly, appreciated the importance of local party organisation and ‘he visited 
constituencies, met local leaders and worked to co-ordinate and assist the growing 
number of Conservative working men’s clubs that had been formed as a result of the 
agitation for, and passage of, the Reform Act in 1867’.14 The organisation of Disraeli’s 
well known visit to Manchester in 1872 was an example of the effort he put into 
attempting to bring together local supporters and the party leadership. At the same 
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time, Disraeli also set up a committee to manage elections in the counties and smaller 
boroughs which were still under the influence of local landowners.
15
 
The efforts put into the organisation of the party paid off for the Conservatives 
in 1874 with their sweeping election victory. Afterwards, however, the leadership 
became more pre-occupied with matters of government and, as a result, party 
organisation was not at all high on the Prime Minister’s agenda. In addition, Gorst had 
hoped that after taking power Disraeli’s dispensation of patronage would adequately 
reward local Conservative leaders in the boroughs. This was not to be the case and he 
became disillusioned by both this and by what he regarded as a failure of the party 
leadership to recognise his own efforts.
16
 His appointment as party agent had formally 
lapsed after the election and no successor had been appointed although he remained 
available for official consultation, which was not sought. He returned to the Commons 
in 1875 and finally in 1877 W. B. Skene was appointed as a replacement party agent. 
Skene was a Scottish landowner and in Feuchtwanger’s words was ‘entirely unsuitable 
for the role of party agent’.17 This was perhaps borne out by the decision to dissolve in 
March 1880 which was entirely supported by central office led by Skene. When the 
Conservatives lost so comprehensively Beaconsfield and others in the party hierarchy 
were mystified why this advice had been so wrong. As a result, for the Conservatives, 
party organisation became important again and W. H. Smith was appointed chairman 
of a standing committee with the task of its improvement.
18
 
The central organisation structures of the Liberal party lagged behind those of 
the Conservative party during the 1860s and 1870s perhaps reflecting Gladstone’s 
lesser emphasis on the subject; certainly ‘unlike Disraeli, Gladstone had no desire 
personally to supervise the conduct of the election, and indeed was ignorant of many of 
the problems involved’.19 Central Liberal organisation was controlled by the chief 
whip and in 1860 the incumbent whip, Henry Brand, joined with William Drake, a 
City solicitor who had been appointed Principal Agent in 1857, to form the Liberal 
Registration Association. This organisation, run by Thomas Roberts, had as its main 
function the giving of assistance to Liberal organisations in the large number of 
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 Brand retired in 
December 1866 and was replaced by George Grenfell Glyn, later second Lord 
Wolverton, a close personal friend of Gladstone, although Brand continued to assist 
until the 1868 general election. It was under Glyn that the whips’ office and the Liberal 
Registration Association were fused into a single party headquarters.
22
 After Glyn’s 
succession to the peerage in 1873 he was replaced by Arthur Wellesley Peel who acted 
as chief whip for the 1874 general election and was replaced after that by William 
Patrick Adam, who served until 1880. At this time the Liberal Registration Association 
was renamed the Liberal Central Association. When the Liberal Principal Agent 
resigned in 1865 Brand decided that his work should be spread between the chief 
whip, the Registration Association and a newly appointed firm of parliamentary 
agents. Thus, until well after the 1880 election, the Liberals did without a central party 
agent. 
The National Liberal Federation was formed on 31 May 1877 by a meeting of 
95 Liberal associations and Francis Schnadhorst became its first secretary.
23
 
Schnadhorst was a member of the Birmingham Liberal Association which had been 
successful in gaining all three seats in their constituency in 1868 despite the 
introduction of the minority clause. Schnadhorst was appointed secretary of the 
association in 1873 and the Liberals were successful in winning all three seats again in 
1874. After his appointment to the National Liberal Federation in 1877, Schnadhorst 
spent the next three years promoting the system of the Birmingham Liberals to other 
local Liberal organisations.
24
 Perhaps the overall lack of urgency on the part of the 
Liberals to the development of party organisation could be partly attributed to the 
different attitude of Whig notables to political organisation as compared to their 
Conservative counterparts. The Whig journal, the Edinburgh Review, remarked in 
1879 when commenting on the future of the National Liberal Federation that ‘political 
associations of a permanent character have never taken root in this country’.25 
III Electoral sociology and organisation 
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The description of party organisation in the previous section has a noticeable focus on 
central party figures and institutions with an emphasis on the mechanistic aspects of 
organisation. In concentrating on these features this brief synopsis reflects the same 
prioritisation as the principal historiography dealing with the subject. Yet this focus on 
the desire of central party figures to organise and control local party organisations and 
the centralised methods and institutional structures they used to do this has led to two 
major problems in the scholarly assessment of the importance of party organisation in 
this period. Firstly, there has been a consequent lack of attention to the development 
and activities of local organisations, the development and operation of which often 
took place independently from the party centres. Secondly, there has been an 
overemphasis on what might be termed the mechanics of party structures, both local 
and national. Thus, in so far as there has been attention to activities at an individual 
constituency level this has focussed on organisational activities during campaign 
periods immediately leading up to the polls and involving such activities as the 
organisation of transport or the canvass, and at a central or national level, involving the 
activities of the party whips, central organisations and chief agents. There has been 
very little attention given to the manner in which parties sought to develop and 
promulgate their message and the symbols and rhetoric they used to do that. 
This emphasis on practical organisation results from the influence of electoral 
sociology which sees a key role of party organisations as the identification of the, 
already largely pre-determined, supporters of a party and the development of processes 
and mechanisms to ensure that they vote. The principal, and sometimes only, purpose 
of party organisation is, accordingly, on this model, identifying and ‘getting out’ the 
vote. Of course, any approach to party organisation which follows these principles is 
then open to many of the criticisms which can be made of electoral sociology itself. As 
has been discussed, electoral sociology has frequently been criticised because it gives 
little active role to political parties regarding them as passive beneficiaries of social 
change and failing to recognise the contingent nature of their appeal to the electorate. 
Its emphasis on the importance of central control accordingly fails to recognise that 
organisational influence also flowed in the opposite direction. Lawrence and Taylor 
have stressed the importance of the role of party in the mediation of political ideas and 
language and the crucial role played by them in the language, culture and imagery of 
electoral politics. Later approaches to electoral politics have recognised that work on 
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political parties needs to ‘devote more attention to the ways in which political parties 
have themselves defined and been forced to redefine the social identities and audiences 
to which they address their politics’.26 However, little work has been done in this area, 
particularly in the period under consideration; a period which most writers, of 
whatever views, would agree was highly important in the development of mass parties. 
As a result, work on party organisation has failed to recognise the importance of 
ideology and locality in an organisational context especially the importance of the 
parties’ role in the language and rhetoric of electoral politics. This taken together with 
the lack of work on local Liberal and Conservative organisation on even a mechanistic 
level means that a different approach is required to deal with these deficiencies. As 
Windscheffel has noted: 
It is more useful to acknowledge that the creation of party organisations involved a 
complex dynamic of discussion, negotiation and accommodation between the 
electorate, local activists and party leadership. Party organisation was thus part of the 
process of actively mediating and redefining political and social identities, and of 




The next part of this chapter seeks to take some steps to further illuminate these 
issues. It does this by first considering the development of local Liberal Registration 
Associations and then the formation of Conservative working men’s associations. The 
examination of the development of these associations seeks to address the first of the 
issues discussed above, namely the relative lack of historical attention to grass roots 
organisation. The examination of Conservative working men’s associations also 
addresses the importance of party organisation in the formation of the language, 
imagery and socialisation of electoral politics. The need for further investigation of 
grass roots Conservatism has been aptly expressed by Matthew Roberts who 
characterised the issue as follows: 
For all the rich literature that exists on the high politics of 1867 and the organizational 
consequences at the centre, historians are still largely in the dark about how the 
Conservative Party in the localities managed the immediate transition to mass politics 
in 1867 and 1884. What of the continuities and changes in popular Conservatism, and 
in particular how ideological aspects of Conservatism filtered down to the grass roots 





IV Liberal associations 
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In his important work on the development of the Liberal party in the 1850s and 1860s 
John Vincent remarked that ‘the massive development of party loyalties throughout the 
country preceded any corresponding full development of party organisation by almost 
a generation’.29 He went on to suggest that in the 1860s the two principal elements of 
Liberal organisation, beside the borough managers, were such central organisation as 
existed through the Liberal Registration Association and the Liberal club movements 
in the constituencies. He suggested that very little could be said of either beyond 
indicating some future lines of research ‘which might throw some light in these very 
dark places’.30 
Recent research on Liberal organisation in the period 1832-52 has contested 
Vincent’s view on the generational delay in the development of party organisation.31 It 
suggests that this is no longer valid and that Liberal organisation in the 20 years after 
the Great Reform Act was ‘remarkably extensive’.32 What follows here supports this 
revisionist view by suggesting that Liberal organisations in the constituencies were 
formed at much earlier dates than those suggested by Vincent. By way of example, 
Vincent suggests that there was no Liberal association in Bury until 1877 but there 
does appear to have been an active Liberal Registration Association operating at least 
as early as 1868.
33
 
In order to research the prevalence and nature of the general activities of local 
Liberal organisations in the later 1860s a textual search was made for references to 
‘Liberal Registration Associations’ and ‘Liberal Associations’ in the available 
digitised copies of British newspapers published between 1 January 1860 and 31 
December 1869.
34
 The results of this survey show that in the larger parliamentary 
constituencies there was already in this period a widespread establishment of local 
Liberal organisations. Of the 38 constituencies with an electorate in excess of 7,000 
(for the 1865 general election), 31 (or 82%) had a Liberal association of some form by 
the end of the 1860s, and, indeed, most of these had been formed before the 1868 
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general election. References were also found to such associations in another 50 
constituencies. It should also be borne in mind that the wide scope of political opinion 
which was encompassed by the Victorian Liberal Party meant that there could be 
several specialised organisations representing different shades of Liberal opinion or 
specific interests. As Vincent put it ‘in most boroughs…there would be at least one 
society for Parliamentary reform, one group of temperance reformers, and another 
political organisation representing the Liberationists’.35 However, the capabilities of 
these organisations were quite another matter. 
These results demonstrate that, certainly in the constituencies across Great 
Britain, there was already a significant coverage of local Liberal organisations, mostly 
before the general election of 1868. A natural question that arises, however, is the 
nature of the political activities of these associations. Registration associations had 
grown up in response to the requirements of the Great Reform Act and their primary 
functions had been to ensure that a party’s supporters had been identified and that they 
were duly registered, which involved the association frequently fighting cases in the 
courts of the revising barristers.
36
 The newspaper reports on these associations shed 
some light on this question and suggest that their activities were more extensive than 
just registration matters. 
There is a significant body of cases which demonstrates that Liberal 
registration associations were deeply involved in the selection of parliamentary 
candidates. Selection was not the only role of the associations. Frequently MPs would 
regard the local Liberal Registration Association as managing the party’s interests in 
the constituency. For example, the importance of the Liberal Registration Association 
of Halifax was underlined when one of the sitting Liberal MPs, Sir Charles Wood, 
chose the Association as the body to inform that he would not be standing at the next 
election.
37
 The associations could also become involved in the behaviour of local 
Liberal MPs. This was shown in Kent in August 1866 when a meeting of the East Kent 
Liberal Registration Association was convened to discuss the views of the sitting 
Liberal MP Sir Edward Deering. The association was concerned that Deering had 
failed to fully support the Reform Bill of the Liberal administration which had just left 
office. Letters from Gladstone and Russell had been received concerning Deering’s 
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position and these were read to the meeting. The association eventually decided to see 
whether Deering gave consistent opposition to the new Conservative administration 
before taking any further action.
38
 Another example of a local registration association 
considering the suitability of a sitting representative arose at Bristol in 1866 in relation 
to one of the sitting Liberal MPs, Sir Morton Peto. Peto was famous for his railway 
construction business but some cloudy dealings concerning the London Chatham and 
Dover Railway brought his firm to the brink of bankruptcy. He wrote to the Bristol 
Liberal Registration Association explaining his position and offering to resign. It was a 
mark of Peto’s charisma that the meeting unanimously requested that he remained as 
the MP. He was subsequently declared personally bankrupt and had to resign.
39
 The 
leading figures of the party also participated in these meetings of endorsement and 
support. The South Lancashire Liberal Registration Association held a meeting in May 
1867 with the purpose of expressing confidence in Gladstone as their candidate – 
describing him as the ‘true and only leader of the Liberal party’.40 Similarly, the North 
Lancashire Liberal Registration Association held what was described as an enthusiastic 
meeting in July 1865 in Preston. The meeting was held to pass a resolution of support 
for Hartington who attended and addressed the meeting.
41
 
At Huddersfield on 24 January 1865 the local Liberal Registration Association 
chaired a meeting at which Edward Leatham, the local MP, was the main speaker. At 
Maidstone in 1865 the two Liberal candidates for West Kent addressed a large and 
influential meeting of their supporters organised by the local West Kent Liberal 
Registration Association, whose chairman presided over the event.
42
 The registration 
associations were also not averse to co-operating with other Liberal pressure groups. 
One example was the United Liberal Association of Leicester which held a combined 
committee meeting with the local Parliamentary Reform Association in April 1866. 
The meeting was held to discuss the policy on reform of the Liberal party. The 
important points were that it indicated both the willingness of the local association to 
debate with other Liberal pressure groups and the activity of local associations in 
political topics of the day.
43
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There was certainly some pressure from active Liberals and pressure groups to 
widen the spread of political activities of the registration associations. At a meeting of 
the Holbeck Reform Association on 21 January 1865 a local councillor held forth on 
the need for Liberals to be united and the necessity of the Liberal Registration 
Association expanding its influence in ways other than just registering votes.
44
 It is 
interesting to note that a few days later the Leeds Liberal Registration Association had 




There was also significant growth in the Liberal working men’s associations. 
An example was at Exeter where a Liberal Working Men’s Protection Association was 
formed in December 1868.
46
 It is notable that instances of Liberal working men’s 
associations only occur to any great extent from 1868 onwards. A number are 
referenced before the general election of that year, but most are after. As will be seen 
in subsequent sections this places the development of these associations much later 
than the development of Conservative working men’s associations. However, in an 
editorial in July 1868 the Gloucester Journal contrasted the recent development of 
Conservative working men’s associations and was convinced that these were being 
started because ‘Liberal Working Men’s Associations, so long the object of 
Conservative sneers have exercised a most obvious a salutary influence’.47 
Liberal registration associations also had an important role to play in election 
planning and strategy. The North Riding Liberal Registration Association held a 
meeting in April 1865 to discuss the results of a canvas undertaken to identify Liberal 
supporters and to ensure their registration. Sir Frederick Milbank, the prospective 
Liberal candidate, attended and based on the canvassing it was thought he could 
improve his vote by some 2,000 and capture one of the seats. This proved relatively 
accurate. At the general election in July Milbank’s vote had increased by over 1,500 




V Grass roots conservatism 
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This and the following section contain the results of a new survey of the development 
of Conservative working men’s clubs using available evidence from a study of  
regional and specialist newspapers and archival sources containing evidence on grass 
roots Conservatism during this period (further details of these sources are given 
below). This work suggests these associations were far more widespread much earlier 
than previously thought. The subsequent sections seek to analyse the ways in which 
local Conservative organisations developed and communicated ‘working class 
Conservatism’ by examining the content of local debate, its language and its imagery. 
This approach uses the available evidence of the activities of the associations to 
demonstrate their importance in the development of political rhetoric and examines 
examples of speeches and articles in the British Lion, a newspaper launched at this 
time solely to support the development of working class Conservatism. It also 
examines the imagery of the movement often expressed in hall decorations and the 
social events often organised by the associations. In addition to developing an 
understanding of the creation of popular Conservatism in this period what follows 
seeks to provide a wider understanding of the operation of party organisation 
predicated less on the ‘mechanics’ of electoral sociology whilst also acknowledging 
the importance of party organisation in the development of policy and political 
rhetoric. 
Conservative working men’s associations have received a variable review in 
the historical literature. Cornford rather disparagingly referred to the Conservative 
party organisation in 1868 as: 
the party’s election machinery, so far as it existed, was in the hands of his [the 
leader’s] solicitors, who attempted at election time to coordinate the activities of the 
motley array of Constitutional Clubs, registration societies, and Workingmen’s 




In addition, more recent work has shown how the relative dearth of available records 
can severely hamper further research further.
50
 
Nevertheless, local political organisations and associations as well as working men’s 
clubs and constitutional associations had been in existence in various forms and with 
various purposes well before the 1870s. Certainly, after the Conservative’s electoral 
defeat of 1865, Lord Nevill decided to increase the number of local Conservative 
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associations concerned with registering electors and bringing them to the polls.
51
 
Conservative associations and clubs were, as a result, arguably a well-established part 
of the popular political landscape at least by 1872. Despite these developments the 
potentially significant influence of these associations on the development of 
Conservative ideology has received little attention from historians. There has also been 
little attention to the numbers, dates of formation, size and extent of these 
organisations leading to potentially serious underestimates of their numbers and how 
early they were formed. Feuchtwanger remarked that ‘in 1867 many Working Men’s 
Associations were founded’, but did not give any suggestions for numbers, nor 
whether he meant exclusively Conservative working men’s associations.52 The 
Examiner estimated there were in excess of 800 Conservative associations in England 
and Wales in 1877 and that 400 of them had been formed before 1872.
53
 Hanham was 
more prudent in his estimates and suggested that, by 1874 there were at least 150 
Conservative working men’s associations, spread over 50 boroughs in five counties 
and that the major growth in these associations took place from the mid-seventies 
onward.
54
 Hanham’s work was based, in part, on the early records of the NUCCA 
which indeed show a steady increase in membership from 289 associations in 1871 to 
472 in 1875. However, the NUCCA records are an unreliable estimate of the total 
number of clubs because only some Conservative working men’s associations were 
affiliated to the organisation, either on their formation or later. Cox and Hanham 
suggest that no earlier figures are available but evidence of their existence can be 
ascertained from other sources.
55
 In order to consider this issue, and the apparent lack 
of other available evidence on these associations, research was undertaken covering 
the years from 1860 to 1870 to attempt to establish the numbers and locations of 
Conservative working men’s associations extant during this period. 
Several sources were used in this research. A complete textual search for references to 
Conservative working men’s associations was made of all the available copies of 178 
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British newspapers published between 1860 and 1880.
56
 The results of this 
investigation provided the principal source for the survey. In addition, a number of 
other searches were made to seek to complement and support this work. Firstly, a 
search was made of catalogued local archives to find any references to local 
Conservative associations and the date of their establishment.
57
 Secondly, the first 
available Conservative party list of associations of 1874 was reviewed to establish 
which associations had been formed prior to 1870.
58
 These surveys reveal that 
Conservative Associations were far more extensive than has previously been thought 
and that there were at least 280 of these associations in existence before the general 
election of 1868 covering the majority of the English boroughs. 
This view is supported by other contemporary evidence. This suggests that the 
development of Conservative grassroots organisation must be dated earlier than the 
standard model implies. The London Review, for example, noted that Conservatives 
were ‘extremely jubilant over the working men’s Constitutional Associations, which 
are fulfilling so admirably one of the main objects of their existence by enabling 
Cabinet Ministers to make triumphant speeches in all parts of the country’.59 Two 
years later, in June 1869, a deputation from the NUCCA visited Lord Derby in order to 
urge the opposition of the House of Lords to Gladstone’s Irish Church Bill with 
addresses from 104 Conservative working men’s associations.60 
The distribution of these associations showed how they were being used to 
target the working-class vote. Overall, of the total 183 borough constituencies in 
England some 92 had Conservative working men’s institutions by 1869. This conceals, 
however, some wide variations. Of the largest borough constituencies, taken to be 
those with an electorate in 1874 of more than 7,500, some 42 of the total of 47 of such 
constituencies had Conservative working men’s institutions by 1869.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising since the majority of the ‘target audience’, that is to say the newly 
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enfranchised workers, were to be found in these constituencies. There was little 
difference between the northern and southern boroughs with equal saturation in each 
category. 
If the larger boroughs had a near 100% coverage of Conservative working 
men’s associations, the medium sized boroughs had less. This category, defined here 
as those with an electorate in 1874 of between 1,500 and 7,500, had a more mixed 
coverage. Of the 79 such boroughs 43 had a Conservative working men’s institution. 
The coverage was slightly higher in the south where 57% of the boroughs had such 
organisations compared to 51% in the north. Finally, the smaller constituencies with 
electorates in 1874 of less 1500, had little coverage with only 7 associations recorded 
in 57 constituencies. Most of these constituencies (44) were located in the south where 
the Conservative borough strength was higher and the impact of the extension of the 
franchise had been lower. 
The expansion in numbers and geographical spread of Conservative working 
men’s associations is further revealed in the pages of the British Lion. The British Lion 
was a one penny weekly paper published on a Saturday which was formed in 1867 by 
H C Raikes who had also founded the Imperial Review and was a supporter of 
Disraeli’s concept of popular conservatism.61 Its first issue was on 29th June 1867 and 
it ceased publication in July 1868.
62
 The paper provides an interesting case study in the 
Conservative aspiration to communicate their message to the working classes in this 
period as well as providing a good deal of information on working men’s 
constitutional associations. Its inaugural issue on 29
th
 June 1867 recorded that: 
For some months past the addition to our newspaper literature of a cheap weekly 
Conservative journal has been contemplated. It was felt that the great principles of 
Constitutionalism, as enunciated by the party now at the head of national affairs, are 
deficient in press representation among the masses’.63 The intention, it was stated, was 
‘to render this journal a thoroughly efficient Conservative organ, and an entertaining, 
instructive general newspaper, suitable for all ranks of the people’. It went on to say 
‘we identify ourselves with the Working Men’s Constitutional Associations and their 
collateral branches’.64 
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The paper went on to assert ‘these associations are based on a sound foundation and in 
every way calculated to promote the unity of action which will enable working men to 
improve their mental, social and physical condition’ and also recognised that the 
‘momentous necessity of exercising well-timed vigilance on the Registration of Voters 
will be kept in view’. 65 This was consistent with its advertisements in which it 
proclaimed itself as the only London weekly penny constitutional journal and as the 
faithful representative of Conservative Working Men expounding true constitutional 
principles with peculiar lucidity and firmness, yet without acrimony.
66
 The paper 
certainly remained true to its claims in its extensive reporting of the foundation and 
meetings of Conservative working men’s associations. 
The launch of the paper was concerning enough to the opposition to provoke 
some scathing reactions in the Liberal press with, for instance, the Bury Times 
asserting that it ‘roars like any suckling dove’ and ‘will be apparently (for a very short 
time) a very feeble defender of Conservative institutions’.67 The publication certainly 
did not show great longevity and ceased publication in 1868. It nevertheless provides a 
valuable insight into the development of popular Conservatism at this time and a 
unique record of the extensive development of Conservative Working Men’s 
Associations in this period. 
The expansion in the numbers and political significance of these working-class 
organisations was also marked by the creation of NUCCA in 1867. An initial meeting 
was held on 29 April 1867 of a number of representatives of Conservative 
Associations in London ‘with a view to forming a union in the interests of the 
Conservative party, and as a means of uniting and communicating with the 
Conservative associations already formed, or in the course of formation, in various 
parts of the country’.68 J. E. Gorst, then the member for Cambridge attended and noted 
that ‘the object of the Conservative Union which they desired to form was to unite and 
establish a system of intercommunication with all the Conservative associations of the 
country’.69 Amongst the union’s objectives was the desire: 
To afford a centre of communication and action between local associations supporting 
constitutional views. There is, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with local 
action; the object of the union is to strengthen the hands of local associations where 
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existing in their respective districts, and to encourage the establishment of associations 
in districts where they are wanting; and to further organise associations by the holding 
of meetings for the general expression and diffusion of constitutional principles and 
the dissemination of sound information upon topics of general political interest, and to 




Another of the objectives was that: 
Each borough should have its Conservative association with its own separate officers, 
and the whole of those associations in a county should be placed under one head, there 
being a president for every county. Then the whole of the county associations so 
formed should be united together and identified with the union. The party would then 
have a vast and important machinery, which they could set to work in four and twenty 
hours over the whole of the country whenever a dissolution of parliament occurred, or 
whenever an effort was necessary for the maintenance of the institutions of the 




The centralising instincts of the representatives of some 60 Conservative associations 
across the country were plain. Later in the day a delegation of the representatives met 
with the Prime Minister who praised Disraeli’s efforts on the Reform Bill.72 
It is interesting that there was the prolonged and heated discussion over the 
name for the society. It was originally proposed that the name be changed to ‘The 
National Association of Constitutional Associations’ thus omitting the reference to 
conservatism in order to provide a wider title under which ‘their objects could be more 
effectually carried on’.73 This was eventually overturned and the compromise of the 
final name achieved by including the word Conservative. It is noteworthy that the most 
vociferous of the delegates in support of this change came from Northern borough 
associations and the debate reproduced discussions which had taken place on the 
formation of many local associations. 
Although NUCCA itself was not a working men’s association it contributed to 
the formation of more of these associations. Leonard Sedgwick, the first secretary of 
the National Union, together with a number of volunteers, spent most of 1868 
travelling the country in order to explain how Conservative Working Men’s 
Associations could best be formed’.74 H. E. Gorst wrote a biography of Disraeli in 
which he described the Conservative challenge in 1870 after the defeat of 1868. He 
wrote: 
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The first step to be taken was the organisation of local committees in the towns and 
county divisions…arrangements were made to meet the most influential local 
Conservatives at each place, and to persuade them to form a committee for the purpose 
of propagating Conservative principles and arranging about a local candidate. These 
committees, when once they had been established, rapidly grew into Conservative 
associations. Intelligent working-men were easily persuaded to join them, and they are 
now known everywhere by the common appellation “Conservative Working-Men’s 
Associations”.75 
 
Harold Gorst was, of course, J. E. Gorst’s son and was writing in 1900 sometime after 
the legend of the senior Gorst’s impact on Conservative party organisation had been 
established. It suggests that the development of Conservative party organisation was 
very largely due to his policies and efforts. However, as has been shown, the number 
of Conservative organisations in existence before 1872 was very much greater than 
previously thought and certainly, more than the numbers suggested in Harold Gorst’s 
panegyric for his father. It may well have taken some time for already established 
organisations to decide to join NUCCA and Gorst’s trips to the constituencies may 
have been equally targeted at persuading organisations to join the organisation as 
opposed to initiating the creation of new organisations. 
The extent and importance of Conservative working men’s associations was 
also shown by their strong presence in various regions. The strength of working-class 
Conservatism in Lancashire has been well documented and unsurprisingly most 
borough constituencies in that area had such associations. The borough constituencies 
in East Anglia also provide an example of Conservative strength in the boroughs and 
an interesting corrective to the assumption that the Reform Act was to be universally 
detrimental to the Conservatives.
76
 At the 1868 general election they had returned 6 of 
the 14 members and at the 1874 general election they nearly swept the board, returning 
13 of the 14 members and with the Liberals only managing to retain a seat in Norwich. 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that local Conservatives had recognised the 
potential of Conservative Working Men’s Associations for the area. The Essex 
Standard, a Conservative newspaper, commented on how these associations ‘ought to 
be introduced in all large towns’ and ‘it is to be regretted that they have not found their 
way into this county, where so many Conservative working men are to be found’ and 
by 1869 a Conservative working man’s club had been established in all but two of the 
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 Despite this in Colchester the Essex Standard thought that the 
Liberals had been better organised and the Conservatives still had much to do, they 
had: 
Fought manfully, and are entitled to the full enjoyment of their present triumph. In 
point of organisation, though not of exertion and courage, they have shown themselves 
superior to the Conservatives, and they have taken care to allow no influence, which 




Again, the closeness of the vote in Colchester made it apparent that large numbers of 
the newly enfranchised working class had voted Conservative and the paper strongly 
argued for the formation of a working men’s Conservative Association. It said that: 
Once before we pointed out the necessity of a Working Men’s Constitutional 
Association to form a nucleus, and to concentrate the valuable assistance which might 
be obtained from the large number of Conservative working men in the Borough at 
such a time as this. It was in this respect that our opponents showed themselves 
superior to us in organisation. We do not, by any means, undervalue the excellent 
spirit and unremitting exertions of the True Blue Club, and of the Junior Conservative 
Club. Both have worked bravely and well, and are deserving of all praise, but 
something more is required. Working men are a gregarious class. They understand 
best, and they naturally like best, men of their own stamp and status in society. There 
are a good many working men in the Borough who, in their earnestness and in their 
ability to advocate and defend their principles, are second to none of their rank in the 
kingdom. These have worked hard during the Election in connexion with the two 
Clubs which we have named, and their services have been invaluable. They have not, 
however, yet been encouraged to take upon themselves the advocacy of Conservative 
principles upon the platform, and have been too much accustomed to lean upon those 
above them, instead of trusting to themselves. We would venture to recommend to the 
Conservative party that a Working Man’s Club should immediately be formed, to 




The paper went on to discuss the importance of such an organisation in the mediation 
of ideas and rhetoric when it suggested that ‘the leading Conservatives of the Borough, 
and others from a distance, might from time to time be requested to give them lectures 
upon the great questions of the day. They should also be supplied with sound 
information on those points upon which they are most likely to be misled by self-
interested agitators and demagogues’.80 
As we have seen the increase in the electorate in many boroughs meant that 
‘organisational effort became still more vital’ especially in the tasks of registration and 
canvassing, in getting party supporters out to vote and in managing the distribution of 
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electors’ votes in constituencies where the minority clause was operative.81 
Conservative working men’s associations could provide vital support in these areas. A 
good example was the Huddersfield Working Men’s Conservative Association which 
reported to its members after the 1868 general election that working men’s 
Conservative associations had ‘contributed, in no small degree, to the measure of 
success that had attended Conservatism during the recent elections’ and ‘they might 
congratulate themselves that so large a proportion of the working men had shown their 
sympathy with the principle of the constitution and the association which existed 
between Church and State'.
82
 The leaders of the Association had ‘found in working 
men who volunteered their services far more efficient persons than they had found 
amongst paid canvassers’.83 Assistance with the canvass was a particularly important 
area and in Westminster during the run-up to the 1868 election the disparate groups of 
Liberal supporters of J. S. Mill were forced to unite in their canvassing effort as a 




The success of the Huddersfield Association at the 1868 election led it to 
expand its responsibilities and activities so that a committee appointed to conduct the 
registration should immediately be brought under the wing of the association; that 
there should be one central association for municipal and parliamentary purposes, with 
branch associations in the several wards; and that each ward should send 
representatives to the council of the central association. Particular emphasis was placed 
on the necessity for the creation of ward organisations because the constituency had an 
electorate of some 11,000 voters and ‘it was an utter impossibility that one association 
could do much’ with that many voters.85 The extent of the development of the electoral 
organisational responsibilities of Conservative working men’s associations can be seen 
from these decisions. Exeter was a classic bell-weather constituency of the period, 
returning two Liberals in 1868, two Conservatives in 1874 and a member from each 
party in 1880. The Reform Act had doubled Exeter’s electorate from 3,000 to 6,000 
and the 1868 general election saw a very close contest with the second Liberal winning 
by a margin of only 66 votes, equivalent to a majority sensitivity percentage of only 
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3.6% on a turnout of 72%.These facts, together with the very close contest in 1864 
under the previous franchise, suggest that contemporary analysis was correct in 
suggesting that the Conservatives gained a good deal of support from the newly 
enfranchised working men in 1868.
86
 Indeed, contemporary reports noted the 
significant organisational effort by the Conservative Committees during the three 
months preceding the election and the role that the Exeter Conservative Working 
Men’s Association played in that effort.87 
Candidate selection was another area in which working men’s associations 
were highly influential. In 1868 the Ipswich Conservative Working Men’s Association 
selected J. R. Bulwer as a Conservative candidate which led the sitting member, J. P. 
Cobbold, to decline to come forward as a Conservative candidate on the ground that 
the Association was likely to stand in his way rather than assist him.
88
 In the event 
Bulwer stood down and Cobbold stood as the single Conservative candidate but the 
influence of the association had been registered. Similarly at Bristol there was a 
particularly active association and the nomination of the Conservative candidate was 
seconded by the chairman of the constituency’s Conservative Working Men’s 
Institution and at Wakefield in 1868 the Conservative Working Men’s Association 




VI  Language, imagery and culture 
 
The first section of this chapter argued that party organisation should be seen 
and investigated as much more than the mechanistic and centralised organisation of 
potential party supporters. Not only was party organisation not wholly mechanistic but 
it was not wholly centralised’. Further, the role of parties in intermediating the rhetoric 
of politics meant that the language and symbols which they used were as important in 
carrying the message which was developed between party and supporters as the ideas 
which they were to represent. This role and the consequent development of the 
Conservative appeal to working class voters together with its language and mode of 
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expression can be clearly seen in the formation and activities of Conservative working 
men’s associations in the 1860s. 
References to the constitution were a fundamental descriptor which linked core 
Conservative values and policies. Vernon has argued that the discourse of popular 
constitutionalism represented the ‘master narrative of English politics’ in the 
nineteenth century.
90
 The party itself was sometimes referred to the Constitutional 
Party and working men’s associations set up by Conservative supporters were often 
called Working Men’s Constitutional Associations. No mention was made of 
‘conservative’, sometimes on the grounds that this might discourage working men 
from joining. A frequent compromise was to call the associations ‘Conservative and 
Constitutional Associations’.91 Constitutional associations were aptly defined by W. R. 
Callendar, credited with the organisational rebuilding of the Conservative party in 
south east Lancashire
92, who said ‘by constitutional associations was meant 
associations to conserve the present order of government by Queen, Lords and 
Commons, to preserve the connection between Church and State, and to promote the 
happiness of the people, at home and their national honour abroad’.93 This definition 
provides a clear association of the Conservative appeal with patriotism and a strong 
foreign policy which identified the ‘national honour abroad’ with the honour of the 
‘people’.94 
Another frequent reference to values and policies was the introduction of mentions of 
the church in an association’s title. Thus, at Ashton-under-Lyne a Conservative 
working men’s association was formed in January 1866 and given the title of the 
Ashton-under-Lyne Working Men’s Church and Conservative Association. The 
founders thought that it was ‘an undeniable and admitted fact that the constitution of 
our country is a wise and good one, well calculated to provide against the exercise of 
tyrannical power on the one hand, and against the insubordination of democratic 
principles on the other. They went on to explain that they included the reference to the 
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church in the title of the association because they were fully satisfied that, under the 
protection of the national Church, this country had maintained her glorious position in 
the scale of nations, and had prospered in a degree unexampled in the history of any 
other nation, either ancient or modern’.95 The members of the Bradford Working 
Men’s Conservative Association required each new member to make a declaration 
‘which stated their determination to maintain the tried and ancient principles of the 
constitution and, while avowing their readiness to promote the reform of proved 
abuses, they held it to be their bounden duty to maintain intact the union of Church and 
State’.96   
The chairman of the Huddersfield Working Men’s Conservative Association addressed 
a meeting of the association and asked what it meant to be a Conservative and whether 
it was possible for a working man to be a Conservative. He said he believed all the 
working men of England were essentially and really Conservative, and Conservatism 
meant ‘to maintain the great institutions of this country, attachment to the throne, the 
upholding of the Established Church’.97 
The defence of the established church in the defence of the constitution was a 
pervasive theme in Conservative rhetoric. The object of the Bradford Working Men’s 
Conservative Association was ‘the defence of the constitution from unwarranted 
changes’ and at their inaugural meeting in November 1866 ‘Church and State’ was one 
of the slogans on banners that decorated the hall filled with 420 attendees. 
98
 
Conservative working men in Portsmouth covered a number of angles by calling 
themselves the Portsmouth Working Men’s Liberal-Conservative Association, 
although there was no doubt from the sentiments expressed at their dinner in 1867, 
attended by 500 working men, that they were truly Tory.
99
 Perhaps because the city 
was such a Liberal stronghold the Conservative working men in Birmingham indulged 
in some similar hedging by calling themselves the ‘Birmingham Working Men’s 
Liberal-Conservative Association’.100 Similarly, the Walsall association, founded in 
May 1868, called themselves the ‘Walsall Liberal-Conservative Association’.101 
Sometimes the phrase ‘working men’ was omitted from the title. In June 1867 an 
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association was formed in Grantham leaving out this reference but clearly displaying 
its protestant connection by calling itself the ‘Grantham Protestant Conservative 
Association’. There was no doubt, however, that its intended targets were working 
men since its purpose was described as ‘affording those who are about to come onto 
the register an opportunity of forming a proper estimate of the political situation’.102  
The imagery of working class Conservatism was also important. As the Blackburn 
Standard reported ‘the banner of the [Blackburn] Central Working Men’s 
Conservative club was much admired. It was a large square banner of blue silk, with an 
orange fringe. On the one side was a bust of the Earl of Derby, and over this were the 
words, “A heart noble, and a mind determined”. On the reverse side was a 
representation of constitutionalist’s and churchman’s emblems, the Bible, the mace 
and the crown. The flag itself was mounted upon two large staffs surmounted with 
representations of the Bible and the crown’.103 The themes of leadership, the 
established church and the crown made frequent appearances in Conservative imagery, 
as they did in the Conservative political message to the working classes. Thus, when, 
in September 1868, a Conservative Working Men’s Club was set up at Livesay, 
Blackburn, some 400 people attended a social function to celebrate its inauguration. 
The press reports noted that the flag of the association bore the motto ‘The Church, the 
Throne, and the Cottage’.104 For the British Lion newspaper the visual representation 
of Conservative appeals to the newly enfranchised was encapsulated in the masthead 
of the new newspaper with a Landseer lion guarding the crown and representations of 
truth and justice. 
Similarly, the Kidderminster Conservative Working Men’s Association held its 
quarterly meeting on 23 August 1868 and at this meeting ‘a handsome banner’ which 
had recently been purchased was displayed for the members. The Chairman noted to 
cheers that ‘in the emblems they had on the flag one of the Church, the Queen, and the 
People, they had at once the chief objects for which an Englishman, lived, strove, and 
if necessary, to die’.105 Mass celebrations could also have religious connotations so 
that on the death of the Earl of Derby in 1869 the Conservative Working Men’s 
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Association of Manchester organised a ‘sermon to be preached’ and ‘at least a 
thousand working men marched in solemn procession to the church’.106 
Conservative working men’s clubs were in some ways the unrecognised 
precursors of the Primrose League and carried out some of the activities of the League 
twenty years before has been commonly supposed. The importance of social occasions 
to the formation of working class political support for the Conservatives was 
frequently demonstrated during this period. One example was the Liverpool Working 
Men’s Conservative Association which organised a picnic for a Saturday in August 
1868. The event took place in Knowsley Park, the ancestral home of the Earls of Derby 
and special trains were laid on to convey the invitees to their destination. Later in the 
evening the crowd approached the hall to cheer the Earl who acknowledged the 
compliment by approaching at the windows.
107
 Similarly the formation of the Working 
Men’s Conservative Association of Stourport in September 1868 was celebrated in 
some style with the attendance of members of the Constitutional Associations of 
Kidderminster and Bewdley marching with their banners and the Kidderminster Brass 
Band. Some two to three thousand people were estimated to have attended the event.
108
 
VII  Conclusions 
 
Historical study of party organisation in this period has tended towards a focus on 
central party organisation and the place of organisation in high politics. To some extent 
this has been the result of the influence of electoral sociology which saw the main 
purpose of party organisation in mobilising a party’s supporters who were already 
predisposed to vote in the way they did. This has led to the neglect of the study of how 
parties sought to gain support and interact with the electorate together with the rhetoric 
and symbols which they used to do this. Local organisations were crucial in achieving 
interaction with individual voters but have been neglected because of this. This chapter 
has sought to show that both local Liberal registration associations and local 
Conservative working men’s associations were much more widespread than previously 
thought, especially in those larger constituencies where there were substantial 
increases in the working-class electorate. It has also sought to show that these 
associations were involved in practical organisational issues such as canvassing and 
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candidate selection. In addition, it has shown that Conservative working men’s 
associations were also important in developing the Conservative appeal to the new 
electors through the party’s emphasis on the defence of the constitution, the protection 
















Between the general elections of 1868 and 1880 by-elections were a central part of the 
political landscape. They were important as indicators of the general political mood of 
the nation and they were significant guides to the electors’ approval or disapproval of 
the policies of the government and opposition. There were no opinion polls conducted 
in Victorian Britain but by-elections were often treated and interpreted in a similar 
way. They were important to politicians, the press and other commentators who often 
took them as guides to the prospects of the parties. As a result many were vigorously 
contested and received nationwide publicity in the press. Leading political figures 
considered them highly relevant as potential indicators of how the electorate might 
vote at a general election.
1
 As discussed in Section IV of this chapter recent by-
election results were used in both 1874 and 1880 as signal factors in the timing of the 
dissolution of Parliament and the calling of a general election. By-elections could also 
have a significant effect on Westminster politics. From 1870 to the general election of 
1874 the Conservatives won 23 seats at by-elections compared to two Liberal wins. 
This series of victories had started in August 1871 when the Conservatives won East 
Surrey for the first time since 1841 and the electoral reaction against Gladstone’s first 
ministry gathered pace well into 1873 when nine Liberal seats were lost. This affected 
the government’s performance and, as Hawkins put it, ‘this haemorrhaging of electoral 
support drained the life blood of the ministry’.2 
The passing of the Ballot Act meant that by-elections held from August 1872 
to January 1874 also became laboratories of electoral reform because they were the 
first elections held in Great Britain under the requirements of that Act. We have seen 
in Chapters II and IV the important role they played giving insights and experience to 
politicians, party agents, managers and electors on how to respond to the new electoral 
environment. They gave rise to the development of new techniques for party agents 
and managers and influenced the great debates on the efficacy of the legislation in 
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achieving its intended impact on bribery and undue influence. These by-elections also 
showed how the conduct of nominations and polling changed dramatically with more 
orderly procedures replacing the previous public spectacles, leading contemporaries to 
comment on the order and quiet of the process. These changes gave rise to the 
development of other modes of public expression through political meetings, crowds at 
polling stations and at the proclamation of the result and these too became apparent at 
these by-elections.
3
 It was also in this period that by-elections became national events. 
As we have seen, the revolutionary widening of the electorate by the 1867 Reform Act 
and the expansion of the use of the electric telegraph transformed British electoral 
politics in this period. As a result the by-election campaigns and results were reported 
in newspapers across the nation.  
Despite the importance of by-elections to the electoral politics of the period, 
these elections have received very little attention from historians. Hanham does not 
mention by-elections
4
 and Dunbabin’s focus was to use them to chart the changes in 
party support between successive pairs of general elections in this period (and 
subsequently) by calculating the parties’ share of the vote in by-elections.5 A 
substantial contribution to remedying this deficiency has very recently been made by 
Otte and Readman’s By-Elections in British Politics.6 The following sections attempt 
to contribute further information and analyses to this renewed attention to the subject. 
The first part of the chapter gives details of the by-elections in this period 
including the reasons for their occurrence and their results. Next, the predictive ability 
of by-elections is considered by comparing the results of contested by-elections in the 
periods prior to the general elections of 1874 and 1880 to the subsequent results at the 
general election. The importance of by-elections to politicians is demonstrated by 
showing how their results were a significant part of the political decision-making 
process. The importance of the contests to electors is considered by examining the 
turnout at these contests and the degree of political activity which was apparent from 
press reports of by-election campaigns. The development of the national nature of by-
elections during the period is analysed by considering the extent of coverage which 
they received in the press, the nature of the issues which were of importance in the by-
election campaigns and the participation of leading political figures and central party 
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organisations in those contests. The frequency and interaction of all these factors are 
then illustrated by an assessment of the by-elections which occurred in the 18 months 
after the revelation in June 1876 of the Bulgarian atrocities. Finally, the importance 
which contemporaries attached to by-elections is illustrated by reviewing a dispute 
over the measurement of the significance of by-election results that was conducted in 
1875 between Gladstone and the Conservative Central Office in the pages of the 
leading national and provincial newspapers. Firstly a broad survey of by-elections 
during the period sets the background for these further considerations. 
II Numbers of by-elections, causes and swings 
 
There were 285 by-elections between the general elections of 1868 and 1880. The 
death of the incumbent member was the most important single cause, giving rise to 87 
elections. In this period it was still necessary for MPs appointed to certain offices 
under the Crown to submit themselves for re-election and, since the elections of 1868 
and 1874 both produced changes in government, a significant number of by-elections 
arose for this reason.
7
 The other major causes were the admission of a member to the 
House of Lords, either by appointment or succession, and resignation, which was of 
course to some extent under the influence of the government. Finally, the general 
elections in this period gave rise to a number of petitions and 25 of the associated legal 
trials resulted in an order to re-run the election, which have been treated as by-
elections for the purposes of the analyses in this chapter. 
It had been the general practice of the parties not to challenge the incumbent at 
ministerial by-elections and over the period 1832 to 1866 only 14% were contested.
8
 
From 1868 to 1880, however, 11 (16.6%) of the 66 ministerial by-elections were 
contested and, interestingly, 4 of these contests were in the period 1871-73 when the 
Gladstone administration was in electoral and political difficulties, losing 23 by-
elections. Although the government did not lose any of these contests they suggest a 
degree of ruthlessness in the new Conservative organisational structure masterminded 
by Disraeli and Gorst. They were prepared to break with existing conventions and to 
fight these elections when the political climate seemed to offer potential prospects of 
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success or the result could be used to further demonstrate the unpopularity of the 
administration and its policies. 
Overall, of the 285 by-elections during the period, 169 (59%) were contested. 
These contests provided valuable information on the state of public opinion and the 
changes in electoral support for the parties.  Tables V/1 and V/2 present the swings of 
electoral support between the parties, as shown by contested by-elections in each of the 
years between 1868 and 1880, together with the number of seats gained or lost. These 
swings are the changes in the average share of the Conservative vote in that year 
compared to the previous general election.
9
 
Table V-1 Swing to the Conservatives between 1868 and 1874 
 




1868 1.05% -   
1869 3.34% 3   
1870 2.24% 5   
1871 -1.59% 5   
1872 0.11% 5   
1873 6.74%* 10†   
General 
Election 
7.5%    
Sources and Notes: Based on the election statistics computed in accordance 
with Appendix I. The swing is the change in the Conservative share of the 
vote and the average over the by-elections is weighted by the electorate of 
the constituency concerned.  Negative figures represent a swing to the 
Liberals. 
Dunbabin provided similar information in his article. It has not been 
possible to reproduce his results but as discussed in Appendix I the above 
figures provide a more accurate reflection of the statistics. 
* This includes by-elections held in January 1874 immediately before the 
general election. Taken separately the swings were 1873 – 4.35% and 1874 
– 16.12%. 
† Includes Stroud which was won on 8 January 1874, before the 1874 
General Election. 
 
The pattern of the results in Table V/1 provides a clear illustration of how by-elections 
reflected the political mood of their time and, in this period, their power to predict the 
result of general elections. In the thirteen months prior to the 1874 general election the 
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average swing to the Conservatives in by-elections was 6.74% and at the general 
election itself it was 7.5%. 
 








1874 -0.41% 5 
1875 -4.75% 1 
1876 -1.85% - 
1877 -2.48% 1 
1878 0.52% 1 
1879 -5.27% - 
1880 0.26% 1 




Sources and Notes: Based on the election statistics 
computed in accordance with Appendix I. The swing is 
the change in the Conservative share of the vote and the 
average over the by-elections is weighted by the 
electorate of the constituency concerned.  Negative 
figures represent a swing to the Liberals. 
* The figures for 1879/80 include those held in the 1879 
calendar year plus the 3 by-elections (Liverpool, 
Barnstaple and Southwark) held in February before the 
general election. 
 
The trend of results in the by-elections between 1874 and 1880 needs to be approached 
with rather more caution particularly in interpreting their predictive ability in respect 
of the 1880 general election result. The period from 1874 to 1877 showed a relatively 
consistent swing against the Conservatives.
10
 The subsequent years from 1878 to 1880 
encompassed the electoral impact of the Eastern Question and resulted in a number of 
swings back and forth in political fortunes as is more fully discussed below. Of 
particular interest for the present purposes of considering the predictive power of by-
elections however, are the contests in the 14 months leading up to the cabinet’s 
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decision to dissolve on 6 March 1880. In the 1879 calendar year the weighted average 
swing to the Liberals was 5.3%, remarkably close to the general election outcome of 
4.8%. However, there were only three contested by-elections in this period which had 
also been contested in 1874 so that a comparison could be made to gauge changes in 
support for the parties, and the result is heavily affected by the 10% swing to the 
Liberals at Canterbury in May. 
Closer to the general election there was a contest at Sheffield on the 21 
December 1879 where a Conservative candidate polled very respectably gaining 
49.1% of the vote. No Conservative had stood in Sheffield in 1874 so it was not 
possible to compute any swing but the result could be regarded as encouraging since 
the Conservatives had not thought the seat worth contesting in 1874. In February 1880 
there were contests at Barnstaple, Liverpool and Southwark. At Liverpool a 
Conservative was returned with only a small swing to the Liberals of 1% whilst at 
Southwark the Conservative captured the seat with a swing of 2.4% to the 
Conservatives. There seems little doubt that the results at Sheffield, Liverpool and 
Southwark heavily influenced Disraeli’s decision to dissolve in March.11 These results 
and the wholly different outcome of the general election provide a salutary reminder 
that in analysing the predictive power of by-elections a number of factors need to be 
taken into account. The representative nature of the results needs consideration – there 
were only three contests in 1879 compared to 20 in 1873. In addition, there was no real 
basis to assess the Conservative performance at Sheffield as an indicator of national 
sentiment because no Conservative had stood in 1874. In fact, at the general election 
there was a small swing to the Conservatives of 0.4%, which meant that the by-
election had been a good predictor of the constituency’s general election result. The 
Liberals were not concerned by the Southwark result which they put down to the 
weakness of their candidate.
12
  At Liverpool particular local factors came into play. 
The Liberals lost because Ramsay, the Liberal candidate, had sought to gain the Irish 
vote by stating he would support an enquiry into home rule but which had the effect of 
alienating a large number of Protestant voters.
13
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III Turnout at by-elections 
 
Turnout at by-elections tended to be lower than at general elections although the 
comparisons need to be carefully made because turnout also varied significantly from 
one general election to another. Table V/3 shows the turnout at the three general 
elections in the period, analysed by region. It can be seen that in the whole of Great 
Britain in 1874 it fell below the level achieved in 1868 and rose again to its highest 
point of the three elections in 1880. As we have seen in Chapter I, the decline in 1874 
may have been due to the unexpected nature of Gladstone’s dissolution, the relatively 
shorter campaigning period for that election and the relatively disorganised state of the 
Liberal party. The other notable feature of the analysis is that over all three elections 
turnout was consistently higher in northern constituencies as compared to those in the 
south. 
 
Table V-3 Turnout at general elections 
 
Location & type of 
constituency 
1868 1874 1880 
    
Southern English Boroughs 70.0% 67.7% 77.8% 
Northern English Boroughs 76.8% 74.0% 78.7% 
Southern English Counties 72.5% 71.0% 74.9% 
Northern English Counties 77.1% 80.5% 80.2% 
    
England 74.0% 72.2% 77.8% 
Wales 80.9% 73.2% 82.6% 
Scotland 77.8% 72.4% 82.2% 
    
Great Britain 74.6% 72.3% 78.4% 
Sources and notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and own calculations. 
 
In the same way that by-election results can be used to give a general indication of 
changes over time in the support for the parties, so they can be used to give an 
indication of changes in the voters’ electoral enthusiasm. Table V/4 below shows the 
increase or decrease compared to the previous general election of the average turnout 




Table V-4 Turnout at by-elections 
 
Year Average turnout Increase (decrease) in 
turnout from previous 
general election 
1868 general election 74.6%  
1869  (0.47)% 
1870  (3.22)% 
1871  (3.77)% 
1872  (3.24)% 
1873  (5.55)% 
1874 general election 72.3%  
1874  3.83 
1875  (1.94)% 
1876  (0.24)% 
1877  0.84% 
1878  2.59% 
1879/80*  10.41% 
1880 general election 78.4%  
Sources and Notes: Based on election statistics computed in accordance with 
Appendix I. 
* The figures for 1879/80 include those held in the 1879 calendar year plus the 3 
by-elections (Liverpool, Barnstaple and Southwark) held in February before the 
general election. 
 
After the 1868 general election turnout was stable in 1869 but thereafter was 
considerably below the 1868 level in every year before 1874. Immediately after the 
general election turnout rose adding weight to the view that the fall at the general 
election had been due to the matters specific to the general election mentioned above. 
In the following three years turnout remained fairly flat until 1878 when it began to 
rise again followed by a substantial increase in 1879/80 until the general election 
which saw the highest turnout of the period. The significant increase in 1879/80 was 
due to the four by-elections held between December 1879 and February 1880. It is 
noticeable that this seeming increase in electoral enthusiasm took place after 
Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign of 24 November 1879 to 8 December 1879.   
 
IV Importance of by-elections to contemporaries 
 
We have seen that by-elections could be useful predictors of future election results. 
Every indication is that politicians thought so too. Gladstone was certainly interested 
in what they could tell about party popularity. In January 1874, after the disastrous 
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year of by-election results for the Liberals and clearly contemplating dissolution, he 
wrote to his Chief Whip, A W Peel: 
Some time ago, when in search of topics of consolation, I obtained them from you in 
the shape of figures. I again repair to the same source. It is alleged that, as a rule, the 
Liberal party fares ill, even in good political times, at single elections as compared 
with general Elections. Have you records which will enable you to show the number of 
seats won & lost by the Liberal party in 1831, & again the number won and lost during 
the existence of the Parliament then chosen? Together with like figures for each 
following Parliament, down to the present & including it to this date. This would fairly 





There is no record of how or whether Peel dealt with the request but it is clear that in 
asking for an analysis of by-elections preceding every general election since 1832 and 
in obviously expressing a knowledge of the ‘swing back’ phenomenon, that Gladstone 
was deeply interested in the predictive power of by-elections.
15
  
Gladstone again emphasised his belief in the importance of by-elections when 
he looked back at his first government and wrote: 
For the first time the mind of the nation, as tested by the constituency, had decisively 
altered during the course of a single Parliament; and the bye-elections, as we now see 
in retrospect, had previously supplied sufficient means of prognosticating the 
alteration. It is evident that, under such circumstances, bye-elections had, so to speak, 
received promotion in rank: they had acquired a new significance and had gathered not 




 It should be remembered that in writing this article Gladstone’s intention was to show 
that the then current Tory administration was becoming more unpopular. Further 
evidence of Gladstone’s faith in the significance of by-elections was shown in the 
same article when he used the by-election results between the general election of 1874 
and mid-1878 to predict the outcome of the next general election. Based upon the seats 
gained by the Liberals at these by-elections he predicted a Liberal majority of 75 seats 
over the Tories. In the event he was too pessimistic as the Liberal party gained a 
landslide majority of 115 seats at the 1880 general election.
17
 
Disraeli was also deeply interested in the results of by-elections. Harold Gorst 
described this in his biography of his father, J. E. Gorst, where he noted: 
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The satisfactory results achieved by this new system of organisation were manifested 
at the bye-elections which occurred from time to time. Disraeli took a great interest in 
the working of the new machinery. When a bye-election was won he was satisfied that 
everything had been in order, and the successful result furnished him with sufficient 
proof that such was the case. But he gave instructions that whenever a bye-election 





Contemporary commentators thought by-elections significant. References by 
the newspapers to the implications of by-election results for the general political 
situation and future election results are legion. A few examples give a flavour of that 
coverage. In 1871 the Examiner was acutely aware of the importance of the Plymouth 
by-election when it remarked that the defeat of the Liberal candidate was ‘a serious 
blow to the party in power’.19 Similarly, in 1871 the Royal Cornwall Gazette, in 
reporting the Conservative success in North Nottinghamshire on 26
th
 February, thought 
that the result was a reaction against the more extreme elements of the Liberal party 
and ‘a general election just now would rather astonish the Leaguers and 
Liberationists’. 20 In May 1873, the Belfast News-Letter gave another good example 
when, after the Conservatives had gained a seat at the Gloucester by-election, it 
analysed the failures and deficiencies of the Gladstonian Liberal government, opining 
that these had made: 
An impression that years will not efface; an impression which told upon the election at 
Bath on Monday, and which told on the election of Gloucester yesterday; and which 
we are confident will turn the political tide finally when the electors of the Three 




In 1878 the Bristol Mercury reported that the question of an early dissolution had been 
discussed in cabinet but no decision had been made as the government awaited the 
results of the Rochester and Southampton by-elections being held that week. In the 
event other factors constrained Disraeli’s hand as the two by-elections countered 
previous recent results by showing a swing to the government.
22
 
By-elections in this period were also important as a means of providing 
important members of the government with a seat in the House of Commons, either 
because they had been unseated, or because they had not previously been a Member of 
Parliament. One of the first by-elections held after the 1868 general election occurred 
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for precisely these reasons. The Marquess of Hartington was a key member of 
Gladstone’s Liberal cabinet but he had been defeated at the general election in 
Northern Lancashire. Hartington had held a seat in this constituency unopposed since 
1857, but when the Conservatives decided in 1868 to contest a number of Lancashire 
seats he was defeated. He went down in good company since Gladstone himself was 
defeated in South Western Lancashire as the Conservatives triumphed in Lancashire as 
a whole.
23
 It became necessary, therefore, to find Hartington a seat and an existing 
member prepared to make an appropriate sacrifice was found in the shape of Richard 
Green-Price, the member for Radnor Boroughs. Radnor was a small Welsh 
constituency with 841 electors in 1868, whose electors had never been called to the 
polls since the Great Reform Act, the seat having been held over the whole of the 
previous period by the current incumbent’s uncle and two other local landowners. 
Green-Price resigned his seat and, despite the Conservatives deciding to contest the 
seat for the first time, Hartington won easily, as he was to do at the 1874 general 
election. Green- Price appears to have been suitably rewarded, being created a baronet 
in 1874 and appointed as High Sheriff of Radnorshire in 1876. He returned to 




V Issues in by-election campaigns 
 
Nothing illustrates the national significance of by-elections in this period and their 
importance to the conduct and rhetoric of electoral politics more than the issues which 
were debated in these single one-off contests. Chapter III contains the results of a 
survey of the issues on which candidates focussed in their election addresses at the 
three general elections in the period. It was shown that the issues which occupied the 
candidates and the newspapers were almost wholly of a national nature; that is to say 
they were matters of policy which tended to effect the whole of Britain, although some 
could be of concern only to a single kingdom because of its particular circumstances - 
an example of this being the electoral pre-occupation in Scotland with the law of 
hypothec, which was a unique product of Scottish law. 
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In order to ascertain whether similar conclusions could be drawn about the 
issues debated at by-elections a survey was undertaken covering by-elections in 59 
constituencies between 1868 and 1880. This included an examination of candidates’ 
reported speeches and local newspaper editorials. The results of this survey were very 
similar to those for the general elections and show that the issues debated were very 
largely of a national nature with only a few relating solely to the constituency 
concerned. The results also suggested two other features of issues debated at by-
elections. Firstly, it was apparent that the by-election debates tended to focus on one or 
two particular topics whereas at general elections the candidates debated a wider range. 
Secondly, it was also apparent that the topics which received such focus at by-elections 
tended to be those which were the most contested topics of the day.
25
 This finding 
illuminates another feature of by-elections during the period, namely their importance 
in providing forums of national political debate when Parliament was not in session. 
This can be particularly seen during the period from 1876 to 1879 when the Eastern 
Question frequently dominated by-election debates.  
Another good illustration of these points is given by the Plymouth contest of 
1871. The last eight months of that year were particularly good for the Conservatives 
and marked a downturn in the fortunes of Gladstone’s administration. In April 1871 
the Conservatives had gained a seat at Durham. In August they famously gained a seat 
in East Surrey and in September Truro fell, leading The Times to comment that these 
results indicated: 
A growing and uneasy dissatisfaction with the conduct, legislative or administrative, 





The Gladstone government had already shown its legislative hyperactivity and 
Forster’s controversial Education Act had passed into law the previous year. During 
1871 the perhaps even more controversial Licensing Bill was being debated in 
parliament and nationally. It was against this backdrop that a piece of government 
mismanagement had resulted in a problem finding candidates to fill the newly created 
judicial positions on the Privy Council, and, despite much discontent from the bar, it 
was decided to appoint the Attorney-General, Sir Robert Collier, a successful QC on 
                                                 
25
 For a description of this phenomenon in Edwardian by-elections see Paul Readman and Luke Blaxill, 
'Edwardian By-Elections', in Thomas Otte and Paul Readman (eds), By-elections in British Politics, 
1832-1914, (Woodbridge, 2013), . 
26
 The Times, 14 September 1871. 
205 
 
the Western Circuit and Liberal Member of Parliament for Plymouth but with no 
judicial experience, to the judicial committee of the Privy Council. This meant Collier 
would be elevated to the peerage and, consequently, could no longer continue as 
member for Plymouth, necessitating a by-election to decide his successor. 
Plymouth was a two member constituency with an electorate of 4,840 in 1868 
(which expanded to 5,552 in 1880). Since 1832 it had generally been a Liberal seat, 
although sometimes the representation was divided. Notably, all its elections from 
1835 to 1868 were contested. In 1868 Collier had been elected with a fellow Liberal, 
Walter Morrison. They defeated a single Conservative candidate, R. S. Lane, with a 
Liberal share of the vote of 58% gained on a turnout of 74%. Collier was appointed 
Attorney-General in December 1868 and a by-election was accordingly called for the 
21 December 1868 and, in common with most ministerial by-elections at that time, 
Collier was returned unopposed. Subsequently, in August 1870 Collier was appointed 
recorder of Bristol thereby necessitating a further by-election in Plymouth. Although 
there were good precedents for the Attorney-General holding the recordership of 
Bristol, it was one of the most valuable in the country, and Collier received a good deal 
of criticism in The Times, the Law Journal, and elsewhere. At that time Plymouth 
Dockyard was already suffering badly from the Liberal policy of retrenchment and the 
consequent cuts in government expenditure. These factors, together with pressure from 
his own local party, led him to announce that he would resign the recordership 
immediately after the election.
27
 In these circumstances there was no challenge to 
Collier and was duly re-elected without a contest. In an editorial The Times accurately 
pointed out that Plymouth, being highly dependent on its naval dockyards, was 
suffering from the impact of the government’s policies of retrenchment and this made 
the possibility of a contest, and even possible defeat, more likely. As The Times 
concluded ‘we suspect that had not Retrenchment been practiced in Plymouth 
Dockyard, not a voice would have been raised in the borough against the Attorney-
General for accepting the recordership of Bristol’.28 In this particular case, therefore, 
the local circumstances of the government’s retrenchment programme seem to have 
been influential.  
Thus, just over a year later, when Collier was appointed to the judicial 
committee of the Privy Council and he had to resign his seat, these fears over electoral 
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sentiment in the Plymouth dockyards were put to the test. The Liberals needed to find 
a new candidate and the Conservatives, perhaps predictably, given the machinations of 
Collier’s legal posts and the political situation in the nation, decided to contest the seat, 
selecting Edward Bates as their candidate. Bates announced himself as a defender of 
the existing institutions of the country and accused the Liberals of subverting the 
Monarchy and the House of Lords. He went on to say he was in favour of Clause 25 of 
the Education Act and, perhaps understandably for a candidate who was both a ship-
owner and standing in a naval constituency, emphasised the need for a strong navy to 
back up a strong foreign policy. Finally, for good measure, he was against temperance 
legislation, against the ballot and in favour of the Church of England.
 29
 The Liberals 
held a public meeting the same day and selected Alfred Rooker, an alderman and a 
leading solicitor in the town, despite some apparent misgivings amongst Liberal 
supporters. At this meeting Rooker professed himself in support of the ballot, and 
prophesised the extension of the franchise and the further redistribution of seats, as 
well as suggesting the duration of Parliament should be shortened and the House of 
Lords reformed by the introduction of life peers. He said he would support Mr Miall’s 
disestablishment motion, but could not go the whole length of the Permissive Bill, 
though he agreed with it in principle.  He condemned the Contagious Diseases Act and 
the Law of Primogeniture.
30
 
These major issues bear a remarkable resemblance to the key issues debated by 
candidates at the general election of 1874.
31
 Education was an issue mentioned by both 
Liberals and Conservatives at that election, together with the armed forces, the 
introduction of the ballot and the extension of the franchise and redistribution. The 
Licensing Laws continued to be debated in 1874 after the watered down version of the 
bill being debated in 1871, passed into law in 1872. In the event Bates captured the 
seat for the Conservatives with a majority of 242 votes and after a swing against the 
Liberal government of 12 %. Bates went on to hold the seat in 1874 and despite the 
Liberal tide of 1880, to hold on in 1880 with a majority of 36. Unfortunately for Bates 
he was petitioned for the 1880 election and was unseated for bribery, although the 
Conservatives won the subsequent by-election.
32
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A review of the press coverage of by-elections in this period demonstrates its 
extent as well as showing it was usually much more detailed than at a general election. 
The sheer volume of information at general elections often resulted in only brief details 
in respect of most individual constituencies, so that, for example, news from a smaller 
constituency in Dorsetshire might never be reported in a Preston newspaper at a 
general election whereas its by-election was reported extensively. 
These points can be aptly illustrated by three by-election examples. There was 
a by-election in June 1870 for the Isle of Wight which resulted in a Conservative gain. 
The election process from the announcement of the death of the sitting member to the 
result and analysis of the poll was reported in major London daily newspapers and in 
most large regional papers across the country, from Cornwall to Dundee.
33
 The poll 
was held on Friday 10 June and on Saturday morning most readers were able to learn 
the result of the election. A second example is the by-election in Mid-Cheshire which 
was polled on 7 March 1873. The results and description of the polling were published 
the following day in numerous newspapers.
34
 Finally, the electors of Dorsetshire were 
not accustomed to being troubled to cast a vote for between 1832 and 1876 there had 
been only one poll. Nevertheless, when they were summoned to the polls for a by-




Thus, by-elections provided important news topics to fuel the ever increasing 
demand of the growing newspaper industry for material and this itself increased the 
political activity at by-elections which became national events. This coverage and the 
spread of newspapers encouraged the nationalisation of the nature of issues debated at 
by-elections. In addition, concurrently, issues debated between the candidates at by-
elections were dominated by national political issues, usually those forming part of the 
current topical debate, especially proposed legislation which was before parliament at 
the time of the by-election. Indeed, as a result of all these pressures, leading politicians 
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found it increasingly appropriate to become involved in by-elections in various ways 
which would have been unheard of before this period. This included articles in the 
media, letters of support and even visits to the local campaign by leading party figures. 
VI Electoral politics and the Eastern Question 1876-78 
 
The previous sections have shown that by-elections were a vital part of 
electoral politics in the 1870s.They acted as barometers of public opinion and as 
forums for the debate of national political issues, features which are illustrated by the 
attention given to the by-elections which took place during the two years after June 
1875, when British politics were dominated by the Bulgarian atrocities and the Eastern 
Question as a whole. By-elections in this period were national events, were reported 
nationally, and were regarded and constantly quoted, as measurements of the public 
mood and its satisfaction or otherwise with the foreign policy of the government.  
Rumours of the Bulgarian atrocities were first reported in Britain in the Daily 
News on June 23 1876.
36
 The same day W. E. Forster, the Liberal member for 
Bradford, prompted by this report, asked the Prime Minister for information that the 
government possessed on the issue and in the following days the story took off in 
Parliament and the national and regional newspapers of Britain. Between June 1876 
and June 1878 there were 48 by-elections in Britain through which the change in 
public opinion since 1874 and the popularity of the government’s policies towards 
Turkey and Russia were closely monitored. The Manchester Times gave its review of 
events of 1876 and noted that: 
Elections took place here and there in different parts of the country, and produced 
results the most audacious devil’s advocate dared not undervalue or ridicule. The 
government was placed upon its trial; the issue in every case was one of confidence or 
no confidence in Lord Beaconsfield’s administration; and for answer there came one 
after another a vote of no confidence at once emphatic and unmistakeable. East 
Cumberland, Burnley, Carmarthen, Horsham, Leeds, Leominster, and Manchester 
gave a decided verdict against the government, and the same set of public sympathy 
was illustrated a little less decidedly in the Premier’s own county of Bucks and the 





Victorian newspapers could frequently be extreme in their political bias and the 
Manchester Times was a decidedly Liberal journal. However, its view of the 1876 by-
elections is supported by most other evidence. The following paragraphs consider how 
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these by-elections, and others, reflected the changing popularities of the 
Administration and the opposition during this period of political turbulence.  
The first by-election after the story broke in June 1876 was held at Shoreham 
on 5 August. Shoreham had returned two Conservatives at the 1874 general election. 
The death of one of these members, Sir Percy Burrell , caused the by-election and his 
brother, Sir Walter Wyndham Burrell retained the seat for the Conservatives. The 
Conservatives had taken 73% of the poll in 1874 but the Liberals performed much 
better this time and there was a swing of 13% against the Conservatives. At this stage 
the Eastern Question did not seem to have had a significant impact and Sir Walter did 
not mention foreign affairs in his acceptance speech.
38
  
The next by-election was at Carmarthen on 14 August 1876, and this provides 
a similar example. A small Welsh borough with 4494 electors in 1874, the seat had 
been surprisingly won at the 1874 general election by a Conservative, Charles Neville, 
in a relatively close run contest, defeating the Liberal, Arthur Stepney, the son of the 
previous incumbent, Sir John Stepney, despite the fact that the latter had polled 76% of 
the vote at the general election of 1868. Neville resigned at the beginning of August 
and after several attempts to find a candidate the Conservative eventually conceded the 
seat without putting up a candidate resulting in the return of Stepney who had stood 
again for the Liberals. Stepney’s election address did not mention the Eastern Question 
or foreign policy, focussing on education and disestablishment (which he supported). 
Foreign policy and the Eastern Question had not, therefore, become a major issue at 
this stage.  
One day later on 15 August 1876 Leeds went to the polls. In 1874 Leeds had 
elected one Liberal and two Conservatives. In 1876, the Liberal member, R. M. Carter, 
resigned giving rise to the by-election. The candidates were John Barran, a former 
Mayor of Leeds, for the Liberals and W. L. Jackson for the Conservatives. Barran won 
with 54.8% of the vote, a small 0.5% swing against the government. Again, at this 
stage, foreign affairs did not feature significantly in the candidates’ addresses. Barran 
asserted that non-intervention was the best policy for the ‘honour and welfare’ of the 
country. Jackson did not mention foreign affairs and neither candidate referred to 
Bulgaria and the Eastern Question. The main issues addressed by the candidates were 
common for this period and included the continuing debate on the universality of 
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education and religious instruction in schools, the extension of the county franchise 
and the redistribution of seats, the disestablishment of the Church of England, the 
relations between employers and employees and the Permissive Bill.
 39
 The content of 




By September, however, the Eastern Question began to gain traction as a 
significant issue as was shown by the by-election in the Prime Minister’s constituency 
of Buckinghamshire on 22 September 1876, caused by Disraeli’s elevation to the 
peerage as Earl of Beaconsfield. The Conservatives had generally taken two of the 
three seats in the constituency at general elections and at the 1868 election the 
representation had again been shared between two Conservatives and one Liberal. In 
1874 a poll had been necessitated because a rogue Conservative, W. Talley, stood; but 
he polled only 151 votes and the ‘official’ candidates were comfortably returned, with 
the Conservatives taking 63% of the vote. 
At the by-election the Hon. T. F. Freemantle stood as Disraeli’s replacement 
and the Hon. Rupert Carington for the Liberals. The Essex Standard did not have a 
high opinion of Freemantle noting that: 
The attempt to force an inexperienced Whigling into the seat he [Disraeli] filled, is 
naturally regarded in Buckinghamshire as an insult to their late honoured member, and 




Freemantle’s appointment, however, showed ulterior Disraelian motives because he 
selected him ‘in accordance with Lord Derby’s predilections’.42 Disraeli’s need for 
Derby’s support for his foreign policy and his stance on the Eastern Question had 
influenced the candidate’s appointment. Carington, for the Liberals, addressed a 
meeting of electors at Chesham on 31 October expressing his strong dissatisfaction 
with the conduct of the government in reference to the atrocities in Bulgaria. 
Freemantle, addressing electors in Uxbridge, spoke on the Eastern Question as well 
noting that, in his opinion, the atrocities would just as well have occurred if Gladstone 
had been premier.
43
 At this stage, however, other issues were also discussed and 
Carington, in a speech at Aylesbury, spoke on local taxation, Lord Sandon’s Education 
                                                 
39
 Leeds Mercury, 12 August 1876. 
40
 Ibid, 12 August 1876. 
41
 Essex Standard and General Advertiser for the Eastern Counties, 1 September 1876. 
42
 Marvin Swartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and Gladstone, (New 
York, 1985), p. 31. 
43
 Pall Mall Gazette, 1 September 1876. 
211 
 
Act, the Burials Bill as well as the Turkish atrocities. Regarding the atrocities, 
Freemantle gave an indication of how politicians viewed by-elections as an important 
means of expressing the state of public opinion on major issues, when he said: 
It rested with the electors of Bucks to express what was in the mind of every 
Englishman. The result of that election would not displace the present government, but 




In the event, Freemantle retained the seat for the Conservatives, but only with a 
majority of 186 and after a massive swing of 12% to the Liberals.
45
 Derby was not as 
disturbed by this result as might be expected recording in his diary that ‘the majority 
under 200, but it was thought likely the Liberals would win: the result proves that the 
existing excitement has not so far done us much harm: and is so far important, that the 
Liberal press was prepared to treat success as a great party victory’.46 
After Buckinghamshire the next by-elections were at Frome and Liskeard. 
Frome was a small borough with an electorate of some 1200 electors. The 
representation had regularly switched between the parties and in 1874 a Conservative, 
H. C. Lopes, had won with 53.5% of the vote. Lopes was made a judge and at the 
consequent by-election, on 24 November,  H. B. Samuelson, who had formerly 
represented Cheltenham, captured the seat for the Liberals with 53.9% of the vote on a 
swing of 7.4% against the government, defeating the Conservative candidate, Sir 
James Ferguson. The Eastern Question seems to have played a decisive role in this 
election. At the general meeting of the Frome Conservative Association on 4 
November  shortly before news of his appointment, Lopes addressed the Bulgarian 
atrocities and the Eastern Question.
47
 He emphasised the importance of protecting 
British interests in the face of Russian aggression and criticised the speeches of 
Gladstone and other Liberal politicians on the issue.
48
 His successful Liberal opponent, 
Samuelson, also thought that his election ‘would tell Lord Beaconsfield’s government 
that the first borough which had an opportunity of expressing an opinion on his policy 
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was emphatically averse to it’.49 As The Times noted, emphasising the importance of 
by-elections to the major political commentators of the time: 
The chief interest of the Frome election is that it occurs at a great crisis in the national 
affairs and the result may be taken as an opinion expressed on the national policy. The 
question of peace or war in the East must have been in the thoughts of every voter who 
thought on politics at all, and it must have been felt that the first decision which the 
new member would have to take after the meeting of Parliament might be whether he 




The next by-election was at Liskeard on 22 December 1876 where the Liberal 
candidate, Leonard Courtney, won easily against a fellow Liberal.
51
 The Eastern 
Question again dominated the campaign. This may well have been influenced by the 
Great National Conference on the Eastern Question held on 8 December 1876 at which 
Gladstone was the key-note speaker. 
The trend of swings against the government continued into 1877 and public 
opinion was tested again at the Halifax by-election on 21 February 1877. Halifax had 
since 1832 generally returned two Liberals and the strength of Liberalism in the 
borough was emphasised when one Tory newspaper described it as: 
A town so bigotedly attached to false Liberalism, a borough so wrapped up in shoddy 
and dissent as to have endeavoured to turn out Mr Forster as a reward for the services 





The Liberals had comfortably retained both seats in 1874 with 58.4% of the votes. The 
by-election was triggered by the resignation of one of the members and at the by-
election the Liberal, John Hutchinson, easily defeated the Conservative, R W Gamble, 
with 61.3% of the vote, a swing against the government of 2.9%. 
The Wilton by-election was also held on 21 February 1877 and provided a 
salutary reminder that influence could still be important in a few small boroughs. 
Wilton was a family borough under the influence of the Earl of Pembroke when the 
Reform Bill of 1832 was passed. Near to Old Sarum, the boroughs were joined 
together in 1832 and converted into some resemblance to a slightly more modern 
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borough; but the place kept its old character. The Manchester Times described the 
constituency as: 
A pocket borough it was, so it remained, and so it is now, when Mr Sidney Herbert, 
the brother of its proprietor, has only to assert his hereditary claim to the seat in order 
to obtain it. It is Liberal or Tory, it is an appendage of the Herberts, and its decision 
does not affect, one way or the other, the question as to whether the country is or is not 




Hanham recognised it as a nomination borough and noted that ‘while the 13th Earl was 
a minor Lady Herbert returned Sir Edward Antrobus a Liberal Conservative who sat 
from 1855 – 1877. 54  Her son, Sidney, was, however, a decided Conservative and 
when Antrobus decided to retire many Liberals thought he had been sacked by the 
Herberts to make way for him.
55
 However, the Liberal nature of Antrobus’s 
representation mattered little against Sidney’s influence.56 Although the Liberals put 
up a candidate, Herbert won easily and 80% of the formerly Liberal borough voted 
Conservative. Perhaps unsurprisingly in this last refuge of aristocratic influence, the 
Eastern Question did not figure strongly in the campaign.  
The next by-election was at Oldham on 1 March 1877. This contest generated 
enormous press coverage and sustained national interest. Oldham, in common with a 
number of Lancashire industrial boroughs, had returned two Conservative members at 
the 1874 general election, so the by-election, prompted by the death of one of those 
members, promised to be a test of the government’s popularity.57 
Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lees was the Conservative candidate and in his address he 
emphasised his local connections, support for the national church, Conservative 
legislation on dwellings for the labouring classes and working hours. He also 
emphasised how: 
The foreign policy of the present government meets with his hearty concurrence and 
particularly the skilful management of the Eastern Question, which under the very 
critical circumstances has preserved the peace of Europe, without, on the one hand 
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The Liberal candidate was J. T. Hibbert and his address was brief, stating he had 
nothing to add to his former professions of Liberal principles but focussing on how he 
was ‘in favour of a more firm and decided policy on behalf of the suffering Christians 
in European Turkey’.59 This proved to be sufficient as Hibbert was victorious with 
2.5% swing against the government. 
Launceston was a small Cornish constituency, with 826 electors in 1877, 
unused to contested elections, having had no polls between 1835 and 1874. The 
Werrington Park estate dominated the borough and, in 1876, was owned by Colonel J. 
H. Deakin. Deakin had been elected in 1874 only to be unseated on the infamous 
‘bribery’ charge of allowing his tenants to shoot rabbits.60 The Colonel’s eldest son 
won the re-run election, but retired three years later at the insistence of the whips. This 
was another good example of by-elections providing a means of getting government 
figures elected because its intention was to bring Sir Hardinge Gifford, the Solicitor 
General, into the House (Gifford had experienced great difficulty finding a seat having 
spent three Parliamentary terms as Solicitor General without a place in the commons) 
and Deakin was leant on to provide this opportunity.
61
 Hardinge’s  address emphasised 
that with regard to foreign policy, ‘an English statesman’s first duty is to consider what 
is best for his own country, and that includes the existence of peace and good 
government among all nations’.62 In a speech he said, with regard to the Eastern 
Question, that the government had had ‘the most tremendous responsibility and 




The by-election at Salford in April 1877 has been much misunderstood by 
historians and the influence of the Eastern Question on its outcome was emphasised by 
contemporaries for their own political purposes. It has been suggested that ‘of all the 
contests during the “Great Eastern Crisis” the one at Salford has been accorded the 
greatest significance’ and that it shaped the contours of British politics for the next 
year or so’.65 In fact, as will be seen, it was heavily influenced by specific local issues 
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and the impact of the Eastern Question on its outcome is highly questionable. Salford 
had regularly returned Liberal members from 1832 to the Second Reform Act. That 
Act dramatically increased the electorate from 5,397 in 1865 to 15,862 in 1868 and the 
constituency led the Conservative reaction in Lancashire, returning two Conservatives 
in both 1868 and 1874.
66
 Lancashire, in this period, was a very poor guide to electoral 
sentiments in the country as a whole because of its particular Conservative 
tendencies.
67
 The death of one of the members caused the by-election which was held 
on 19 April and which resulted in the return of a Conservative, Colonel O. O. Walker. 
It was a close run contest with Walker taking 50.79% of the vote - a swing against the 
government of only 0.03% as compared to 1874. The Liberals had expected to win and 
the Conservatives were jubilant claiming the result was a turn in the electoral tide and 
a vindication of the government’s foreign policy. In fact, matters were rather more 
complicated. Firstly, the Liberal candidate, Joseph Kay, had been unwell and had spent 
the entire campaign in London. He was unable to visit Salford at any time and could 
not undertake any canvassing or make any speeches and appearances. Shortly before 
the election rumours circulated that he was dead and the Liberals had to distribute 
posters attesting to their candidate’s health.68 The Liberals were certainly concerned 
that their candidate’s absence might be interpreted as seeming indifference and lose 
them votes as a result. Equally, they had to reassure the electorate that Kay would be 
able to carry out his duties if elected. The second major factor was that the Irish vote 
was very important in Salford, estimated at 1,500 electors. As a result the governance 
of Ireland was an issue and there had been talk of replacing Walker with a 
Conservative candidate more sympathetic to Home Rule because of it.
69
 Kay supported 
the establishment of a committee of enquiry into Home Rule and the local members of 
the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain appointed a committee to organise and 
direct the Irish voters. One of their leaders, Hugh O’Donnell, claimed that they 
delivered the Irish vote to Kay.
70
 Whilst this may have been the case the problem in 
Lancashire was the reaction of the significant anti-Irish vote; as the Daily News 
commented ‘Mr Kay’s ill-judged coquetting with the Home Rulers may have lost him 
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some votes’.71 Thus, there were other factors, apart from the Eastern Question, which 
significantly influenced the result in what was already a constituency with strong 
working class Conservative support. The difficulty of reading the Salford result as 
being a clear verdict on the government’s policy over the Eastern Question is also 
suggested by the return to large swings to the Liberals at by-elections immediately 
afterwards. 
The by-election at Huntingdonshire in June 1877 had some claim to fame in 
having been caused by the demise of the sitting member due to sunstroke while riding 
his horse in Hyde Park. The Conservative candidate was Lord Mandeville, eldest son 
of the Duke of Manchester, and a man who had great influence in the constituency, 
which was home to Kirmbolton Castle.
72
 The Eastern Question does not appear to have 
been a major issue and Mandeville’s address did not mention it focussing rather on 
local taxation and farming. It was sufficient for the Conservatives retained the seat but 
there was a 6% swing against them. The Liberal tide continued at Grimsby in August 
1877 when they gained the seat from the Conservatives with a 10% swing in their 
favour. Despite the interference of another Liberal candidate Alfred Watkin was 
successful. 
As diplomatic negotiations on the Eastern Question continued into 1878, by-
election results became more mixed. The year had opened with an 8% swing against 
the government in January at Perth. However, in February the government held a 
Scottish seat and the local contacts of the Conservative candidate helped reduce the 
swing against them to 3.4%. By March proposals for the Congress of Berlin were 
under discussion and the government’s position appeared to stabilise when they held 
Hereford, maintaining their share of the vote. By the end of the month public sentiment 
appeared to be flowing with the administration as they gained Worcester with a swing 
in their favour of 9.8%. This was the height of war discussions with the call up of 
reserves and the resignation of Derby although the Conservatives were undoubtedly 
helped by the failure of the local Liberal party to agree on a candidate - eventually, Sir 
Francis Lycett agreed to stand but only 7 days before polling.
73
 
At Tamworth on 25 April 1878 the Liberal press became very excited about a 
great victory and indeed the Liberals did gain a seat previously held by the 
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 It has been suggested by T. G. Otte that the swing to the Liberals was 
an enormous 43% on a larger turnout.
75
 This fails to take account of the voting patterns 
in Tamworth and the actual swing to the Liberals was only 3.7%, making the result in 
line with the swing against the government at this time but not one of any great 
significance.
76
 A bigger swing was recorded by the Liberals at Reading on 18 May 
1878 when they retained their seat with a favourable swing of 6.5%. By June, 
however, the tide began to swing back towards the Conservatives. The Liberals held 
their seat at Rochester but there was a 2.3% swing to the Conservatives. Similarly, the 
Conservatives held Southampton on 17 June 1878 with a swing in their favour of 
4.8%. As The Times cautioned, however, Southampton was one constituency where 
specific issues relating to the docks and shipping industry were important and probably 
more important than the Eastern Question.
77
 
These by-elections over the 24 months to June 1878 show how important such 
contests were to the national political controversy over the Eastern Question and this 
importance was aptly illustrated by a debate which took place a few months later in 
September and October 1878. It involved senior politicians of both parties, leading 
national and provincial newspapers, and concerned the status of by-elections as the 
opinion polls of their day, as the best indicators of the state of public opinion on 
particular issues and, by extension, the legitimacy of government policy. The debate 
thus showed the vital importance of by-elections in electoral politics and the power 
that they held for commentators and politicians, and the electorate. 
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The debates started on 23 September 1878 when Gladstone sent a letter to a 
Rowland Rees JP in response to information conveyed to Gladstone through Mr Rees 
by his son,  a member of the legislature in one of the Australian colonies, referring to a 
meeting recently held in support of Gladstone’s Eastern policy. Gladstone had 
suggested that the state of opinion in Australia on the Eastern Question must be highly 
dependent for information on what can be learnt from the London newspapers, but 
according to the great majority of these papers, the policy of the government has the 
general and warm support of the people of Britain. Gladstone further stated that: 
The Australian public is neither aware of the testimony of the national Press at large 
nor is it probably cognisant of the fact that while Europe, as well as the colonies, have 
been fed with these assurances, the constituencies of this country, when an opportunity 
has chanced to occur and the question has been tried, have returned in large majority 




It is, of course, typical of Gladstone’s skill for political tactics and self-publicity that 
this letter to an Australian state legislator should happen to be published in The Times. 
The following day this attack on the popularity of the government’s policy 
provoked a reply from Lord Claud Hamilton, which was similarly published in The 
Times.
79
 In this letter Hamilton challenged Gladstone to demonstrate his assertion that 
there had been a large majority who disapproved of the policy of the administration, in 
the context of the by-elections which had taken place since the autumn of 1876.
80
 
Hamilton’s letter summarised the results of the by-elections since then, suggesting that 
these results could not sustain Gladstone’s view that by-elections had ‘returned in large 
majority those who disapprove the conduct of the ministry’. A response from 
Gladstone was published contemporaneously in which he appeared to some to be 
ducking the issue, saying: 
I fully admit your title to make the challenge contained in your letter of the 27
th
, but I 
also ask the liberty of choice as to my method of dealing with it; and I do not see any 
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reason why I should reply to questions involving only a part of the case, rather than 




This prompted a rather acerbic reply from Hamilton in which he stated that the points 
he made were questions of fact rather than opinion: ‘Is it not evident that the 
authenticated records of Parliamentary elections during the past two years prove your 
‘fact’ to exist merely in your own imagination’.82 Those who thought Gladstone might 
make an ill-considered comment or retreat from a challenge were, subsequently, to be 
proved wrong yet again. 
In the same edition of The Times, an editorial devoted much space to a 
somewhat tongue in cheek discussion of Gladstone’s attempts to withdraw from public 
life, using Hamilton’s letter as an example of the kind of attention which he could not 
avoid. However, the same editorial admitted the validity and significance of by-
election results. The Times thought that Gladstone would have difficulty in sustaining 
his argument, stating: 
We scarcely see how Mr Gladstone will be able to make good his words. He will be 
able to show that there has been some gain for the Opposition, but there have been 




The Times reckoned that ‘twenty five seats had been lost, while, on the other hand, 
only twenty seats have been gained’ and ‘we look in vain to the voice of the country 
for a clear , definite sentence of any kind, such, for example, as that which it 
pronounced towards the close of Mr Gladstone’s own Ministry’.84 
There was no immediate response from Gladstone at this stage but on the 7
th
 
October at Kinross, W. P. Adam, who had been Gladstone’s Chief Whip in the 
previous administration, gave a speech which addressed the issue. He said that: 
Many speakers and writers were persisting in saying that the elections were still in 
favour of the government, but, in order to show the fallacy of this, he had prepared a 




His argument was that since January 1876 there had been 83 by-elections of which 57 
were contested and 26 were uncontested, and, of the contested elections, 32 had also 
been contested at the 1874 general election. These latter elections, he said, ‘offered the 
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best ground of comparison as to the government in 1874 and since January 1876’ and 
in these 32 elections, exclusive of those in Ireland, the Liberal party had gained ten 
seats, while they had lost only one’. In addition, the total votes, in these elections, for 
the Liberal party was 103,249 in 1874 compared to 101,999 for the Tories. The 
comparative figures for 1876 were 118,139 for the Liberals and 104,697 for the Tories. 
This gave Liberal majority in 1874 of 1250 and in 1878 of 12442, and if the Leith 
election were to be added the Liberal majority would be increased to 14583. He finally 
noted that ‘during the present year 19 elections had resulted in a majority of 7416 
against the Eastern policy of the government’.86 
The Aberdeen Weekly Journal was a consistently Conservative journal and 
must have been in a sarcastic mood when it referred to ‘Mr Gladstone’s heroic 
announcement to his Australian admirers’. 87 Accordingly, it was not going to allow 
Adam to cover Gladstone’s tracks quite so easily. The newspaper had two objections. 
Firstly, Adam’s comparison had used by-elections from the commencement of 1876 
rather than mid-1876 when the issue of the government’s policy on the Eastern 
Question had come to the fore. Secondly, they noted that a number of Liberal 
successes in the 19 elections over the past year were not necessarily due to the ‘labours 
of the Liberal caucus’. The paper thought the omission of the Irish elections was 
significant and suggested that at the Tamworth by-election Bass’s beer carried the day 
while at Newcastle under Lyme the Liberal Home Rulers gained the victory.
88
                     
The debate was next taken up by the Central Offices of the party organisations. 
On 14 October W. B. Skene wrote to The Times on behalf of the Conservatives with an 
attack on Adam’s remarks which he thought ‘were calculated to create a false 
impression’.89 Skene thought Adam was wrong because he left entirely out of 
consideration those elections which were uncontested. Instead, he suggested, 
consideration should be given to all of the elections during 1878 and of all of the 
elections since 1874. Thus, he maintained, during 1878 33 seats had fallen vacant 
containing 233,341 electors, out of which 20, with a total of 175,216 electors had 
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returned Conservatives, and 13, with a total of 58,215 electors had returned Liberals. 
Of these seats 12 were uncontested, ten Conservative and two Liberal. He pointed out 
that 5 of the ten uncontested Conservative seats had been warmly contested by the 
Liberals in 1874 but they had chosen to leave them uncontested at the subsequent by-
elections. Two of these were Ministerial elections and Adam had stated that it was not 
good etiquette to contest seats vacated by Ministers on appointment except under 
special circumstances. Skene then showed the combativeness of the Conservative party 
organisation in contesting seats when he said that even in these circumstances surely 
Adam ‘would not deny the changed feeling of the country which he alleges to have 
taken place is a special circumstance which would warrant such a contest’.90 Skene 
then showed that the remaining 21 contested seats were equally divided between the 
parties (10 Conservative and 11 Liberal) and so far as concerned the number of 
electors in these constituencies, the Conservatives had a majority of ‘upwards of 
14,000’. He then used a bit more statistical wizardry in relation to the results since the 
1874 general election. In this period the Liberals had gained 12 seats from 81 
Conservative seats, a success rate of 14.5%, whereas the Conservatives had won 10 out 
of 55 Liberal seats, a superior success rate of 18%. Finally, he noted that this net loss 
of two seats compared favourably to the net loss of 47 seats endured by the Liberals in 
the five years of the last parliament.
91
 Skene’s response received coverage in a number 
of national and provincial newspapers. 
The Standard took the view that it was fairer to take the results over the whole 
Parliament because of the impact of the Eastern Question on the Liberal cause, or, as 
they put it the ‘unfair advantage taken of the “heart of the country” during the autumn 
of 1876 by the traders in Turkish atrocities’.92 The newspaper also reminded its readers 
that ‘as in the fifth year of every government its influence and popularity begin to 
decline, so Mr Adam, the Liberal whip, will not be persuaded that the process with 
which he has been so familiar has already begun with his opponents’.93 The Isle of 
Wight Observer also supported Skene’s response, although it did make a remark which 
must have chimed with a number of the followers of this debate that ‘almost anything 
can be proved with figures, and it scarcely required so much ingenuity and experience 
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as we are told Mr Adam possesses to make out a plausible case for the assertion that 
the Liberal party has been growing in favour with the constituencies of late years’.94  
The next major step came with a riposte from Liberal Central Office. In a letter 
to The Times Alexander Craig Sellar, who worked for Adam in the Liberal central 
office, argued that it was correct to consider the period from 1 January 1876 ‘because 
it was only from 1876 that the Eastern policy of the government became of paramount 
importance in elections’.95 Sellar then reiterated the argument that in this period those 
constituencies which were also contested at the 1874 General Election afforded the 
purest and best available test of the feeling of the country. The result of this test was, 
he said, was to show a large increase in the voting power for the Liberals amounting to 
12,872, with a gain of ten seats and a loss of one. He rejected the concept of taking into 
account the uncontested elections since 14 of these occurred in English counties, 
where, he said, at any time, a contest would be hopeless for the Liberals.
96
 
This letter provoked a further reaction from Skene in which he produced 
tabulations of the votes of the elections concerned, aiming to show that the figures of 
Adams and Sellar were wrong. The key to the difference between the calculations was 
in the results for Manchester and Oldham which were constituencies where ‘the 
Liberals have had a larger number of candidates than there were seats to be filled, the 
votes polled by the redundant candidates having been included’. In addition, he said ‘in 
cases where two candidates stood on each side, each party has been credited, as is 
obviously fair, with the number of votes polled by their highest candidate’.97 As will 
be shown in Appendix I, this method of measuring electoral support in multi-member 
constituencies is not necessarily fair. There was also a mistake in his figures which was 
pointed out by Harcourt.
98
 
Then on 30 October there was a substantial rejoinder from Gladstone when he 
published his paper on by-elections entitled ‘Electoral Facts’ in the Nineteenth Century 
magazine.
99
 This is one of the most important contemporary publications in this period 
on by-elections since it demonstrates on the one hand, the importance of the analysis of 
these contests to contemporary politicians and, on the other, its analysis spans a large 
part of the period from the Liberal victory of 1868 to 1878, the year of its publication. 
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It is also important because the paper develops the concept of electoral swing for the 
first time. Although he does not use the expression itself there can be little doubt this is 
what he had in mind when he said that: 
Numerical advance in seats gained is not, however, the only test; the diminution….of 




In this article Gladstone also gave his much-awaited response to the debate over public 
opinion and the Eastern Question. He takes it as agreed with Skene that there had been 
49 contested by-elections since the 1
st
 January 1876 of which the Liberals had won 28 
and the government 21, which was ‘a majority of seven elections upon forty-nine, or a 
majority exactly of four to three, is, as will be seen if it be extended to larger numbers 
by multiplication, a large majority’ and this provides the justification for his original 
assertion, that had started the whole debate, that electors had ‘since the Eastern 
Question came forward, returned Liberals in large majority’.101 Rather more 
impressively, he then goes on to examine those contests that were also contested in 
1874 so as to measure the swing to the Liberals in this period, a calculation which he 
performs by measuring the change in the aggregate votes cast for the parties, and 
which shows a swing to the Liberals of 2.28%.
102
  
As might have been expected, Gladstone’s paper received widespread coverage 
in the newspapers; the coverage reflecting both his insistence on the importance of by-
elections, his continued assertions that the balance of public opinion was to be 
measured by their results and that they clearly showed a majority against the 
government’s foreign policies. After Gladstone’s broadside Skene made another 
attempted attack, repeating his arguments against Adam’s (and thereby Gladstone’s) 
figures, but the argument had moved on and the debate petered out at this point.
103
 
Whilst at times this debate had become somewhat arcane and must have tried the 
patience of some of its followers it is nevertheless important because it shows the 
importance to which by-election results had risen in political assessments and debate. 
It also demonstrates the growing use of aggregate electoral statistics together with 
Gladstone’s own interest and belief in their utility. 
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By-elections were of central importance to electoral politics between the 
Second and Third Reform Acts. They provide important insights into the development 
of electoral politics in a period in which the public political sphere become much more 
‘pluralistic, representative and responsive’.104 They were regarded by contemporaries, 
including politicians, commentators and the public, as important indicators of public 
opinion and as good predictors of the likely outcome of general elections. In the latter 
assumption they were generally justified. Sometimes individual by-election results 
needed careful interpretation because of the impact of important political issues of the 
day or because of the influence of particular local factors, but on the whole the results 
of by-elections immediately preceding general elections tended to be good predictors 
of the overall result of the general elections. This was particularly true of the period 
before the general election of 1874. The contests immediately before the 1880 general 
election, however, need care in their interpretation. Politicians used their results to 
make decisions – certainly they were considered by both Gladstone and Disraeli when 
making decisions on the timing of a dissolution. However, whilst there is no doubt 
both Prime Ministers used by-election results, ultimately Gladstone ignored their 
indications, called a general election and lost whilst Beaconsfield tried to interpret 
them, called a general election and also lost. They were also used to score political 
points and to mount attacks on the policies of opponents – by-elections were used this 
way in the run-up to the 1874 general election and during the heat of the debates over 
the Eastern Question. 
By-elections also functioned as laboratories for the development of new 
techniques such as those that were needed after the Ballot Act. Most importantly they 
played an important role in politics generally as forums of debate for key issues of the 
day. They tended to focus on the key issues of politics which were currently being 
debated and provided an important forum to do so when Parliament was not in session. 
Changes in modes of communications in this period both enabled and courage this 
role. Firstly, the communications revolution of the period ensured that news and debate 
from a single by-election was spread immediately across the country. Secondly, a 
single by-election with no other competing electoral news could achieve a degree of 
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publicity which was simply not possible at a general election when the sheer volume of 
results swamped the reporting of individual debates. This meant by-elections were 
both an agent of as well as a beneficiary of the nationalisation of politics in this period.  
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  Resolving political change Chapter VI
 
 
I Changes in the electoral environment 
 
The 1870s saw some of the most dramatic changes in British electoral politics in the 
nineteenth century. These changes set the course for the future development of 
electoral politics. The three general elections from 1868 to 1880 were conducted under 
a unique franchise which trebled the size of the electorate and which for the first time 
gave the vote to large numbers of working men. Each successive election produced a 
change in government and a precedent was set for British parliamentary politics when, 
for the first time, the incumbent prime minister resigned before parliament met. After 
the 1880 general election The Times succinctly made this point when it said: 
The moral of the past general election, as of its predecessor, is that the British people 
holds itself constantly free to commission the leaders, now of one party, now of 
another, to do its work. Those leaders must do the work for the people and in 
obedience to its spirit, not in accordance with their own pleasure.
1 
 
The electoral structure was significantly altered with the introduction of the 
secret ballot, the end of public nominations and the gradual development of the 
requirements of the franchise. These were accompanied by transformational changes in 
communications through the enormous growth in number and circulation of 
newspapers and the use of the electric telegraph. All these factors contributed to the 
development of national electoral politics and a lessening of the importance of the 
politics of place. They also resulted in huge changes in the development of party 
organisation - driven not only by the increase in the electorate but also through the 
changes in the framework of the electoral system, principally caused by the Ballot Act. 
 
II Changes in structure, language and organisation 
 
The Ballot Act undoubtedly reduced the frequency of violent incidents at election 
times. Its impact on corruption was perhaps less than intended by the Act’s supporters 
but it is probable that the nature of corruption changed. Before the Act bribing 
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individual electors had been a significant feature of electoral corruption. Proponents of 
the secret ballot thought this would be eliminated because, they argued, it would make 
no sense to bribe an individual when there was no way of knowing whether he had 
kept his side of the bargain by voting for a particular candidate. There does seem to 
have been a reduction in individual bribery but this was accompanied by an increase in 
other forms of corruption such as treating. As was suggested at the time, this meant 
that electoral malpractice became more wholesale and less retail. The impact of secret 
voting on intimidation is less clear. There is little evidence that secrecy significantly 
altered behaviour. However, this lack of evidence may equally be due to an over-
estimation of the impact of influence before the introduction of the Act rather than its 
failure to eliminate its impact. Certainly the legislation stopped the intimidation and 
threats inherent in the system of public voting and also disposed of the meaningless 
ritual of public nomination of candidates on the hustings. Lawrence suggested that this 
entailed the loss of a valuable means of political expression for non-voters.
2
 The 
crowds at the hustings had been composed of both electors and those not qualified to 
vote as well as including a significant proportion of women. He argued that the 
speeches given on the hustings by the candidates and the robust heckling provided an 
inclusive political atmosphere in which all could participate. When the returning 
officer called for a vote, for example, many of the disenfranchised would participate in 
the show of hands. The significance of the participation can, however, be overrated. By 
the time of the 1868 general election, the only general election held using public 
nomination and voting on the enlarged franchise, many who had previously attended 
the hustings in the boroughs were now enfranchised. Whilst an open show of hands 
was often called for when there was a contest between candidates it was always 
followed by the declaration of the need for a poll and the show of hands never decided 
an election. Similarly, it has not been possible to find an instance of a candidate 
standing down or being rejected at the hustings.   
We have seen in Chapters III and IV how, during this period, the language of 
electoral politics and party organisation began to develop significantly. We also saw in 
the Introduction how these changes were enabled and enhanced by the development of 
the press. If the change in the electoral environment brought about by legislative 
changes acted to improve popular participation in electoral politics then the 
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development of communications did the same. The 1870s were a golden age for 
British newspapers and their development privileged the development of print media 
as the principal mode of electoral communication.
3
 It liberated electors by providing 
much easier access to political debates and arguments, both by immediacy of access 
and by the sheer variety of views and opinions. Importantly, it also gave non-electors 
similar access to the electoral debate because the wider availability of newspapers and 
the significant reductions in their prices. It also gave non-electors similar access to the 
electoral debate. Vernon took a contrary view holding that English politics became 
‘progressively less democratic during this period as political subjectivities were 
defined in increasingly restrictive and exclusive fashions’.4 He thought that the 
development of the print media was an important factor in this process which was part 
of a closure of the public political sphere.
5
 This dissertation argues these views are 
wrong. Vernon claims that the growth of the press has been exaggerated and he was 
also ‘doubtful whether it created new or wider audiences’ because of the widespread 
collective use of papers since the eighteenth century.
6
 Chapter II argued that his 
arguments cannot be sustained in the face of the aggregate national statistics and the 
dramatic improvement in literacy rates in this period. This dissertation has taken the 
view that the most important change was the huge increase in the volume of available 
information and the transformation in its speed of transmission. These two factors 
enlarged the public sphere and enabled the debate and development of politics as did 
the multiplicity of political sympathies represented by the growth in the number of 
newspapers. This expansion of the public sphere and the importance of the press is 
show in Chapter III where the examination of candidates’ addresses demonstrates the 
growing importance of the nationalisation of political language which in this period 
was already significantly loosening the importance of the politics of place. The party 
leaders’ addresses connected this development to the parties’ ideas and language. 
The importance of this symbolism and language together with their 
connections to party organisation was discussed in the Introduction and Chapter IV, 
where we noted the emphasis placed by recent writing on electoral history on the role 
of parties in constructing their allegiances and support through the use of language and 
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ideas. The importance of party organisation in communicating with and responding to 
electors was crucial. Chapter III’s analysis of candidates’ addresses showed the 
linguistic differences in the parties’ strategies and appeals and particularly focussed on 
the development of Conservative language, which remains neglected by historians. 
This theme was also developed in Chapter IV which looked at the use of language and 
imagery in the development of Conservative working men’s associations. These two 
chapters show how the parties, particularly in this case the Conservatives, could be 
more flexible and adaptable than has sometimes been suggested. We have seen how 
the development of the newspaper industry dramatically changed electoral 
communications and this had its impact on the development of language and ideas. By 
way of example, Disraeli’s speech at the Crystal Palace in 1872 was subsequently 
reported in newspapers across the nation. Similarly, Gladstone’s Midlothian speeches 
of 1878 were reported across the country. These speeches were not just for the benefit 
of his Scottish electors, they were for the country as a whole and the newspapers 
ensured the whole country received them. 
These two major developments in the electoral environment and the changes in 
electoral language and communications had their impact on party organisation. The 
increase in the size of the electorate and the increase in the size of the working-class 
vote presented particular challenges. Historians have, however, focussed less on the 
impact of the Ballot Act on party organisation. Arguably, the changes brought by the 
secret ballot, which were described and analysed in Chapter II, had at least as much 
impact as the increase in the number of electors. Parties responded to these 
organisational demands on two different levels. Chapter IV described the 
developments of the 1870s in central party organisation with the appointment of 
central party agents, the formation of central offices and the creation of national 
organisations of constituency bodies. The chapter also focussed on the development of 
local party activity, particularly in the run-up to the 1867 Reform Act. This suggested 
that the parties were aware of the challenges that Reform might bring and were much 
more active in the constituencies than may have been previously thought. Local 
associations of both parties developed in this period. Chapter IV records how local 
Liberal Registration Associations were more common than had perhaps been 
previously thought. In the case of the Conservatives the development of Conservative 
working men’s associations showed an acute recognition at local levels of the 
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challenges that would come from bringing a conservative message to the newly-
enfranchised electorate. 
III General elections and electoral statistics 
A recurring theme of this study has been that there is much evidence that general 
elections were remarkably general and were becoming increasingly so as the period 
progressed. Chapter III showed how the issues discussed by candidates in their 
election addresses were remarkably consistent across the countries and regions of 
Great Britain and that there were many similarities between the issues that were 
considered important in England, Wales and Scotland. Perhaps even more strikingly, 
there were very few issues mentioned that could be regarded as purely local and 
specific to the constituency concerned. Chapter III also demonstrated how candidates 
most often followed the examples of their party leaders in the issues which they 
included in their addresses. In addition, we have seen how the language used by 
candidates of each party was also remarkably consistent across the country as was the 
imagery frequently used by party associations. 
Chapter V analysed by-elections during the period and these provide a good 
deal of evidence for the nationalisation of general elections. They were regarded by 
contemporary politicians, commentators and the public as good predictors of the likely 
outcome of general elections. This belief would have made no sense without the 
conviction that the results of an election in a single constituency were swayed by 
debates of a national character and that the electors of that constituency were in some 
way representative of the nation as a whole. This conviction was shared by Gladstone 
and Disraeli, both of whom paid attention to the predictive power of by-elections when 
deciding upon their timing in calling general elections. The generality of elections was 
also displayed by the topics debated most fiercely at by-elections. These were nearly 
always issues of a national nature and often reflected the debates that were taking place 
in Parliament at that time. Indeed, by-elections performed an important role as a forum 
for national debates when Parliament was not in session.    
Chapter I examined certain electoral statistics for the three general elections 
and used variations in turnout and electoral swing to analyse and discuss the results of 
the three general elections. An overriding feature of these statistics is their exceptional 
consistency across Great Britain. There were, of course, variations in the details, but 
broadly speaking, nationwide trends tended to be followed in the vast majority of 
constituencies. Thus, in 1874 the swing to the Conservatives varied from region to 
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region and from constituency to constituency, but that degree of variation was limited. 
Constituencies which exhibited a swing to the Liberals were exceptional. The 
conspicuous consistency of behaviour amongst voters across the regions and nations of 
Great Britain suggests that the individual politics of particular localities may not have 
been as important as nationwide factors. It also indicates the analytical power of these 
statistics since it is difficult to conceive of this aggregate picture arising from the total 
effect of a large number of random factors at play in individual constituencies. There is 
certainly no evidence that contemporaries thought this. 
Salisbury wrote in1884 in his article on the redistribution of seats that ‘the 
obtrusion of statistics upon the readers of the National Review requires some apology’, 
but nevertheless went on to use them at length to support his argument.
7
 This thesis has 
also taken the view that electoral statistics, used in an appropriate manner with relevant 
caveats, can also provide illuminating insights into the development and understanding 
of electoral politics. The results of elections are facts which historians ignore at their 
peril. This is not necessarily a fashionable view but the Introduction and Appendix I to 
this thesis show that two particular approaches deployed to undermine the use of 
electoral statistics, particularly for this period, are not necessarily valid. The first 
argument is usually based on the supposed invalidity of using of election results 
together with other information in order to draw certain sociological conclusions. This 
argument is usually found in discussions of electoral sociology and the example given 
of such improper use of statistics is almost always the work of Kenneth Wald.
8
 This 
thesis has not disputed this particular critique but simply observes that any refutation 
of such sociological quantitative analyses does nothing to invalidate the use of 
illuminating electoral statistics such as turnout and swing. The second argument has 
generally focussed on the difficulty of calculating electoral statistics for this period 
because of the prevalence of multi-member constituencies and the failure of the parties 
to always contest the maximum number of seats in a constituency. More importantly, 
this thesis has described and used a new and more complete methodology for the 
computation of such statistics from the election results of these constituencies. 
Appendix I describes the approach adopted which has allowed a more accurate 
calculation of these figures and which has suggested that a number of key national 
statistics contained in the only available resources for this period are inaccurate - and 
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indeed misleading. By way of example, it is suggested in Hanham that turnout at the 
1874 general election was 79%, an increase of 3% over 1868, whereas turnout in fact 
fell to 72%.
9
 In Rallings and Thrasher’s work on British Electoral Facts turnout in 
England at the 1880 general election is recorded as 71% when it was closer to 78%.
10
  
The analysis of multi-member constituencies and the trends in voting patterns 
in these constituencies over the period has also allowed some further insights into 
party strategies in this type of constituency. In particular, it has provided, as described 
in the Appendix, an explanation of why fielding a single candidate in a two-member 
constituency can be the optimum strategy in certain conditions. This tends to 
undermine Hanham’s contention that the fielding of single candidates in such 
constituencies was simply the result of poor organisation and implied that such 
constituencies were not properly contested.
11
     
IV The legacy of the 1870s 
 
The Introduction to this dissertation noted how Harold Hanham’s Elections and Party 
Management has remained for many years a key work on the electoral politics of the 
period. The wish to respond to this work in the context of later developments in 
historical writing on the electoral politics of the period provided a core motivation for 
this dissertation. Conducting research on the electoral politics of this period has 
emphasised the depth of Hanham’s research and scholarship and has shown how 
Elections and Party Management remains a valuable source. This dissertation has also 
taken issue with Hanham’s view on the nationalisation of electoral politics. He wrote: 
General elections were not general. Only about half the seats were contested by both 
parties, and even when both parties were in the field with the same number of 
candidates, local or regional or ‘national issues’ tended to be as important as those 




It was the intention of this dissertation to show that all of the components of 
this statement require substantial, if not complete modification. The preceding chapters 
have sought to show that the transition to national politics was well under way by the 
early 1870s. General elections had indeed become general. The expansion of the 
electorate, the development of communications, the progress of party organisation and 
                                                 
9
 Hanham, Elections, p. 193. 
10
 Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher, British Electoral Facts, p. 99. 
11
 Hanham, Elections, p. O/S. 
12
 Ibid, p. 191. 
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the evolution of political language all provided a basis for future developments in 











Appendix I Multi-member constituencies and psephological statistics 




I The issues arising in dealing with multi-member constituencies 
 
 
Multi-member constituencies have a long record in the history of Parliament and after 
the Second Reform Act the majority of English constituencies (163 constituencies or 
63%) still returned two members, 7 returned three or more and London returned four.
13
 
This was the case for the elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 until the Third Reform Act 
reduced the number of multi-member constituencies to 24. Such constituencies were 
less common in Scotland and Wales. There were only three Scottish boroughs 
returning more than one member and none in the Scottish counties.
14
 One Welsh 
Borough, Merthyr, returned two members, as did three Welsh counties and three 
university constituencies.
15
 Multi-member constituencies pose particular challenges 
and interests for students of political science and for historians of electoral politics in 
this period. These fall broadly into three categories. 
Firstly, the calculation of electoral statistics in these constituencies is more 
problematic than similar calculations in single member constituencies. In computing 
important psephological statistics such as turnout or a party’s share of the vote it is 
usual to use the total number of votes cast as a measure of the number of people 
voting. In a single-member constituency where an elector has a single vote, percentage 
turnout is easily calculated by simply dividing the number of votes cast by the number 
of registered electors. In a multi-member constituency, however, in order to derive the 
number of electors actually voting from the number of votes cast, it is necessary to 
make an assumption about the number of votes cast by each voter. For example, 
Rallings and Thrasher make the assumption that each voter casts two votes, the 
                                                 
13
 Bristol, for example, returned two members from 1295 to 1885. After the introduction of the so-called 
minority clause in the Second Reform Act each elector in a multi-member constituency had two votes 
(three in London) this meant that in three or four member constituencies the elector had fewer votes than 
the number of members to be elected which was the deliberate intent of the minority clause. See also  
Matthew Roberts, 'Resisting “Arithmocracy”: Parliament, Community, and the Third Reform Act',  
Journal of British Studies, 50 (2011), 381-409, and Salmon, '"Plumping Contests"'. 
14
 They were Glasgow (3), Dundee (2) and Edinburgh City. 
15
 The Welsh counties were Denbighshire (2), Carmarthenshire (2), Glamorganshire (2), Monmouthshire 
(2). The universities were Cambridge (2), University (2) and Dublin (2). 
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maximum number of votes an elector could cast in the majority of multi-member 
constituencies. In presenting their statistics for turnout they note the use of this 
methodology and recognise that it ‘makes no allowance for electors using fewer than 
the votes allowed to them’.16 They suggest that this method produces ‘a slight 
understatement of the number of electors voting as distinct from the numbers of votes 
cast’, but they provide no evidence to support the view that this understatement is 
‘slight’.17 In other words, this problem would not be so great if electors did mostly cast 
all of the votes available to them as they have assumed. The problem is they did not. In 
double-member constituencies one party would often put up a single candidate whilst 
their opponents fielded two. In these circumstances the supporters of the party of the 
single candidate usually cast only one vote, or ‘plumped’, for their single candidate. 
The other combinations of votes which electors used and the strategy of fielding single 
candidates are dealt with in more detail below but for present purposes it suffices to 
say that frequently half the electors in a constituency would cast one vote, and the 
other half would cast two. Most contemporary and later writers have recognised that 
measuring turnout in this situation using the total votes cast as a percentage of the 
electorate is completely meaningless.
18
 Similarly, measuring a party’s share of the vote 
when it has twice the number of votes of the opposition simply because it has fielded 
twice the number of candidates is equally meaningless. Most proposed solutions to this 
issue have agreed that all meaningful electoral statistics need to be based upon the 
number of voters casting ballots rather than the number of votes they each cast 
individually. Thus, for example, when one party fields a single candidate and the other 
two, a means needs to be found to determine how many electors voted for each party. 
This also has the benefit of making these elections more comparable to those after 
1884 when most constituencies became single-member seats. Section III of this 
Appendix is about the means that have been sought to solve this problem. 
The second significant feature of multi-member constituencies is the historical 
insight they provide on aspects of voter behaviour. For the 1868 general election a 
number of poll books are available which provide, inter alia, information on how 
individuals voted in multi-member seats. For the general elections of 1874 and 1880, 
after the 1872 Ballot Act, poll books were no longer used, but overall analyses of the 
                                                 
16
 Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher, British Electoral Facts, p. xvi. 
17
 Ibid, pp. xvi-xvii. 
18
 See, for example, Frisby, 'Voters not Votes' and Dunbabin, 'Parliamentary Elections in Great Britain'. 
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vote were sometimes made available by the returning officer and often published in the 
newspapers. In any case, this information shows the proportions of voters who cast 
their ballots in various ways open to them. Thus, for example, in a two member 
constituency contested by two Conservative candidates and two Liberal candidates, it 
shows how many voted for both candidates of each party, how many used only one of 
their votes and plumped for a single candidate and how many split their two vote 
between candidates of different parties. This data can provide valuable information on 
changes in national electoral behaviour over time and valuable insights into the 
electoral politics of the individual constituency concerned. For example, the trends in 
plumping and split-voting have been used in the formation of theories on the 
development of a party orientated electorate.
19
 The information for a particular 
constituency at an individual election may provide insights into the local political 
situation; a high rate of plumping or split voting perhaps indicating the electorate’s 
differing view of candidates of the same party.
20
   
Finally, a failure to recognise the complexities of party and voter electoral 
strategies in the tactics of voting and the number of candidates each party should field 
in a multi-member constituencies can lead to significant misunderstandings. Hanham, 
for instance, took the view that when a minority party fielded only a single candidate 
in such a constituency the seat was, as a result, ‘virtually uncontested’, and, he 
suggested, often indicated a lack of organisational strength. As will be shown, this was 
in fact often the optimum electoral strategy for a minority party, and, far from resulting 
in a lack of contest, was much more likely to lead to a highly competitive election, the 
                                                 
19
 The application of political science techniques to elections in British multi-member constituencies 
from 1832 to 1880 has been most thoroughly conducted by Gary Cox, particularly in Cox, The Efficient 
Secret; Gary W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts: Approval Voting in 
Practice?',  American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-738; Gary W. Cox, 'On the Use of 
Party Labels in Victorian England',  British Politics Group Newsletter,  (1985), 5-6 ; F.W.S. Craig and 
Gary W. Cox, 'Appendix 1: Analysis of Voting in Multi-Member Seats, 1874-1880', in F.W.S. Craig 
(eds), British Parliamentary Election Results, 1832-1885, (Dartmouth, 1988),  ; Gary W. Cox, 'The 
Development of Collective Responsibility in the U.K',  Parliamentary History, 13 (1993), 32-47 ; Gary 
W. Cox, 'A Comment on The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England: 
Letter to the Editor',  American Historical Review, 100 (1995), 1371-1373. 
20
 Hanham used Blackburn in 1880 as an example of the impact of local influence because of the 
disparity of the total votes given to the two successful Liberal candidates while noting in passing that 
only 3% of the voters had ‘given a straight party vote’. His argument would have been more convincing 
if, in his analysis of the poll, he had noted that nearly all of the split votes had gone to J. K. Cross, the 
sitting Liberal member, and T. L. Rushton, the unsuccessful Conservative candidate who had a strong 
local presence as a former mayor and alderman and was ‘universally known in the constituency’ and 
was ‘widely respected’. (Blackburn Standard, Darwen Observer, and North-East Lancashire Advertiser, 
3 April 1880; Hanham, Elections, p. 199. 
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expression of minority views and the gain of a seat by the minority party which might 
otherwise have been lost had two candidates been put forward.
21
   
Despite, or perhaps because of, these issues the questions arising from an 
electoral system dominated by multi-member seats have received little or no attention 
from historians. In fact, the most detailed attention has been given by Cox, who has 
spent his career as a political scientist.
22
 Hanham also recognised some of the issues 
involved with electoral statistics by using techniques developed by contemporary 
commentators.
23
 As shown below, however, these are themselves less than totally 
adequate and can give misleading indications. Importantly, we have also seen how 
these difficulties make comparisons between elections held under Second and Third 
Reform Acts respectively problematic and this may have lead historians to shy away 




This Appendix uses an individual election in a two member constituency in 
1874 to illustrate a number of the issues involved and uses this as a basis to examine 
various attempts that have been made to deal with these statistical issues. From this a 
new stratified voter methodology is proposed which provides a better means of 
calculation. This has been applied to all the relevant constituencies in England, Wales 
and Scotland and forms the basis for most of the statistics in this thesis. The remaining 
sections of the chapter deal with a number of issues connected with the calculation of 
electoral swing and a discussion of the strategic issues arising for parties and 
candidates in multi-member constituencies. 
 
II The 1874 general election in Pontefract 
 
The electors in the vast majority of multi-member constituencies had two votes, 
elected two members, could vote in any combination except voting twice for the same 
candidate and, importantly, could choose to cast a single vote only. Accordingly, in a 
typical two member constituency with two candidates from each party a voter had a 
possible 10 different voting options. He could cast a single vote, plumping for one of 
                                                 
21
 Hanham, Elections, p. 197. In a footnote Hanham says ‘the strategy of this was often disputed, as a 
candidate ran the risk of losing because his supporters gave their second vote to his opponents. On the 
other hand, there was always a chance in the counties and in the boroughs where the majority party was 
divided, that a single candidate might attract ‘protest votes’’, p. 197. 
22
 See for instance, Cox, The Efficient Secret. 
23
 Hanham, Elections; Dunbabin, 'Parliamentary Elections in Great Britain'. 
24
 See the Introduction to this thesis.  
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the candidates (4 possibilities) or he could use both his votes selecting one of the 6 
possible combinations, two of which meant a straight party vote and four of which 
involved ‘splitting’ his votes between candidates from rival parties. 
The psephological issues arising from these potential voting options may be illustrated 
by the case of an individual constituency. Pontefract was a small two member borough 
with 2,038 electors registered for the general election of 1874. At the 1868 general 
election the Liberals had fielded two candidates and the Conservatives one. The 
resulting poll split the representation between the parties, electing H.C. E. Childers for 
the Liberals and Major Samuel Waterhouse for the Conservatives.
25
 At the general 
election of 1874 Childers and Waterhouse stood again with Viscount Pollington also 
standing as a second Conservative. Childers and Waterhouse were again returned as 
members, and, at this election the detailed analysis of the vote count was recorded and 
published enabling us to analyse the vote combinations used by the Pontefract electors. 
Pontefract’s vote count for 1874 is shown in Table A-1. 
 
Table A-1: Pontefract – 1874 Vote Count 
 
Candidates Voting Combinations  
 Plumpers 
Split 
C + W 
Split 
C + P 
Straight 
W + P 
Total 
Votes 
Childers (L) 699 182 53 0 934 
Waterhouse (C) 60 182 0 619 861 
Pollington (C) 37 0 53 619 709 
 796 364 106 1238 2504 
Stratified analysis of voters 
casting two votes      
Childers (L)/Waterhouse (C) 182     
Childers (L)/Pollington (C) 53     
Waterhouse (C)/Pollington (C) 619     
 854     
      
Total Persons Voting 1650     
Sources and  notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885 
and Cox, Efficient Secret, p. 96. 
 
As the table shows, in this example a number of voters chose to split their votes 
between candidates of different parties, thus, 182 voted for Childers and Waterhouse 
and 53 for Childers and Pollington. This gave a total of 235 voters splitting their vote. 
In addition, Conservative voters had the opportunity to use both their votes to vote for 
                                                 
25
 As described in Chapter II there was also a by-election in Pontefract in 1872.  
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Conservative candidates, however some chose to vote only for one of these candidates. 
These plumpers totalled 97 (Waterhouse 60 and Pollington 37). The table also shows 
that, based on this analysis, the total number of electors voting was 1650. As has been 
noted this is an important aggregate since it is used to calculate a number of electoral 
statistics such as turnout and each party’s share of the vote. 
For the majority of elections in the period under consideration only the total 
votes cast for each candidate were recorded. In the Pontefract example these were 
Childers 934, Waterhouse 861 and Pollington 709, a total of 2504 votes cast. As we 
have seen, in a single-member constituency where a voter has a single vote the 
aggregate number of votes cast accurately represents the number of voters casting their 
vote. In a multi-member constituency matters are more complicated because the 
aggregate number of votes cast bears a more complex relationship to the number of 
voters voting. As noted above, one method of doing this is to assume that each voter 
uses the maximum number of votes available to them and divide the aggregate number 
of votes cast by this amount. Thus, in the Pontefract example, each elector had two 
votes and a total of 2504 votes were cast, giving the number of electors voting as 1252. 
With an electorate in 1874 of 2038 this would imply a turnout percentage of 61.4%. In 
fact, because of the availability of the poll count we know that 1650 persons voted, 
giving a turnout percentage of 81.0%. This aptly demonstrates the substantial 
inaccuracy of the method adopted by Rallings and Thrasher. In this case it is plainly 
due to the fact that a large number of electors plumped for a single candidate, using 
only one of their votes. Thus, most Liberal supporters, but not all, plumped for 
Childers.  
A second example of the complications of calculating electoral statistics in 
multi-member constituencies is the calculation of the percentage share of the total vote 
gained by each party. This is an important statistic as it is often used to measure the 
electoral swing between parties from one election to the next.
26
 In the case of 
Pontefract the Conservatives polled a total of 1570 votes out of a total of 2504 votes, 
giving them on this basis a 62.79% share of the poll. This is clearly misleading 
because, as noted, most Liberal supporters did not wish to use their second vote. In 
order to produce sensible statistics which are comparable to elections in single member 
constituencies it is necessary to compute the parties’ relative shares of the vote based 
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 A detailed analysis of the different methods of calculating electoral swing is set out below. 
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upon the number of persons voting rather than the numbers of votes cast. Thus, in the 
case of Pontefract, there was a total of 1650 electors who voted, of whom 833 voted 
Conservative, giving the Conservatives 50.5% of the poll.
27
 
It will be apparent that these measurement difficulties arise when voters decide 
to split their votes or to plump for a single candidate which requires an adjustment to 
be made to the recorded number of votes cast in order to determine the number of 
voters voting for each party.
28
 Plumping often occurred because a voter did not wish to 
vote for any other candidate even if another representing their party preference was 
available or because there was only one candidate of their party available. This latter 
reason was a significant issue in the general elections under consideration for it was 
common for parties to field an unequal number of candidates, the party that perceived 
itself to be in the minority frequently fielding a single candidate in a double-member 
constituency.
29
 Equally, split voting could arise simply because of a voter’s preference 
for a candidate irrespective of their particular allegiance. The next section details the 
proposals that have been made to solve this problem. In order to do this it is necessary 
to introduce two statistics, developed by Cox, which provide a useful means of 
discussing this issue.
30
 These he termed the Non-partisan Plumping Rate (NPPR) and 
the Split Voting Rate (SVR). The NPPR expresses, as a percentage of the number of 
total voting electors, the number of electors who cast only a single vote (or plumped) 
when another candidate of their chosen party was potentially available for their other 
vote. The SVR expresses, as a percentage of the number of total voting electors, the 
number of electors who split their votes between candidates of different parties. It will 
be seen that these two statistics in essence measure the deviation of the electorate from 
straight party voting. The derivation of these statistics may be illustrated using the 
example of the 1874 Pontefract election as follows. 
In Table A-2 below further analyses the 1874 results in Pontefract and shows 
that 235 electors cast one vote for the Liberal Childers and one vote for one of the 
                                                 
27
 The Conservative plumpers amounted to 97; 619 voted for the Conservative ticket of Waterhouse and 
Pollington; and 117.5 split their votes with the Liberal giving a total of 833.5 rounded down to 833. 
28
 As we have noted it is for this reason the percentage shares of the aggregate vote given in Colin 
Rallings and Michael Thrasher, British Electoral Facts for the general elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 
need to be treated with extreme caution since they make no adjustment for this complication which 
makes their comparison with later elections hazardous. Nor are they comparable between themselves 
because the number and location of constituencies where there was an unequal number of candidates 
varied from election to election. 
29
 Also see Salmon, '"Plumping Contests"' for a more extensive discussion of plumping. 
30
 Cox, The Efficient Secret, pp. 91-92. 
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Conservative candidates. Expressed as a percentage of the total electors voting of 
1650, this gives an SVR of 14.2%. Similarly, it shows that 97 electors chose to cast 
only a single vote for one of the Conservatives when another Conservative candidate 
was available. Expressed as a percentage of the total electors voting of 1650, this gives 
an NPPR of 5.9%. 
  
Table A-2: The calculation of the Split Voting Rate and the Non-partisan 
Plumping Rate at Pontefract 
 
Total Persons Voting  
Childers (L)/Waterhouse (C) (Split) 182 
Childers (L)/Pollington (C) (Split) 53 
Waterhouse (C)/Pollington (C) (Straight) 619 
 854 
  
Total Persons Voting 1650 
  
Split Voting Rate (SVR)  
Childers (L)/Waterhouse (C) 182 
Childers (L)/Pollington (C) 53 
 235 
  
Split Voting Rate (SVR) 14.2% 
  
Non-partisan Plumping Rate (NPPR)  
Waterhouse (C) 60 
Pollington (C) 37 
 97 
  
Non-partisan Plumping Rate (NPPR) 5.9% 
Sources and  notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885 
and Cox, Efficient Secret, p. 96. 
 
The following section now examines the different methods which have been used to 
attempt to deal with these issues. 
III Methods of dealing with electoral statistics in multi-member constituencies 
 
We have already discussed a more recent attempt by Rallings and Thrasher to 
solve this problem and that they make no mention neither of how serious the 
deficiencies in their methodology might be. Their approach, which it will be recalled 
assumes that electors cast two votes, might be satisfactory if the parties had always 
fielded a number of candidates equal to the seats available and if voters had always 
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used their two votes, voting for the one of the other party when they had only one ‘first 
choice’ available. In fact, as we have seen, both these assumptions are invalid. 
Recalculations of all the results for the elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880, as discussed 
below, suggest that the differences arising from their methodology are likely to be 
significant. For instance, using the stratified voter methodology applied in this thesis 
(described further below) across all relevant constituencies in England the Liberal 
share of the vote in 1874 was 52.0% not 55.4% as suggested by Rallings and Thrasher. 
Contemporary commentators were also perfectly well aware of these problems and one 
of the first attempts to deal with the matter systematically was proposed by John 
Biddulph Martin in a paper read to the Statistical Society in May 1874. This dealt with 
the results of the 1868 and 1874 general elections, the latter having taken place only 
three months previously.
31
 The methodology used by Martin and his results are also 
relevant because they were repeated by Hanham and have , because of the popularity 
of Hanham’s work, become a frequently quoted source of statistical results for the 
three general elections in question.
32
 Martin identified the core issue of measuring 
votes in multi-member constituencies noting that ‘it is obvious that the number of 
votes is only in a very few cases an index of the number of voters’.33 Martin’s 
approach was to draw overall conclusions about the general election as a whole by 
considering only a sample of constituencies. His method of selection was to choose 
firstly, English boroughs ‘returning one member which were contested at each election 
by one candidate of each party’; secondly, large English boroughs returning more than 
one member and contested at each election and ‘contested by a number of candidates 
of each party not exceeding the number of seats, the highest number of votes given to a 
candidate of either party being taken as an index of the strength of the party’34 ; and, 
finally, English, Welsh and Scottish Counties together with Irish Boroughs on a similar 
basis. Fortuitously, for comparative purposes the constituencies in this selection were 
also similarly contested at the 1880 election so that Hanham was able to update 
Martin’s original calculations for that election. The unique features of Martin’s 
methodology in dealing with multi-member constituencies are, therefore, that only a 
selection of constituencies are included and only the votes polled by the candidate of 
each party recording the highest number of votes are used in the analysis to give an 
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 Martin, 'The Elections of 1868 and 1874'. 
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 Hanham, Elections, pp. 192-197. 
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 Martin, 'The Elections of 1868 and 1874', p. 196. 
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 Ibid, p. 196. 
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index of the strength of the party.
35
 In other words, if a party put forward two 
candidates in a two member seat then the votes given to the highest polling candidate 
of the two are used as a ‘proximately accurate’ index of the strength of the party and 
the votes of the second candidate are ignored.
36
 
Hanham’s 1959 work used Martin’s analysis to present a series of statistical 
tables seeking to reflect the electoral changes shown by the general elections of 1868, 
1874 and 1880.
37
 The information was based on Martin’s rather small sample of 
constituencies but Hanham thought this could give ‘a more or less scientific analysis, 
in the minority of constituencies which were contested at every election by sufficient 
candidates to enable us to say that the contest was a party contest as well as a local 
one’.38 He recognised that the sample did not necessarily cover all types of 
constituencies but asserted that the value of his analyses lay in ‘the tendencies they 
point to, not in their representative character’.39 
There are severe frailties with this analysis. There are few grounds on which 
the sample can be regarded as necessarily representative as a basis for the general 
conclusions which are drawn from it. The sample on which all of Hanham’s 
conclusions are based is made up of 47 constituencies in Great Britain whereas there 
are 119 other constituencies which were contested at both the 1868 and 1874 general 
elections which meet the specified criteria but which, for reasons which are unclear, 
Martin and Hanham decided not to include. One speculation is that Martin did not 
have available the size of the electorate for these constituencies, a figure which he 
needed to calculate turnout. He notes in his paper that the official return had not yet 
been published at the time of his presentation and he also estimated the electorate for a 
number of the constituencies which he did include.
40
 However, no attempt was made 
by Hanham to update the data for information which was obviously later available or 
for the further 168 constituencies which were contested in 1874 and 1880 and which 
also met the specified criteria. Finally, there are other more detailed errors. For 
example, one of the constituencies in the sample used by Hanham was Halifax where 
in 1868 Edward Owen Greening stood as an independent labour candidate, receiving 
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strong support from local labour activists and old Chartists.
41
 Unfortunately, Greening 
was classified by Hanham and Martin as a Conservative and the votes he received 
were erroneously used in calculating the Conservative share of the poll.
42
 
As a result, the utility of these statistics, which have found their way into much 
of the subsequent literature, is highly questionable. The differences in the figures can 
be significant. For example, Hanham presents a table showing turnout at the three 
general elections which shows that turnout increased from 76.43% in 1868 to 79.26% 
in 1874.
43
 In fact, all the other measures of turnout for this period show that turnout 
fell significantly from 1868 to 1874. Ralling and Thrasher suggest that it fell from 
68.5% in 1868 to 66.6% in 1874.
44
 Using the method utilised for this thesis turnout fell 
from 74.6% in 1868 to 71.8% in 1874. The swing to the Conservatives in Great Britain 
at the 1874 General Election is suggested by Hanham as 4.69% whereas, using what is 
suggested below to be a more accurate method, the figure is 6.61%.
45
 
The next approach to the issue was developed by Alfred Frisby in an article 
published in the Contemporary Review in 1880.
46
 Frisby’s identification of the 
problem is clear in the title of his paper ‘Voters not Votes’ and his explanation of the 
difficulties arising where the parties field disparate numbers of candidates.
47
 His 
method was also resurrected by Dunbabin in his 1966 article ‘Parliamentary Elections 
in Great Britain, 1868-1900: A Psephological Note
’
, which appeared in The English 
Historical Review in 1966.
48
 This article surveys movements in political opinion from 
1868 to 1900 and uses Frisby’s method and statistics to determine the swings between 
the Liberal and Conservative parties over the years 1868 to 1884, before the Third 
Reform Act. The method used by Frisby is described by Dunbabin as follows: ‘He 
grosses the votes cast in any given constituency for the various candidates of the same 
party, and divides by the number of votes each elector possessed’. In fact, this is a 
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seriously incomplete summary of Frisby’s methodology for he also adjusts for the 
number of candidates fielded by the parties. Thus, in a constituency where, for 
example, the Conservatives fielded two candidates and the Liberals only one, the 
Conservative vote would be divided by two and the Liberal vote by only one (being 
the lesser of the votes an elector possessed and the number of candidates fielded by the 
party). This accuracy is significant because it is the part of the method which makes 
the Frisby method intuitively attractive. It is also important because, as discussed 
above, parties frequently only fielded one candidate in constituencies where they 
considered themselves weaker than the opposition. It is important to note that these are 
the only adjustments that Frisby makes. His methodology implicitly assumes that 
electors of the minority party allocate all their votes to a single party, that is to say it 
makes no allowance for split voting and plumping. 
Frisby bases his calculations of swings only on those constituencies that were 
contested by both political parties in all of the general elections during the period in 
question.
49
 The use of the phrase ‘during the period in question’ is important in this 
context. In his 1880 article ‘Voters not Votes’, Frisby makes a comparison of the 1874 
and 1880 general elections using only constituencies in Great Britain that were 
contested at both these elections. In his 1881 article ‘Has Conservatism increased’, he 
makes a comparison between the general elections of 1868 and 1880 using 
constituencies in England which were contested at both those elections. It is not clear 
on what basis Dunbabin has calculated the relative shares of the vote for the general 
elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880. In his 1880 article Frisby shows a lead at the 1874 
general election for the Conservatives over the Liberals of 0.01% for constituencies 
contested in both the 1868 and 1874 elections. Dunbabin shows a lead of 0.38%. It has 
not been possible to recreate Dunbabin’s result under any combinations of Frisby’s 
figures or by using data from Craig. 
Frisby’s methodology, therefore, takes into account only constituencies 
contested at all three elections between 1868 and 1880. This thesis takes the view that 
this is unnecessarily restrictive and is likely to lead to misrepresentation of movements 
in political opinion. The total votes and shares of the vote achieved by the parties at 
each general election have no absolute value because of the number of uncontested 
seats. Thus, the percentage of electors who voted for a party at a general election 
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cannot accurately tell us about the percentage of electors in the country who support 
that party because of the unknown number of those supporters who were unable to 
register their vote in uncontested constituencies. However, this will not affect the 
validity of the swing between two elections provided that it is measured using 
constituencies which were contested at both elections, since it is a measure of the 
change in opinion of a (very large) sample of voters. Accordingly, swing is most 
effectively measured by using constituencies contested at both elections in pairs of 
successive elections. Thus, in measuring the swing between 1868 and 1874, 
constituencies contested at both elections are used and in measuring the swing between 
1874 and 1880 constituencies contested at both those elections are used, but it is not 
necessary that they are the same constituencies for all three elections. This is an 
important implicit assumption which goes to the heart of the utility of electoral 
statistics for it holds that the aggregation of data across individual constituencies is a 
valid and meaningful procedure. 
This review of the various methodologies which have been used in calculating 
electoral statistics for multi-member constituencies suggests that the Frisby 
methodology is the most accurate in seeking to base these statistics on the number of 
voters rather than the votes cast. It is possible, however, to potentially enhance this 
analysis further by the application of three further improvements. It has been seen that 
the primary difficulty with the Frisby methodology is that it takes no account of split 
voting and plumping. The first improvement therefore is to use actual poll analyses for 
each constituency showing split voting and plumping, where these are available. The 
evidence of plumping and splitting may be gained by using poll books, where these are 
available, and for elections after the Ballot Act in 1872, by using records of vote 
counts which were sometimes recorded and published. Cox has surveyed all the 
available poll records for elections covering the period 1832-1910. His work shows 
that for the elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880 vote counts for a significant percentage 
of multi-member constituencies are available.
50
 This has enabled Cox to calculate the 
SVR and NPPR for all available vote counts for each of the 1868, 1874 and 1880 
general elections. These results are summarised in Table A-3 below. The first column 
shows the percentage of all double-member contests for which vote counts are 
available. The second and third columns show the SVR and NPPR respectively for 
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these constituencies. The remaining columns show these statistics for boroughs and 
counties respectively. The results for the general elections of 1859 and 1865 have been 
included for comparative purposes and illustrate the rapid decline in the SVR. The 
table also shows the relative stability of these measures over the three general elections 
under consideration. 
 
Table A-3: SVR and NPPR statistics 
 

















1859 † 11.6 5.3 13.6 6.3 6.2 2.4 
1865 † 8.5 4.8 10.3 6.5 6.3 2.7 
1868 47 5.5 4.2 6.0 4.7 5.2 3.8 
1874 47 4.8 4.1 5.1 5.0 4.2 2.2 
1880 61 4.5 2.3 4.7 2.8 4.3 1.8 
† Figures not comparable. Sources and  notes: Cox, Efficient 
Secret, pp. 99-110; F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary 
Election Results 1832-1885; own calculations.         
 
The available vote counts also cover a reasonable proportion of the number of voters in 
multi-member constituencies. Taking the total number of votes for which actual vote 
counts are available as a percentage of the total number of voters in all multi-member 
constituencies is about 50% for each of the three general elections.   
Next, the application of the Frisby method in the Pontefract example points to a 
second potential improvement. Table A-4 shows the application of the Frisby 
methodology in this example and shows that the calculation of the number of persons 
voting under this methodology is 1719 as compared to the actual figure of 1650 which 






Table A-4: The application of the Frisby methodology to the Pontefract 
example 
 
 Total Candidates Frisby Adjusted  
248 
 
Votes Votes (FAV)/Persons 
Voting 
    
Liberals (Childers) 934 1 934 
    
Conservatives (Waterhouse 
+  
Pollington) 1570 2 785 
    
Totals 2504  1719 
Sources and  notes: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-
1885 and Cox, Efficient Secret, p. 96. 
 
It can be seen that the difference between the actual number of persons voting 
and the Frisby calculation of the number of persons voting is a function of the number 
of persons casting only a single vote for the Conservative candidates and the number 
of persons splitting their votes between the parties. These differences can be 
represented by statistics developed by Cox which were discussed previously. It may be 
shown that there is a formula based on the SVR and the NPPR, which when applied to 
the number of persons voting as calculated under the Frisby method gives the correct 
number of persons voting. Thus, in the above table the Frisby Adjusted Votes (FAV) 
are 934 and 785 for the Liberals and Conservatives respectively. The correct number 
of votes for each party can be obtained by applying the formula (FAV*2)/((SVR-
NPPR)+2) where FAV is the simple Frisby Adjusted Vote, SVR is the Split Voting 
Rate and NPPR is the Non-Partisan Plumping Rate. Thus, applying this formula with 
an SVR of 14.2% and a NPPR of 5.9% to the Frisby calculated voters of 1719 will 
produce the correct figure for the number of voters of 1650. 
Of course we do not know the SVR or NPPR for every multi-member 
constituency (if we did the Frisby method would not be needed in the first place). It is 
suggested here that because Cox has obtained a relatively large sample of results (as 
shown in the table above) and the remarkable stability of the statistics, it would not be 
inappropriate to use the overall figures for SVR and NPPR as a surrogate for the 
individual statistics for an individual constituency where the actual figures are not 
available. This use of a surrogate to amend the actual figures together with the use of 
the actual poll counts where they are available is a feature of the innovative 
methodology employed to compute the electoral statistics used in this thesis. In other 
words, where vote counts are available these have been used to calculate the relevant 
statistics and where vote counts are not available the average  SVRs and NPPRs for 
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that year, as calculated by Cox, have been used as a surrogate for the actual SVRs and 
NPPRs in order to estimate the relevant numbers of voters for each constituency. 
In summary, the electoral statistics used in this thesis have been calculated 
using the actual recorded votes for single-member constituencies and the adjusted 
recorded votes for multi-member constituencies. The actual recorded votes for multi-
member constituencies are used where records of the relevant vote counts are 
available. Where these vote counts are not available the recorded votes are adjusted 
using a Frisby method which is then modified by the use of SVR and NPPR statistics.  
IV The calculation of electoral swing 
 
In this thesis electoral swing or ‘swing’ is measured as the percentage change 
in a party’s share of the adjusted total vote between one election and another. The 
adjusted total vote is calculated on the basis described in the previous section of this 
Appendix, which, in essence, adjusts the votes cast in multi-member constituencies 
where parties field numbers of candidates which are different from the number of seats 
available in the constituency. This methodology, which measures the swing as the 
percentage change in one party’s share of the total vote is sometimes referred to as 
Butler swing, after David Butler who used this method in a number of his 
psephological works.
51
 This method is sometimes contrasted with Steed swing, named 
after Michael Steed, a British psephologist, which measures the swing between two 
parties based only on the total votes cast for those two parties. This method therefore 
excludes the votes cast for other parties.
52
 Since virtually all the elections in Great 
Britain from 1868 to 1880 were contested only by the Liberal and Conservative parties 
both the Butler and Steed methods will produce, to all intents and purposes, the same 
results for these elections. Thus, in this thesis, swing is measured by the percentage 
change from one election to another in one party’s share of the vote, which will, of 
course, be equal and opposite to the change in the other party’s share.53 
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The question then arises as to how to measure the overall swing over a number 
of elections in a group of different constituencies. This question is important because it 
arises in any circumstances which seek to measure a party’s share of the vote at any 
level above that of an individual constituency – for example, a party’s share of the vote 
in a particular set of constituencies (for example, a region) or at a general election or a 
set of by-elections in a particular year. In these circumstances there are a number of 
different ways to calculate an average for swing. The methods addressed here, and 
those generally used in the literature, are, for a set of individual constituency results, 
the weighted average (where the swing in each individual constituency is weighted by 
the total votes cast, or perhaps the total electorate, in that constituency), the arithmetic 
mean and the median. 
Since this issue is under discussion in the context of elections from 1868 to 
1880, two important issues should be noted. Firstly, there was an enormous disparity in 
size between the electorates of different constituencies. At the extremes, based on the 
number of registered electors for the 1880 general election, the smallest constituency 
in Great Britain was Sutherlandshire with an electorate of 326 and the largest was 
Liverpool with an electorate of 63,946. The electorates in other constituencies 
followed a broad range within these two points. After the 1885 Redistribution Act the 
uniformity of constituency size becomes an increasing feature of the British electoral 
system. Accordingly, for elections before 1885 consideration needs to be given to 
whether the results of a large constituency should be given more weight than those of a 
smaller one when attempting to give a picture of the overall position, whereas from 
1885 onwards this is a less important issue. Secondly, in Victorian and Edwardian 
elections seats were often uncontested and plainly, at an individual constituency level, 
a swing can only be calculated for those constituencies which had a contest at the 
relevant elections between which it is wished to make a comparison. This issue needs 
to be borne in mind when comparing results over more than two elections, and as we 
saw previously, for the seats contested at both of the first pair of elections may not be 
the same as those contested at the second pair. 
The three different measures of the average swing all appear to have been used 
in the literature although, as will be argued, below the weighted average method is the 
one which makes most sense in the context of elections where there is a considerable 
discrepancy in constituency size. In Pippa Norris’s work the share of the vote of each 
party is calculated for each constituency and the arithmetic mean of these figures is 
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taken as the average for a particular year or parliamentary term.
54
 Therefore, in this 
case, changes in the share of the vote or swings are calculated on an un-weighted basis. 
Butler and Kavanagh, in their volumes on British General Elections, analyse changes 
in the share of the vote by a broad range of classes including different categories of 
geographical location and types of constituencies. In calculating the shares of the votes 
of the parties in each category the aggregate votes given for each party in each 
constituency are aggregated for the category and the relative shares calculated using 
these totals.
 55
 Therefore, the changes in the shares of the vote or swings are calculated 
on a weighted average basis. It has been further suggested that, in at least one instance, 
Butler appears to have used the median of the swings in each individual constituency. 
56
 This appears to be supported by his tables in another of his works where, when 
presenting statistics for the overall swing between general elections, he refers to the 
mean swing.
57
 Finally, Dunbabin refers to the unequal size of constituencies before 
1885 and notes that when calculating the overall annual swing for by-elections 
between 1868 and 1885, he will give a note when there is ‘the possibility that the result 
in one large division may obscure the general picture’.58 Although he does not describe 
his method of averaging the swings in individual constituencies it is difficult to 
understand the necessity of this remark unless he used a weighted average method.  
There appears, therefore, to be no consistently agreed method on the 
calculation of averages of percentage shares of the vote and, therefore, swings for 
collections of individual constituencies, nor does the subject appear to have received a 
great deal of debate. One strong reason for this may be that, as already mentioned, if 
constituencies are all of similar size there will be little difference between the results 
obtained by a weighted average method and those obtained by taking the arithmetic 
mean of the individual constituency results. Indeed, if all constituencies had exactly 
the same number of voters and turnouts were exactly the same then the figures 
obtained using the arithmetic mean and the weighted average would be exactly the 
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same. However, in circumstances where there is a significant disparity between 
constituency sizes and/or turnout the weighted average method is most likely to give 
useful results for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it simply seems intuitively wrong to give the same historical weight to 
an election result in Harwich, with an electorate in 1868 of 622, as that of Hackney, 
with an electorate in 1868 of 40,613. Secondly, the purpose of calculating swings for a 
whole general election, for a region or for some other sub-division of constituencies is 
surely to seek to help to give indications of the nature of political change in that region 
as a whole which means that results must be aggregated and weighted averages used. 
So far as concerns by-elections, contemporary commentators and politicians wished to 
know what indications election results gave for future political change in all 
constituencies and whilst extrapolation from a small number of results is always 
hazardous, it is surely better to place more weight, for these purposes, on the results 
from more populous constituencies. 
 
V Party strategy in multi-member constituencies 
 
There were a number of reasons why a party might put up a single candidate, 
rather than two, in a double-member constituency. There are good strategic and 
theoretical reasons which make such an approach the optimal strategy in particular 
circumstances, as well as some good practical reasons which may also have influenced 
the situation in some constituencies. These practical reasons included the availability 
of candidates, expense and lack of information, and are factors which could give rise to 
a decision by a party not to contest a seat at all, and which are dealt with in more detail 
in the Section of Chapter I of this thesis which deals with uncontested seats. Typically, 
these factors worked in conjunction with one another. Thus, in an age when a 
candidate had to fund most of his own election expenses (which in the elections under 
consideration could be considerable) the lack of candidates could be due to the lack of 
anyone willing to risk considerable sums in a hopeless cause. Of course, whether the 
cause was hopeless or not depended on estimates of local opinion and indications from 
the results of previous elections and this information could be sketchy or very old 
because, for example, a constituency had not been contested for some time. In such 
circumstances a party might have put up a single candidate in order to test opinion at 
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least cost. Such a motivation seems, for example, to have been behind the Liberal 
decision to contest Lincolnshire North in 1880 since the constituency and its 
predecessors had not been contested since well before the Second Reform Act.
59
 In any 
event, the purpose of obtaining such information was to be able to make the optimal 
strategic decision in the circumstances. 
The incentive to cross vote did not exist when there were two candidates from 
both parties, and it was often argued that running a single candidate was bad strategy, 
since the ‘second votes of one’s own partisans might be the cause of defeat’.60 Hanham 
similarly suggested that, in relation to running single candidates in two member 
constituencies: 
The strategy of this was often disputed, as a candidate ran the risk of losing because 
his supporters gave their second vote to his opponents. On the other hand, there was 
always a chance in the counties and in the boroughs where the majority party was 
divided, that a single candidate might attract ‘protest votes.61 
 
Hanham did not give any contemporary references for these views and the purpose of 
this section is to examine the issue from first principles as well as in the light of 
available electoral evidence. Given the number of two-against-one contests in two 
member constituencies period understanding the logic of party strategy in deciding on 
the number of candidates to field is important to understanding the nature of electoral 
politics in this period.
62
 
The potential benefits of running a single candidate strategy in a two member 
seat can be seen with the use of a simple example. For this illustration an imaginary 
constituency is assumed which has 2100 electors who support the Conservative party 
and 1900 electors who support the Liberals. In the simplest case in which the 
supporters of each party vote for both of their candidates the Conservatives would 
obviously always win. In reality we know that electors sometimes only used one of 
their votes, voting for a single candidate, and sometimes they split their votes between 
candidates of different parties. Thus, to make the example more realistic it is assumed 
that 240 of the Conservative supporters will split their votes equally between a 
Conservative candidate and a Liberal candidate, which implies a split voting rate of 
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11.4%. Similarly, it is further assumed that 80 of the Liberal supporters will split their 
votes equally between a Conservative candidate and a Liberal candidate, which implies 
a split voting rate of 4.2%. Finally, it is assumed that four Conservative supporters and 
four Liberal supporters will plump for a single candidate from their own party and that 
the remainder of the voters will vote on party lines, casting both of their votes for 
candidates of their own party. Table A-5 then sets out the election result on these 
assumptions. This shows a victory for the Conservatives returning both of their 
candidates each with 1980 votes compared to the Liberals’ 1940 votes. 




Voters Splitters SVR Plumpers NPPR Party Vote 
Conservatives 2100 240 11.43% 80 3.81% 1780 
Liberals 1900 80 4.21% 80 4.21% 1740 
 
4000 320 8.00% 160 4.00% 3520 
 
 
Plumpers C1+C2 L1+L2 C1+L1 C1+L2 C2+L1 C2+L2 Votes 





C2 40 1780 
   
















160 3560 3480 160 160 160 160 7840 
Double 
Votes         
C1+C2 1780 
      
 
C1+L1 60 
      
 
C1+L2 60 
      
 
C2+L1 60 
      
 
C2+L2 60 
      
 
C1+L1 20 
      
 
C1+L2 20 
      
 
C2+L1 20 
      
 
C2+L2 20 
      
 
L1+L2 1740 
      
 





      
 
 
It is now instructive to consider what the result of this election would be if the 
Liberals were to field only a single candidate. The same assumptions are used as in the 
four candidate example, thus it has been assumed that the Conservative supporters who 
had previously decided to split their votes continue to do so, except of course that one 
of their split votes now goes to the single Liberal candidate rather than being split 
between two Liberal candidates and that the Liberal supporters who previously 
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plumped for a single Liberal candidate continue to vote for the single candidate rather 
than abstain. Table A-6 sets out the result of this illustrative election. 
 




Voters Splitters SVR Plumpers NPPR Party Vote 
Conservatives 2100 240 11.43% 80 3.81% 1780 
Liberals 1900 240 12.63% 80 4.21% 1580 
 










C1 40 1780 
 
240 
   
2060 
C2 40 1780 















       
C1+C2 1780        
C1+L1 120        
C2+L1 120        
C1+L1 120        
C2+L1 120        
Total 
persons 
voting 4000        
 
 
It can be seen from Table A-6 that the Liberal candidate is now elected, 
gaining 2140 votes compared to 2060 votes for each of the Conservatives. It is also 
evident that this arises because, with all other things being equal, a single Liberal 
candidate receives all of the split votes of the Conservative supporters rather than these 
being divided between the two Liberal candidates. It can also be seen that this 
outweighs the impact of increasing the split voting rate amongst Liberal supporters. 
The single Liberal candidate receives an additional 12 votes from Conservative split 
voters and an extra 4 votes from the original Liberal split voters who transfer their split 
vote to the sole remaining Liberal. The increase in the split Liberal voters has no 
impact on the Liberal vote because these voters continue to cast a ballot for the Liberal 
candidate. They do, however, increase the Conservative vote but the Conservative 
element of the increase in Liberal split votes, in this case 160 votes, is split between 
the Conservative candidates, increasing each of their totals by 80 votes. For ease of 




Table A-7: An illustrative election with three candidates 
 
 Party vote Plumpers Splits Total 
votes 
Liberal with two candidates 1740 4 160 1940 
Plumpers - 4 - 40 
New splitters (160)  160 0 
Conservative splitters - - 120 120 
Liberal splitters - - 40 40 
Liberal single candidate 1580 4 520 2140 
     
Conservative with two Liberals 1820 - - 1980 
New Liberal splitters - - 80 80 
Conservative with one Liberal 1820 - 80 2060 
 
Accordingly, it can be seen that split voting can have a significant impact on 
the election result such that, if the split voting rate remains the same, a single candidate 
will always do better than two candidates. Even if the split voting rate increases as a 
result of a single candidacy for one party, it must increase sufficiently to outweigh the 
gain made by a single candidate from previously split votes and to increase the 
opposition vote sufficiently to overcome the disadvantage the opposition have in that 
each candidate’s vote will increase by only 50% of the change. 
The likelihood of an increase in the split voting rate as a result of a single 
candidacy by one of the parties can be estimated from the results of contests for which 
we have vote counts. Cox notes that ‘one reason suggested by contemporaries for split 
voting in two-against-one contests was that the followers of the party putting up only 
one candidate had an incentive to use their second votes to help the lesser evil from the 
other party. He did find that ‘contemporaries were correct that the incentive to cast 
split votes in two-against-one contests was greater than in two-against-two contests’.63 
In support of this contention he notes that the mean split voting rate in the 594 of the 
three-candidate contests for which poll counts are available between 1832 and 1910 
was 17.1%. This statistic is, however, misleading in the context of the three general 
elections from 1868 to 1880, for the mean split voting rate in three-candidate contests 
for these elections was a much lower 5.6% compared to a mean split voting rate in 
four-candidate contests for the same elections of 3.5%, showing that for contests in 
this period the difference in the split voting rate between three-candidate contests and 
four candidate contests in two member constituencies was not great and, therefore, the 
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danger of losing because the supporters of the party putting up a single candidate gave 
their second votes to the rival party are overrated. 
A number of practical examples serve to illustrate that the single candidate 
strategy could be effective for a minority party in elections during the period. At the 
1874 general election Bury St Edmunds elected two Conservatives who had been 
opposed by two Liberals. The majority of the second placed Conservative, Hervey, 
over the top placed Liberal, Hardcastle, was 207 and the split voting rate was 5.11%. 
In 1880 the Liberals decided on a single candidate strategy with Hardcastle standing 
against the two incumbent Conservatives. This single candidature for the Liberals 
certainly does not seem to have arisen from any lack of organisation. Gladstone 
certainly thought they were well organised since he wrote to the local party secretary 
‘expressing the pleasure with which he hears of the hearty and united state of the 
Liberal party of the borough’.64 The constituency went to the polls on the 1st April and 
returned Hardcastle, the single Liberal candidate, at the head of the poll, with a 
majority over the other elected Conservative, Greene, of 260 votes. Despite the 
arguments of Hanham, the split voting rate had hardly changed, only rising from 
5.11% in 1874 to 5.46% in 1880. Hardcastle was undoubtedly assisted by the national 
swing to the Liberals at the 1880 general election but he also benefitted from the 
additional split votes which he longer shared with a fellow candidate and the 
Conservatives did not benefit from any increase in split voting arising from Liberal 
supporters using their second vote. Accordingly, the single party strategy was a 
complete success for the Liberals. At Chester in 1874 the Conservatives followed a 
similar strategy and Raikes, the single Conservative candidate, beat two Liberals into 
second and third place, with a majority over the leading Liberal of 222. The split 
voting rate was 4.10%. At the 1880 general election the Conservatives decided to field 
two candidates against two Liberals but were swept aside as the Liberal landslide 
gathered momentum. In this case the split voting rate did fall to 1.90%. At Lincoln in 
1874 the Conservatives fielded a single candidate against two Liberals and Henry 
Chaplin, the Conservative candidate, topped the poll with a majority of 200 over the 
leading Liberal. There was a relatively high split voting rate of 13.78% (521 electors) 
which undoubtedly benefitted Chaplin as a single candidate receiving all 521 split 
votes rather than sharing them with a colleague whilst Seely, his nearest Liberal 
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challenger failed to receive 139 of the split votes which went to Palmer, his fellow 
Liberal. Thus, Chaplin would have been defeated if he had needed to share the split 
votes with a second Conservative candidate. Lincoln was thus another success for the 
single party strategy.  
So far we have considered the issue of multi-member constituencies from the 
perspective of the political parties and their decisions over the number of candidates to 
field at contested elections. This has shown the importance of electors who did not 
vote on a straight party basis, either by plumping or by cross voting. It is now 
necessary to consider this issue from the perspective of the individual voter. Cox 
decided that ‘there was no necessary relationship between influence and split voting’.65 
He also discounted bribery as a source of split voting and went on to identify three 
categories of the electorate: the independent electorate – those whose votes were 
neither bought nor determined by influence; the dependent electorate – electors both of 
whose votes were controlled or bought by some other person; and the cross-pressured 
electorate – electors for whom only one of their votes was sold or influenced. 
He proposed a reasonable assumption that independent electors ‘sought to use 
their votes to elect the candidates they most preferred’.66 In order to consider the 
possible voting patterns of an independent elector in a two member seat with three 
candidates, two from one party and one from the other, he considered the position of a 
Conservative supporter in a constituency with two Conservative candidates (denoted 
by C1 and C2) and a single Liberal candidate (denoted by L1). It can be shown that in 
these circumstances ‘depending on how large the utility differentials between C1, C2 
and L are, and on the probabilities that the vote for C2 will defeat L or C1, it makes 
sense for a voter with these preferences to plump. For example, if the voter intensely 
prefers the arch-Tory views of C1 to the middle of the road Conservatism of C2, and 
does not see much difference between C2 and L, he is more likely to plump; and if the 
voter thinks it is certain that L will be elected, then the only possible effect of the vote 
for C2 is to defeat C1, and again he is more likely to plump. Similar points can be 
made about split voting. Another voter whose utility preferences can be summarised as 
L1>C1>C2 is more likely to cast a split vote for L and C1 on the basis that the larger 
the utility differential between C1 and C2 relative to that between C1 and L, and the 
larger the probability that a vote for C1 will defeat C2 relative to the probability that 
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such a vote will defeat L. For the purposes of this discussion, the important point is 
that both non-partisan plumping and split voting are more likely when voters perceive 
significant differences in the value (to themselves) of the election of candidates of the 
same party. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, any trend which reduces the 
differences which voters perceive between candidates of the same party will tend also 
to depress split voting and non-partisan plumping’.67 It further follows, given the 
importance of these rates to the success or otherwise of a single candidate strategy in 
two member constituencies that these strategies are more likely to be successful, and, 
therefore, more likely to be adopted, in these situations, namely where voters see 
significant differences between the two candidates of the majority party. 
 
                                                 
67
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Appendix II Selected electoral statistics 
 
The following tables give, for the three general elections, certain important electoral 
statistics which have been calculated in accordance with the methodology described in 
Appendix I. Constituencies have been categorised as described in the Definitions. 
 
Number of voters voting for each party 
    
 
1868 1874 1880 
Southern English Boroughs 
   0-1500 
   Conservative 12677 15095 19065 
Liberal 11968 13898 19059 
1500-7500 
   Conservative 50837 66746 71265 
Liberal 63580 66614 79937 
>7500 
   Conservative 74429 104248 139199 
Liberal 134249 105926 156725 
Southern English Boroughs – Total 
  Conservative 137943 186088 229529 
Liberal 209796 186437 255720 
Northern English Boroughs 
   0-1500 
   Conservative 4453 4118 5660 
Liberal 5191 5149 6907 
1500-7500 
   Conservative 37684 47623 50493 
Liberal 49221 55364 71070 
>7500 
   Conservative 110686 171290 181243 
Liberal 215352 232781 301230 
Northern English Boroughs - Total 
  Conservative 152823 223031 237395 
Liberal 269764 293293 379206 
Total English Boroughs 
   Conservative 290765 409119 466924 
Liberal 479560 479730 634925 
Southern English Counties 
   Conservative 98836 75463 117712 
Liberal 86972 53937 99887 
Northern English Counties 
   Conservative 105303 71232 136068 
Liberal 90265 67407 139048 
Total English Counties 
   Conservative 204139 146695 253780 
Liberal 177237 121343 238935 
Total South 
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Conservative 236778 261551 347240 
Liberal 296768 240374 355607 
Total North 
   Conservative 258126 294263 373463 
Liberal 360029 360699 518254 
Total England 
   Conservative 494904 555813 720703 
Liberal 656797 601073 873860 
Welsh Counties 
   Conservative 14286 14653 18381 
Liberal 12226 14229 23401 
Welsh Boroughs 
   Conservative 8382 13693 16543 
Liberal 25015 27228 25250 
Total Wales 
   Conservative 22668 28346 34924 
Liberal 37241 41457 48651 
Scottish Counties 
   Conservative 10853 18158 26489 
Liberal 17706 20816 33221 
Scottish Boroughs 
   Conservative 13132 31712 36310 
Liberal 70055 80481 101266 
Total Scotland 
   Conservative 23985 49870 62799 
Liberal 87761 101297 134487 
Great Britain Total 
   Conservative 541557 634028 818425 






Percentage share of the vote 
    
 
1868 1874 1880 
Southern English Boroughs 
   0-1500 
   Conservative 51.4% 52.1% 50.0% 
Liberal 48.6% 47.9% 50.0% 
1500-7500 
   Conservative 44.2% 50.0% 47.1% 
Liberal 55.8% 50.0% 52.9% 
>7500 
   Conservative 35.7% 49.6% 47.0% 
Liberal 64.3% 50.4% 53.0% 
Southern English Boroughs - Total 
  Conservative 39.7% 50.0% 47.3% 
Liberal 60.3% 54.0% 52.7% 
Northern English Boroughs 
   0-1500 
   Conservative 46.2% 44.4% 45.0% 
Liberal 53.8% 55.6% 55.0% 
1500-7500 
   Conservative 43.4% 46.2% 41.5% 
Liberal 56.6% 53.8% 58.5% 
>7500 
   Conservative 36.2% 43.2% 38.5% 
Liberal 63.8% 53.8% 61.5% 
Northern English Boroughs - Total 
  Conservative 36.2% 43.2% 38.5% 
Liberal 63.8% 56.8% 61.5% 
Total English Boroughs 
   Conservative 37.7% 46.0% 42.4% 
Liberal 62.3% 54.0% 57.6% 
Southern English Counties 
   Conservative 53.2% 58.3% 54.1% 
Liberal 46.8% 41.7% 45.9% 
Northern English Counties 
   Conservative 53.8% 51.4% 49.5% 
Liberal 46.2% 48.6% 50.5% 
Total English Counties 
   Conservative 53.5% 54.7% 51.5% 
Liberal 46.5% 45.3% 48.5% 
Total South 
   Conservative 44.4% 52.1% 49.4% 
Liberal 55.6% 47.9% 49.4% 
Total North 
   Conservative 41.8% 44.9% 41.9% 
Liberal 58.2% 55.1% 58.1% 
Total England 
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Conservative 43.0% 48.0% 45.2% 
Liberal 57.0% 52.0% 54.8% 
Welsh Counties 
   Conservative 53.9% 50.7% 44.0% 
Liberal 46.1% 49.3% 56.0% 
Welsh Boroughs 
   Conservative 25.1% 33.5% 39.6% 
Liberal 74.9% 66.5% 60.4% 
Total Wales 
   Conservative 37.8% 40.6% 41.8% 
Liberal 62.2% 59.4% 58.2% 
Scottish Counties 
   Conservative 38.0% 46.6% 44.4% 
Liberal 62.0% 53.4% 55.6% 
Scottish Boroughs 
   Conservative 15.8% 28.3% 26.4% 
Liberal 84.2% 71.7% 73.6% 
Total Scotland 
   Conservative 21.5% 33.0% 31.8% 
Liberal 78.5% 67.0% 68.2% 
Great Britain Total 
   Conservative 40.9% 46.0% 43.6% 







to and (from) the Conservatives 
    
  
1874 1880 
Southern English Boroughs 









Southern English Boroughs - Total 11.0% 10.7% 
Northern English Boroughs 









Northern English Boroughs - Total 4.1% 4.1% 
    Total English Boroughs 
 
8.4% -4.6% 
    Southern English Counties 
 
6.4% -4.4% 
Northern English Counties 
 
1.0% -5.0% 
Total English Counties 
 
3.6% -4.7% 






    Total England 
 
7.5% -4.6% 






    Total Wales 
 
6.6% -6.8% 






    Total Scotland 
 
7.8% -5.3% 








Appendix III Local party organisations in existence in the 1860s 
 
 
Conservative Working Men’s Associations in existence in the 1860s 
 






































































Oxford City 5328 


































Liberal Registration Associations in existence in the 1860s 
 





















Devonshire, North 9260 
Devonshire, South 8047 
Dover 3392 
Durham 1756 
Durham, South 9532 
Durham, North 10576 






Gloucestershire, East 8858 









Kent, East 13107 
Kent, West 8828 
Kidderminster 2323 
Lambeth 33377 
Lancashire, North 14399 
Lancashire, North-east 8649 
Lancashire, South-east 19340 




Lincolnshire, Mid 8694 
Lincolnshire, North 9436 









Norfolk, North 6432 
Norfolk, South 7709 
Norfolk, West 7062 
Northampton 6621 
Nottingham 14168 












Tower Hamlets 32546 
Wakefield 3627 






Yorkshire, North 19205 
Yorkshire, West Riding, North 16918 
Yorkshire, West Riding, South 19908 
 
Newspapers searched for evidence of Conservative Working Men’s Associations and 
Liberal Associations 1860 - 1869 
 
The Times Aberdeen Journal 
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Aldershot Military Gazette 
Alnwick Mercury 
Baner ac Amserau Cymru  
Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette 
Belfast Morning News 
Belfast News-Letter 
Berkshire Chronicle 










Bury and Norwich Post 
Bury Times 
Caledonian Mercury 
Cambridge Chronicle and Journal 












Derbyshire Times and Chesterfield 
Herald 
Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette 
Dorset County Chronicle 
Dover Express 
Dublin Evening Mail 
Dumfries and Galloway Standard 
Dundee Advertiser 
Dundee Courier 
Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser 
Dunfermline Press 
Dunfermline Saturday Press 
East London Observer 
Economist 






Exeter and Plymouth Gazette 
Exeter and Plymouth Gazette Daily 
Telegrams 














Hertford Mercury and Reformer 
Herts Guardian, Agricultural Journal, 
and General Advertiser 
Huddersfield Chronicle 
Hull Packet 
Illustrated Police News 
Ipswich Journal, The 
Isle of Man Times 













Liverpool Daily Post 
Liverpool Mercury 
Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper 
London Daily News 
London Standard 
Louth and North Lincolnshire 
Advertiser 
Luton Times and Advertiser 
Maidstone Telegraph 












North Devon Journal 





Pall Mall Gazette 
Perry’s Bankrupt Gazette 





Royal Cornwall Gazette 
Salisbury and Winchester Journal 
Salopian Journal 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph 
Sheffield Independent 
Sherborne Mercury 
Shields Daily Gazette 
Shoreditch Observer 
Somerset County Gazette 
South London Chronicle 
South London Press 
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Staffordshire Sentinel and Commercial 






Taunton Courier, and Western 
Advertiser 
Wells Journal 
West Briton and Cornwall Advertiser 
West Middlesex Advertiser and Family 
Journal 












Yorkshire Gazette  
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Appendix IV Counties and boroughs by category 
 























Salop, North (Shropshire) 











Yorkshire, West Riding, East 
Yorkshire, West Riding, North 
Yorkshire, West Riding, South 
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